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Preface 
Designing a contract is often more of an economic than a legal problem. A good 
contract protects parties against opportunistic behavior while providing 
motivation to cooperate. This is where economics and, especially contract theory, 
may prove helpful by enhancing our understanding of incentive issues. The 
purpose of this book is to provide specific contract tools which will help to write 
better contracts in real world environments. 
Concentrating on moral hazard literature, I have derived a tentative checklist 
for drafting contracts. This work is not complete. On the theoretical side, both the 
important literature on Adverse Selection and on Incomplete Information could 
not be covered. On the empirical side, this book strongly advocates casuistic work 
without actually providing any comprehensive case study. I am strongly aware of 
these shortcomings. 
Still, I think that this book makes a contribution toward filling an important 
gap arising from the obvious imbalance in literature between devising ever more 
sophisticated models and attempts to summarize and apply them. Having said this, 
I must acknowledge that the book is still very abstract. There are also passages 
which are more contrived than I would like them to be, but at the present stage I 
was not able to achieve more simplicity without avoiding the tricky issues. 
I still hope that the practical intent of this book becomes evident. Ina way, 
this aim is reflected by the relative prominence of methodological discussions. 
While in a specialized research environment such debates may be considered 
superfluous as the researchers in the field implicitly share the same 
methodological premises, this is not the case as soon as one is interested in 
applications. Most often, applied research requires entering into interdisciplinary 
dialogue. My own experience is that, in order to get such dialogue started, explicit 
knowledge of methodological choices is essential. 
This book is based on my dissertation at the Vienna University of 
Economics and Business Administration. I would like to express my thanks to my 
academic advisors Wilhelm Bilhler and Mikulas Luptacik. I am also especially 
grateful to Bernulf Bruckner for our many invaluable discussions and to Genia 
Schonbaumsfeld for her willingness to read and criticize early drafts of the 
philosophical part. These discussions helped to clarify many of the thoughts 
contained in this book. I also wish to thank Karim Medjad and Bernard Garette 
who first stimulated my interest in the economic analysis of contracts during my 
stay at HEC-Paris. Finally, I am very grateful to Stephen Hansen for agreeing to 
proof-read the manuscript, and for his many (not only stylistic) comments. All 
remaining errors are, of course, mine. 
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I Introduction 
1 The Contracting Problem 
Trade will only take place if each party feels certain that the counterparty honours 
its obligation once it has performed its part. It can only derive this certainty from 
an enforceable contract. In contracting, three problems have to be dealt with: The 
contract parameters must be defined, observed and a mechanism for enforcement 
provided. For every conceivable contract parameter, problems might arise on any 
one of these levels. Either they cannot be solved or at least not without cost. If, 
however, the problem of contracting is not solved, no trade will take place, 
resulting in a loss of welfare. Provisions for solving the contracting problem can 
therefore be valuable even if they come at a cost. 
Consider a principal who hires an agent to develop a marketing strategy for 
a certain product. One might think that what he cares for is to be able to sell more 
of the product at a possibly higher price. However, this is not exactly what the 
principal demands of the agent. If there is a boycott against the principal' s 
products or should a highly publicized blackmailing affect consumers' 
preferences for the good, the principal will suffer a loss. Will he blame this loss 
on the agent? Probably not. Not to be mistaken, the principal's aim ultimately is to 
sell more at a higher price. And he knows that in order to get there, he has to take 
action. Some of this action, though, may require specialized know-how or just 
time, which the principal does not have. He also knows that even if these tasks are 
performed, there is still some uncertainty about how things will turn out. He may 
ask himself whether he is willing to take this risk, or whether he would prefer to 
shed some of the risk; but the two questions of delegation via an agency 
relationship and risk management are a priori unrelated to each other. Therefore, 
when hiring a "marketing specialist", the principal really wants to make sure that 
he exerts effort and does everything a marketing specialist can do to boost sales. 
But if he cannot contract on effort ( or something related), no trade will occur. 
When trying to contract on effort, the first problem, however, can be to 
define what this contribution expected from the agent actually comprises. This 
will be especially difficult if the principal does not know the production function 
or, to put it differently, if he does not know the drivers of success or failure in this 
area. In particular, this will be true in settings where tasks require specialized 
knowledge and are non-routine. In such cases, it is likely that no reliable 
information based on prior experience exists, neither in the principal's 
organization nor readily available through simple research. But, even if the 
principal can define total contribution expected from the agent, he may very well 
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not be able to observe it. Maybe he can observe it at a cost by putting in place 
some kind of monitoring device. Possibly, he cannot observe it at all. 
Even if the principal can observe effort, this will not be enough. In order to 
contract on it, an agreement must also be enforceable. Consider the above 
example, wherein the company hires the marketing specialist. The marketing 
specialist visits the company's premises, spends time, produces a report, but, in 
the end, the company feels that he did not exert effort. Perhaps the company's 
managers have observed that the marketing specialist and his team were working 
on two projects at a time. The managers cannot prove that when they entered the 
consultants's on-site office the consultants seemed to behave strangely, quickly 
switching from one computer document to another, etc. Without entering into 
further details, it becomes clear that there are verifiable, objective "hard facts" on 
the side of the agent, but only elusive, subjective "soft facts" on the part of the 
principal. If the parties rely on the court system for enforcement, it is clear that 
there will be problems of enforcement for the principal. The concept of effort is 
too elusive for the court with its bias towards objectivity. In order for a 
contingency to be enforceable in court it must be verifiable, and in order to be 
verifiable it must be objective. Thus, the court enforcement mechanism sets 
constraints on the set of contingencies that can be used as performance criteria in 
a contract. 
This set of performance criteria can, of course, be expanded by introducing 
other enforcement mechanisms. First of all, the parties are free to choose any 
jurisdiction and any court in the world to settle disputes. There might be 
differences in quality and bias 1• Second, parties can resort to arbitrage, barring 
the recourse to courts (where possible). Arbitrageurs usually represent a third 
party that is more accustomed with the subject matter of the contract than 
unspecialized courts. So, they will probably be able to deal with "softer" 
contingencies, relying on their judgement and thereby making it possible to 
enlarge the set of contractible contingencies. 
But there is an even more radical alternative: One can try to put in place a 
self-enforcing mechanism which is able to enforce subjective performance 
measures that depend to a certain extent on the discretion of the parties involved. 
The basic problem of subjective performance measures is the following: If the 
decision of whether effort was exerted or not is left to one of the two parties, say, 
the principal, he will have the incentive to report that no effort was exerted. Thus 
he releases himself from his own obligations to pay the agreed-upon fee. In other 
1 It is said e.g. that a seller will always prefer Swiss law and a buyer German law. 
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words, he will have the incentive to renege in any event. So, any mechanism 
relying on subjective performance measures must adress this problem. 
One such self-enforcing mechanism is the tournament mechanism. Here, 
the principal, dealing with a group of agents, makes a verifiable pledge as to the 
total amount of bonus paid out to one agent or group of agents. However, the 
decision on what agent or group of agents receive the bonus is left at the 
discretion of the principal. This allows him to introduce judgement. The argument 
goes that, since the principal cannot save by reneging, he will live up to his 
obligation. This is true if he has at least a marginal preference for rewarding 
merit and keeping his promise and there are no side-payments2 from the agent 
to the principal3 which will cause the mechanism to break down. In fact, 
promotion can be seen as some sort of tournament mechanism. This mechanism 
can be used when dealing with many agents, or if one wants to reward relative 
overperformance and punish relative underperformance. 
Another self-enforcing mechanism is the reputation mechanism, which 
will be treated at length later in the analytic part of this thesis. Still, just to provide 
a taste of the argument: The idea is that if the principal or the agent reneges on 
their promises their reputation will suffer, not allowing them to do certain kinds of 
business in the future. This is surely the case with the specific counterparty, but 
also with other counterparties, if the news is spread. So, long-term reputation 
concerns may counterbalance the prospect of short-term gains on reneging. 
The principal must therefore be able 1) to define total contribution, 2) to 
observe it and 3) to enforce it. It can be seen from the above that, on each of these 
levels, problems might arise. Sometimes these problems can be solved at a cost, 
but sometimes they cannot be solved at all. In this case, the parties can only 
switch to alternative measures of performance. 
2 Applications 
Based on relatively recent developments in microeconomic theory, such as game 
theory and economics of information, contract theory has a wide range of 
applications. The design of incentive contracts within and between companies 
(e.g. with suppliers or sales partners), the structuring of financial transactions, the 
design of market structures, pricing and guarantee arrangements and the economic 
2 Side payments would induce a cooperative equilibrium in game theoretical terminology. 
3 Social relations and favours can play a part. 
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analysis of legal and other institutions are only a few possible examples. In 
contrast to the usual problem of optimization within constraints, contract theory is 
concerned with the optimization of constraints. When stuck in a setting where the 
interaction of people leads to suboptimal solutions, the challenge is to design 
contracts which allow them to reach better outcomes. 
3 Models of Contracting 
There are various kinds of contracting models. Different classifications exist, but 
none is universally recognized. The author tends to distinguish between models of 
"moral hazard", "adverse selection" and "incomplete information". Moral hazard 
problems arise if the agent can benefit from taking advantage of information 
asymmetry after the contract is concluded. This can come in the form of action 
that he can take which cannot be observed by the principal, or by information that, 
at a given point of the interaction, becomes available to the agent but not to the 
principal. Moral hazard problems therefore come in two variants: Moral hazard 
with hidden action and moral hazard with hidden information. Adverse selection 
models refer to asymmetric information before the contract is concluded. 
Sometimes models of moral hazard with hidden information are also regarded as 
problems of adverse selection. Possible strategies to overcome the adverse 
selection problem are signaling and screening. In the case of signaling, the agent 
is trying to send a credible signal revealing private information. This can be done 
by taking some kind of action which would cause a loss to the agent if he was not 
telling the truth. In the case of screening, it is the principal who, by offering a 
menu of different contracts, tries to extract information from the agents. Signaling 
and screening are sometimes treated as separate types of models. Models of 
incomplete contracts deal with the problem that contracts are often concluded 
knowing that not all possible contingencies are covered by the contract, because 
this would be either too expensive or impossible due to bounded rationality. 
Incomplete contracts are therefore often considered as belonging to "transaction 
cost economics", while moral hazard and adverse selection are considered as 
belonging to "economics of information" - the difference being that the first 
assumes less perfect rationality than the second. 
4 Obsession with Modeling Single Effects 
The literature on contracting is extensive and complex. A considerable investment 
of time has to be made to read articles which model only a tiny effect within the 
broader phenomenon of, say, moral hazard with hidden action. While 
simultaneous modeling of many effects is not sensible, as will be argued below, 
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modeling single effects is the right thing to do. However, little effort is given in 
trying to summarize the different effects and in trying to show how these can be 
applied to specific problems. Real-world problems usually comprise a multitude 
of effects. When assessing a contract between a company and its sales partners, 
there is usually both a moral hazard and an adverse selection problem. If the sales 
partners are not exclusive partners, there is the effect of many principals 
competing for the attention of one sales partner. Many other effects can probably 
be found in the specifics of a particular situation. It can, of course, be argued that 
some effects are more important than others which can subsequently be safely 
ignored; however, it would at least be good not to make a leap of faith but to 
carefully weigh different effects according to relevance. As will be argued later, 
this weighing should be done close to the specific problem. 
5 Methodological Reflection 
In order to apply contract theory to specific problems, it is not sufficient to 
summarize the different effects. The specific methodological problems of 
application also need to be discussed. In addition, although economic method is 
largely analytical and this approach is helpful, it must also be clear that there are 
other important sources for understanding contracts. As contracts like other 
institutions are the product of evolution, it is plausible to grant them the 
presumption of implicit wisdom. Contract theory is therefore a potentially 
multidisciplinary field combining the methods of economics, law, sociology, 
history, anthropology and psychology. 
Starting with some brief remarks on philosophy of science in general and 
then proceeding to a discussion of orthodox microeconomic methodology, this 
thesis will present the methodological foundations of contract theory. It will be 
argued that contract theory takes a microanalytical approach but can learn from 
the implicit wisdom of existing institutions if and insofar as they can be 
interpreted as the product of evolution. A mix of analytical models and casuistic 
work is expected to be most fruitful. 
6 A Note to the Reader 
Part II can be seen as an attempt by the author to come to terms with the 
epistemological foundations of science. Although in some respects it sets the stage 
for part III, it is clearly longer than needed for an economic monograph and is not 
necessary in order to follow the rest of the text. Although the analysis in part IV is 
only concerned with moral hazard with hidden action, the methodological 
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reflections in part III are much more general. The reason for this seeming 
imbalance is that this thesis is intended as both proposal and description of a 
research programme plus the realization of a tiny bit of it. So, the methodological 
discussion is meant to be an essential part of this thesis in its own right rather than 
just a preliminary exercise. Part V summarizes the result, provides a checklist for 
analysing contracts from the perspective of moral hazard and finally provides an 
outlook for further research. 
The author tries to insert many synoptic sections in order to make the text 
more readable than it was in earlier drafts. Each part opens with a complete 
overview. In the analytical part, hypotheses which are to be derived are stated at 
the beginning of the Section. At the end of each Section, results are discussed 
verbally without taking recourse to mathematical notation. This should make it 
possible for the non-technical reader to browse through the material while treating 
the analytical parts as black boxes. 
6 Alexander Stremitzer - 978-3-631-75400-9
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:25:38AM
via free access
II Epistemic Problems and Philosophy of Science 
1 Overview 
In Chapter 2 the objectives of economics as a science will be discussed. It will be 
stated that economics intends to derive conditional statements which tell people 
how they can interfere with the course of events. Economics therefore follows the 
positivist programme, although it does not fully take over positivist methodology. 
In Chapter 3 the fundamental question of what makes a theory scientific is 
raised. The traditional way of answering this question consists of calling a theory 
true because it is well founded. This leads to the question of the ultimate 
justification of science. 
Chapter 4 offers a brief overview of traditional attempts to solve the 
problem of absolute justification. For the sake of argument, criticism is presented 
from a radically sceptical perspective. Section 4.1 addresses the problem of the 
nature of reality, its relation to human beings and their consequences for human 
cognition. Starting from the concept of a preestablished meaning that reveals itself 
to human beings through rational thinking, the argument turns to another concept 
focusing more on the active constitution of reality by the perceiver. Yet, pursuing 
this argument in the sense of radical scepticism leads to fruitless solipsism. 
Additional assumptions about the human faculty of cognition and its 
commensurability with the (outside) world are needed. Reflecting the specific 
sources of human cognition, the controversy between empiricism and rationalism 
is briefly mentioned - pointing to the difficulties of both approaches. Finally, the 
concept of intersubjectivity is considered mentioning the tight relationship of this 
concept to anthropological assumptions. It is concluded that the very possibility of 
cognition requires assumptions that are not beyond doubt. Section 4.2 deals with 
strategies to derive scientific statements. If it is accepted that the human faculty of 
cognition depends on both sense-perception and rationality, the question is asked 
whether there exists a strategy that allows one to derive statements about reality 
which depend on simple, readily acceptable postulates. Such statements could 
then be regarded as being absolutely justified and intersubjectively valid. In this 
sense, inductivism, pragmatism and falsificationism are briefly discussed in 
consecutive Sub-Sections; although finally it must be said that the project of an 
absolute justification has so far failed. 
Chapter 5 discusses the consequences of this failure. Section 5 .1 addresses 
the argument that the impossibility of providing absolute justification leads to 
scepticism. However, failure to prove the existence of an absolute justification 
does not prove its non-existence. Therefore, scepticism is just one possible 
7 
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conclusion among others which will subsequently be argued to be highly 
inadequate on the grounds of its absurd consequences. Yet, as is pointed out in 
Section 5.2, rejecting scepticism is not tantamount to embracing dogmatism, 
which seems to have shown itself to be equally inappropriate. This is because 
dogmatism can be used to immunize any arbitrarily chosen premiss or statement, 
and also because it is an obstacle to scientific and methodological progress. 
Section 5.3 proposes common sense or intuition as a basis for arguing that some 
statements are better than others. After all, optimism may be justified by stating 
that the human way of viewing the world offers man at least some of the 
orientation he seeks. If no mechanism is found to settle disputes, however, this 
approach can lead to relativism. Two parties could disagree but both would cite 
common sense as the basis for their statement. Section 5.4 argues that, even if the 
concept of absolute truth is to be abandoned, the notion of analytical truth - which 
guarantees truth relative to premisses - is very meaningful. It is suggested that 
casting scientific statements in axiomatised versions offers methodological 
advantages. The consequences of such an approach are to divide the scientific 
argument into two spheres: The sphere of analytical truth and the sphere of 
discussion about first principles. 
Chapter 6 addresses the question of the cognitive status of such a first 
principle. Section 6.1 explores the consequences of relativism that follows if the 
decision on the first principle is made by everybody on his own, without any 
additional structure. It is argued that the consistency rule embodied in the 
axiomatised approach ensures a minimum of objectivity, but that science then 
loses its claim as a peaceful and impersonal arbiter if it is not possible to move 
beyond relativism. Overcoming relativism is therefore the objective of Section 
6.2. It is argued that the notion of the validity of scientific statements is tightly 
associated with the idea of objectivity common to human beings. Therefore, 
analogous to the categorical imperative in ethics, the crucial point is that science 
is conducted with the intent to serve the idea of truth - although no enforceable 
mechanism can be devised that would overcome relativism in practice. It is 
argued, then, for pragmatic reasons to allow for relative anarchism in science and 
to only require consistency and openness for criticism as formal criteria. 
Chapter 7 lays down the methodological implications of the previous 
discussion. It proposes to structure science into two spheres: The sphere of first 
principles and the sphere of analytical truth. It is argued that such an axiomatised 
approach facilitates communication and increases transparency. 
8 
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2 The Objectives of Science 
Economics, as it is understood in this thesis, ultimately has a practical purpose4• 
Its aim is neither to provide identity5 nor to be a logical pastime6• "It wants to 
know in order to predict and to predict in order to interfere"7• This objective is 
taken from the positivist programme8• If nature can be harnessed for human ends, 
why should not the same be possible with social relations for the sake of social 
welfare? Theory thus serves purposeful human action9• In the words of Mises, 
4 This is quite in line with the positivist programme which wanted to transfer the approach of the 
natural sciences to social sciences. It is based on the philosophy of Bacon (see e.g. Schiilein, 
Reitze (2002), p. 61) and turned against Hegel. Also, Hobbes (Mader (1992a), p. 176) 
explicitly calls for a practical intention. 
5 As is arguably the case for arts and humanities (see Mader (1992a), p. 53); The distinction 
between "sciences" on the one hand and "arts and humanities" on the other is relevant as it has 
methodological consequences. The method of the natural sciences is clearly positivist, 
empirical and ahistoric. The method of arts and humanities is the "historical method", also 
referred to as "Hermeneutics" or "Verstehen". Their objective is to study the different 
expressions of human existence as they are revealed in different situations and conditions 
during history. The only thing that remains more or less the same in this flow of events is the 
human being. So by studying history, literature and art in the past and present, human beings 
try to answer the eternal question of"who they are". 
6 As is arguably the case for some ill-conceived economic models; see Hutchison (1994), p. 29 
Comte (1852), p. 91, "Savoir pour prevoir afin de pourvoir", translated by the author. 
8 For an introductory chapter on the philosophy of Comte, see e.g. Mader (1992b), pp. 142-151. 
In the Anglo-Saxon tradition the word "science" is used synonymous with "natural sciences". 
The term "social sciences" is also common, but only underscores social sciences· ambition to 
emulate the natural sciences. Therefore the positivist programme in philosophy which 
advocates the transfer of the method of natural sciences to the study of social relations (hoping 
to bring about progress to social relations similar to the impressive progress achieved in the 
realm of technology) is engraved into terminology. This is different in the German tradition. 
The term "Wissenschaft" is used in a much wider sense: It traditionally comprises the natural 
sciences ("Naturwissenschaft"), arts and humanities ("Geisteswissenschaft" or 
"Humanwissenschaft"), mathematics and logic ("Formalwissenschaft") and the social sciences 
("Sozialwissenschaft"). In the German tradition the social sciences and especially economics 
methodologically stand somewhere in between arts and humanities and natural sciences. This 
does not matter so much for the objectives of economics, which were stated to be clearly in 
line with the positivist programme. But especially, when it comes to the problem of controlled 
experiment in economics and to the discussion of methodological individualism, the method of 
"Verstehen" arguably plays an important role (see: part II of the text). There is a very rich 
discussion of this in the German tradition, and it is interesting to see how the now dominant 
Anglo-Saxon tradition appears a bit uneasy when addressing this question because of its 
terminological self-imprisonment. 
9 Of course purposeful action presupposes a human being with a free will whose needs and 
wants are taken as an absolute given, and who thinks in categories of teleology - taken as the 
only possible human way of thinking. If this is too reductionist for some readers, they are 
9 
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"The archetype of causality research was: Where and how must I interfere in 
order to divert the course of events [ ... ] He searches for the regularity of the law, 
because he wants to interfere. Only later was this search more extensively 
interpreted by metaphysics as a search after the ultimate cause of being and 
existence"'0• The argument, that such a prediction is not possible in economics 11 , 
is not accepted but it is acknowledged that precision and margins of error are 
certainly higher for economic predictions than for other sciences12• However, 
"assuming that prediction [ ... ] remains an inevitable activity in real-world 
economic life"13, the question is not whether the status of economic predictions is 
high in an absolute sense, but rather if there is "any margin of advantage 
economists may or may not have over non-economists in providing less 
inaccurate predictions"14. In the view of the author there is no way economics 
could circumvent this challenge. 
Theory, in the positivist sense, can therefore be defined as the teleological 
element which is necessarily part of every purposeful human action. This 
definition allows the casting of theories as an integral part of practical life. It 
also allows for deriving a formal property of theory as something ultimately 
concerned with predictions in the form of conditional statements15• 
3 What makes Science scientific? 
If the objective of science is to support purposeful human action it seems natural 
to assume that a scientific theory's quality should be judged by its reliability. A 
theory is reliable if expectations based upon it are not frustrated. This raises the 
question of what distinguishes a reliable or "good" theory from an unreliable or 
"bad" theory. This is essentially the question about the foundation of science 16• A 
good theory would be a "scientific" theory because of a set of properties that 
makes it distinct from a bad theory, which could be just any statement. These 
referred to part II where it is shown that these concerns can be accommodated by adopting a 
wide notion of human preferences. 
10 Mises (1949), p. 22 ( 4.ed. 1996) 
11 see McCloskey (1985), p. 15 cit. Hutchison (1994), p. 29 
12 see Hutchison (1994), p. 29 
13 Hutchison (1994), p. 32 
14 Hutchison ( 1994), p. 32 
15 Conditionals have an "if-then structure". 
16 Science is simply taken as a short-cut for: "The sum of all endeavours to create good theory." 
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properties are traditionally truth in the sense of correspondence with reality17, or at 
least objectivity18 • 
Scientific knowledge is traditionally argued to be well-founded and 
therefore true 19• Well-founded knowledge is supposed to derive its truth from an 
underlying cause; but where does this cause derive its truth from? It can easily be 
seen that this approach leads to infinite regression if one does not ultimately find 
an absolute justification on which all further knowledge is based. This search for 
the absolute justification has traditionally been the task of philosophy. Once 
firmly established, it would ideally prescribe a method leading directly from this 
ultimate source of truth to scientific knowledge in any field of interest. 
So, why bother about these questions in an economic monograph? Would it 
not be more efficient (and much easier) to stop thinking about methodology20 and 
just follow the method prescribed by philosophy of science? After all, every 
reasonable man would be forced to agree that everything one comes up with is 
scientific and therefore true. Unfortunately, it is not that easy. The reason is that 
philosophy has proven far more successful at showing the shortcomings of 
different approaches to the problem of the ultimate justification than it has been at 
solving the problem itself. Like it or not, it simply is a brute fact that at present 
there is no compelling solution to the problem of absolute justification. The next 
Chapter will take a radically sceptical perspective in order to to drive this point 
home. 
4 Absolute Justification 
4.1 Basic Concepts of Cognition 
One concept of cognition is to assume that there is a preestablished objective 
meaning in the world. As human beings are part of this world, they also have 
access to its meaning. This can be thought of as a more or less passive process. 
The meaning is already there. It has only to be received. Often, this meaning is 
assumed to have a certain structure. It could, therefore, e.g. have a rational 
17 This is the Aristotelian definition (see Mader (1993a), p. 126). The same concept is somewhat 
more weakly expressed as "approximation of reality"; see Chalmers (1994), pp. 151-159 
18 Although there are different shades to the notion of objectivity, the essential element is 
independence from the will of the perceiving subject in one way or another. 
19 see Mader(1992a), p. 13 
20 especially for an economist who advocates separation of labour 
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structure. Then, of course, human beings only have access to it, if they engage in 
rational thinking as opposed to believing in irrational myth. This was arguably the 
programme of the early days of western philosophy. These assumptions, however, 
now appear very speculative. 
Alternatively, one could give up the notion of a preestablished meaning and 
argue that there will never be any meaning independent of its human perceiver. 
So, meaning is the product of an active act of constitution in the perceiver's mind. 
It follows that the world cannot be known "as such" but can only be known "for 
us". 
But why for us? What do I know of the meaning the world has to others? 
Can I be sure that there is a world? Can I be sure that there are others? The last 
bulwark against scepticism of this kind is my own self-consciousness21 ; but 
impressive as this certainty may seem, it also reveals itself as being quite useless. 
Nothing interesting concerning how to access reality can be derived from it. 
Descartes e.g. proposed rational thinking and suggested that God could not be so 
heartless as to bestow man with such a faculty if it was not in order to help him 
find orientation in the world. Once again, one has to make a leap of faith. Of 
course, modem thinkers would probably not refer to God but rather to biological 
evolution to support their optimism that the human faculty of cognition actually 
provides some orientation in the world. 
Descartes' obsession with rational thinking as the only source of the human 
faculty of cognition is also controversial. There is clearly another obvious 
candidate: sense perception. The controversy between empiricism22 and 
rationalism will not be thoroughly discussed. It shall only be mentioned that both 
approaches encounter difficulties: The rationalist approach has difficulty 
explaining the body-spirit relationship - a problem if an outside world is 
assumed. The empiricist approach, on the other hand, has difficulty explaining 
how cognition is possible without any preestablished notions and ideas23 • 
By saying that there is no meaning independent of the perceiver, one seems 
to elegantly circumvent the tricky question of whether there is an outside world. 
21 This is Descartes' famous cogito principle. 
22 in its extreme form also called sensualism 
23 By transgressing from perception to a statement of perception, a notional apparatus is needed. 
12 
It could be objected that the notional apparatus itself is derived from perception. Someone 
could observe several objects, look for a common characteristic and give it a name; but merely 
the choice of different objects on the basis of a common characteristic presupposes the notion 
of that characteristic. 
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In fact, one could say that the question does not matter. For even if there was an 
outside world, nothing could be said about it. Still, there remains the experience 
that things are happening against my will. So, in the reality that my mind 
constructs, there is an element which I cannot control at will, which is - in a sense 
- objective. Whether there is an outside world or not, I must still be confident that 
there is a basic commensurability between my thinking and this objective element 
which I will call the world. This is basically an ontological assumption very close 
to the structural symmetry assumed above. 
The world can be further differentiated thusly: There is an animated and 
unanimated world. The animated world is comprised of entities that I consider 
similar to myself and which I will call my fellow human beings. When I say that 
my fellow human beings are similar to myself, I am also saying that there is a set 
of relevant characteristics which make them and me human. This is, I make 
anthropologic assumptions. If there is a specifically human faculty of cognition, a 
specifically human way to think and to sense, then there is also a specifically 
human way to view the world. This means that, in so far as the construction I 
make is a specifically human construction, it is necessary and therefore objective 
in the sense ofintersubjectivity. 
In conclusion, it can be said that assumptions have to be made in order to 
allow for the possibility of cognition. These assumptions seem very subtle and it 
does not seem reasonable to oppose them. Strictly speaking, however, they are 
not beyond doubt. From arguably the only bulwark against scepticism, human 
self-consciousness, nothing interesting can be derived. The list of additional 
assumptions usually includes an ontological assumption which claims some 
degree of commensurability between human thinking and the world, and an 
anthropological assumption which states some specifically human faculty of 
cognition. 
4.2 Strategies to derive scientific statements 
4.2.1 Introduction 
So far, fundamental concepts of cognition have been discussed, and it has been 
seen that the possibility of cognition cannot, strictly speaking, be taken for 
granted. However, even if it is assumed that such fundamental assumptions as 
those discussed above are met, nothing has been said about specific strategies to 
derive scientific statements. 
If human cognition, as was suggested above, is divided into sense 
perception and rationality, and if the spontaneity of the intelligible "I" is such that 
13 
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sensual perception functions in terms of space and time and rationality in terms of 
causality and teleology, cognition is possible24• Perceptions in space and time 
would be initially subjective. In order for them to become objective they would 
have to be further structured25• This would happen in terms of causality and 
teleology as the only categories available to the human mind. Either everybody 
who is exposed to the same data would come up with exactly the same answer, or 
- regarding cognition as a reflexive activity - can at least be convinced to agree to 
the same answer in an ideal discourse situation26• Therefore, the following 
Subsection will explore if there exist strategies which lead to theories that every 
reasonable human being would be forced to accept (intersubjectivity). Once again, 
a radically sceptical perspective is taken when criticising the different approaches. 
4.2.2 lnductivism 
One approach would be to consider a statement to be scientific if it is either 
directly founded on observation or derived by means of deductive logic from such 
a statement27• If it is accepted that deductive logic is the epitome of human 
structured thinking, the question is how is it possible to derive general statements 
from observation. For inductivism the answer is "inductive logic". It plainly states 
that if it is observed that A follows B in many instances and under many different 
conditions, then A always follows B28• Of course, there are two key assumptions: 
If such a statement is to be considered objectively valid it must be assumed that 
both perception and "inductive logic" are objectively valid. Accordingly, 
objections are raised against both "inductive logic" and the status of perception. 
Russell's example of the desolate fate of the "inductivist turkey"29 displays 
the argument that inductive logic cannot be proven by deductive logic: Suppose a 
turkey observes that he is fed regularly at a certain time. As he is scientifically 
minded he does not want to jump to conclusions and observes this behaviour 
under many different conditions and circumstances. Still, when he recognizes that 
24 see Mader ( 1992a), p. 207. This is in the spirit of Kant. 
25 see Mader ( 1992a), p. 207 
26 The requirement of honest dialogue is posed by Kant in "Was ist Aufkliirung" (I 784) for the 
"Public use of reason" and taken up by Apel, Habermas and Schniidelbach in their efforts to 
transform transcendental philosophy to "Universalpragmatik". See Mader (1993), p. 220-220 
27 This is the methodological programme of neo-positivism of the "Wiener Kreis"; see Mader 
(1992b), p. 154; Chalmers (I 994), p. 38 
28 see Chalmers (I 994), p. 19 
29 see Bertrand Russell cit. Chalmers (I 994), p. 20 
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he is fed at the same time independent of weather conditions on all days and 
during all seasons, he finally acknowledges this as a scientific regularity. The 
following day, he is slaughtered. Attempts to save the inductivist approach by 
taking recourse to the notion of probability30 will not help. If it is acknowledged 
that there is an unlimited potential set of possible perceptions, this probability will 
always tend toward zero. If a limited set of perceptions is assumed, this is an 
additional assumption. A possible reason why this should be the case is that nature 
is assumed to be stable and structurally simple, so that as more and more 
observations are available, statistical inferences can be made with ever smaller 
marginal error. 
Also the status of perception in inductivism is subject to criticism. On the 
one hand, perception is in doubt as a sure source of scientific knowledge3'. On the 
other hand, perception is shown to be theory-laden32 • Perceptions are therefore 
subject to the same distortions as theory. In the first case it is maintained that there 
are different experiences of perception, because these are the product of physical 
and psychological factors which can both differ among individuals. In the second 
case - the argument that perception is theory-laden - it is pointed out that by 
transgressing from perception to a statement of perception33 a notional apparatus is 
used which is itself based on theory34 • Induction does not create a direct link 
between perception and statement, but only a link between a statement of 
perception and a more general statement35• In addition, perceptions are always 
guided by theory as for the necessary choice between relevant and irrelevant36 • 
Inductivism as a practical approach to conducting science depends on the 
assumption that perception and "inductive logic" are objectively valid. These 
30 see Chalmers (I 994 ), p. 24 
31 see Chalmers (1994 ), p. 28f 
32 see Chalmers (1994), p. 32f 
33 see Chalmers (I 994), p. 33£: Every statement presupposes to be communicated by language or 
by some other means. 
34 see Section Il4. l 
35 Insofar as it is structurally close to deduction also linking different kinds of statements. 
36 see Chalmers (1994), p. 36f: Observations and experiments are always guided by theory, or at 
least should be. Otherwise, only lists of aimless observations would be drawn up. It is, 
however, the objective of science to test, extend and improve theories. There is always a 
hypothesis that is tested. Observations which are considered to be unequivocally irrelevant will 
therefore be excluded. Yet in order to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant observations, 
a guiding theory is needed. If the theory from which the guidelines to conduct the experiment 
were derived is false, relevant factors could be mistakenly excluded. 
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assumptions are not beyond doubt. They therefore do not ensure that the 
construction of the world obtained by using inductivist methodology is 
intersubjectively valid: It is possible for reasonable people to disagree. 
4.2.3 Pragmatism - Foundation by Method 
Another way to justify a scientific statement is to argue that it was derived by a 
successful method. This argument could be used to support inductivism or any 
other method claimed to have been successful. 
This argument has no problem in accepting the idea that both sensual 
perception and thinking are fallible; but it assumes that these errors can be 
corrected by observing methodological prescriptions37 • Bacon e.g. distinguishes 
the following common sources of distortion of human cognition: The prejudice of 
subjectivity (idola specus), of language (idola fori), of tradition (idola theatri) and 
a certain degree of incommensurability of the human faculty of cognition and the 
structure of reality (idola tribus )38• The scientific method makes sure that sensual 
perception, which is the basis for induction and is thus the ultimate source of 
knowledge, is "supported" by controlled experiment. In addition, it provides rules 
to "guide" thinking. By prescribing a common method for everybody, subjectivity 
of cognition is reduced. Language is reformed in order to fit the necessity of 
exactness in science. History and tradition are explicitly excluded as an obstacle 
to cognition. 
The quality of a scientific statement therefore depends on the method that 
was used to derive it, more specifically on the suitability of this method to correct 
the sources of distortion in thinking and perception; but why should one method 
be better than another in this respect? One possible justification could be that 
theories, derived using a specific method, are generally successful in explaining 
and predicting things. But can past success be used as an appraisal criterion? 
Essentially, it is claimed that something that was successful in many different 
cases will be successful in all or at least in most cases. But this is exactly what is 
claimed by "inductive logic". 
Ultimately, foundation by method is shown to be based on "inductive 
logic" which can be justified neither by deductive logic19 nor by experience'0• 
Therefore, it is either circular or makes an additional assumption41 • 
37 see Mader (1992a), p. 197 
38 see Mader (1993), pp. 168-171; Schiilein, Reitze (2002), pp. 60-64 
39 see David Humes proof of circularity: in e.g. Chalmers (1994), S. 20 
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4.2.4 Falsificationism 
Attempts to provide an ultimate justification for scientific statements can be 
credited rather for prematurely cutting off the argument by referring to some 
"metaphysical insight" which cannot be proven than for pushing it to a point 
where no further criticism is possible. Ironically, this is also true for the 
inductivist and pragmatic foundation of science, the very attempt that was meant 
to fight back metaphysics. 
Even if no unassailable justification can be given for any scientific 
statement, however, it does not mean that all theories are equal; but why should 
any particular theory be better than any other, if both are not proven true? One 
reason why this might be the case was put forward by Popper who stressed the 
"logical asymmetry between falsification and verification"42 • If a general 
statement is claimed to be universally true in space and time, while at the same 
time it has already failed in the past to explain and predict reality, it cannot be 
true. If, however, something has worked in the past, while it cannot be said that it 
is true, there is still a possibility for it to be true43 • Of course, this presupposes a 
world functioning according to rules which are stable over time - but even if 
stability is admitted, only the problems of "inductivist logic" are circumvented. 
The problem of the status of perception remains. Therefore, falsificationism does 
not solve the epistemological problems, but - as will be argued below (IIl6.9) -
rather has a different emphasis compared to verificationism as an approach to 
practical research. 
Falsificationism as an attempt to establish an absolute criterion to 
distinguish between good and bad theory depends on the metaphysical 
assumption of stability and the objectivity of perception. Therefore, 
epistemological problems are not completely solved. 
4.2.5 Conclusion 
It has been shown that there is no possibility to absolutely justify a theory. The 
argument was only cursorily sketched, but seen logically, any attempt to justify a 
theory can be shown to reside on a metaphysical assumption, fall prey to 
40 see Russell's story of the inductivist turkey, in e.g. Chalmers (1994), S. 20 
41 In the case of inductivism such an additional assumption, neither based on deductive logic nor 
on experience, violates the very standards inductivism proclaims. 
42 see Blaug (I 994), p. 111 
43 see Chalmers ( 1994 ), p. 41 
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circularity or lead to infinite regression44• This is an important result, because it 
dispels the widespread prejudice among scientists and the layman alike that 
science always depended on simple postulates of reason like deductive logic. Kant 
calls this the dialectic of reason: Reason demands a firm ground but seems unable 
to provide it45 • 
5 Beyond Absolute Justification 
5.1 Against Scepticism 
It should be acknowledged here that, at present, one cannot distinguish between 
good and bad theory by means of simple commonly accepted postulates of 
reason46• This result is relevant in so far as it can and was indeed argued that - in 
the absence of absolute justification - it could not be proven that science was any 
more than a mere habit47 or psychological illusion. Consequently, suspending 
judgement48 would be the best thing for a wise man to do. This is the position of a 
radical sceptic. 
In order to avoid misunderstandings: The result that no logical foundation of 
science has been found does not prove that it does not exist, neither does it prove 
that even if there is no logical foundation of science there might not be an 
objective foundation in other-than-logical terms. Therefore, it is a fallacy to argue 
that scepticism necessarily follows from the failure to find a convincing argument 
for a logical foundation of science. The sceptical position is just one possible 
hypothesis among others, regarding the fact that no logical foundation of science 
has been found. So, the question is: Why should it be an adequate hypothesis? It 
will be seen that the adequacy of scepticism is highly questionable. 
First of all, the sceptical position is self-contradicting. If nothing can be 
known, how can it be known that nothing can be known? Of course, this problem 
can be solved by arguing that this is an exception to the rule. Yet, this seems 
rather arbitrary. Moreover, withholding judgement seems to be inadequate in the 
44 see Albert, H. ( 1968), p. 13 
45 see Mader (1993a), p. 209-213 
46 In Aristotelian terminology: There seem to be no a priori synthetic truths. 
47 see Hume cit. Schilllein, Reitze (2002), p. 77 
48 It must be stressed that this is not the opinion of Hume but of the Pyrrhonians. Hume is a 
pragmatic confining his scepticism to theory. 
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light of the inevitability of action in practical Iife49• By taking purposeful action, 
people implicitly or explicitly choose a theory. It could be argued from the 
sceptical point of view that there is no benefit to consciously taking this decision. 
Indeed, the big merit of philosophy could be to free people from the psychological 
illusion that science is superior to anything else. Yet, it could be argued that even 
a psychological illusion has its merit. People demand theories that best calm the 
mental unease they experience concerning the uncertainty of the outcomes of 
their actions. Conscious decision-making would provide the individual with self-
transparency, continuity and identity. It is ultimately preferences which decide 
which theory somebody chooses. By choosing a theory, people reveal preferences. 
If it is assumed that there is some stability in their preferences, scientists could 
engage in tailoring scientific statements to these preferences. By doing so, 
scientists are delivering utility to people. Is this not enough of a justification to 
pursue science50? But then, the ultimate criterion for science would be subjective 
appeal. If this is actually all that science ultimately boils down to, one might be 
tempted to agree with the sceptical prescription of withholding judgement. 
But consider the following thought experiment: If the radical sceptic is 
taken by his word he should be willing to withhold judgement if asked whether he 
wants to swallow a cyanide capsule or not and agree to toss coins instead. Yet, it 
is difficult to imagine many people exhibiting the extent of fatalism implied by 
the sceptical position in a similar situation. Anything else, however, would lead to 
a divorce of philosophical conviction and practical decisions51 • 
The radical sceptical (pyrrhonic) position - if immunized against the self-
contradiction argument - can be neither proven nor disproved. Yet, its 
prescription of withholding judgement appears utterly inadequate in the light of 
the inevitability of theory choice in practical decision making. It leads either 
(improbably) to fatalism or to a divorce of philosophical conviction and 
practical decision making. 
5.2 Dogmatism 
As already implied by the above thought experiment, most people would expect 
that swallowing a cyanide capsule is not advisable. Similarly, people would 
distrust a theory based on the statement that stones rise upwards instead of falling 
49 see Hume cit. Mader ( 1992a), S. 20 I 
so In this case it is difficult to judge where scepticism ends and relativism starts. 
51 Hume the foremost proponent of theoretical scepticism advocated pragmatism in real life. 
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down when "dropped"; but when trying to find a principle of truth they are 
confronted with the whole range of sceptical arguments. 
Taking a dogmatic stance, it could simply be stated that some theories are 
better than others. After all, this is what motivated the search for the ultimate 
justification in the first place. Only later did epistemology try to find its principle. 
If it has not succeed thus far, it should try a little harder. Curiously, it is quite 
common to continue to think about science as if it was based on something that 
could ultimately be traced back to simple postulates of reason which are self-
evident. Once again, technically speaking, all which has been said does not mean 
that this is impossible. It just says that all attempts to do so up to now have failed. 
Still, the question once more is if the dogmatic position is adequate. 
The practical consequence of dogmatism is to immunize arbitrarily chosen 
methodological prescriptions against criticism. If they are not chosen arbitrarily, 
but because of some specific criterion ( e.g. because they are "obviously true"), the 
question is why no attempt is made to convince others of the quality of this 
criterion. As a prescription for conducting science, dogmatism leads to a self-
contradiction given the fact that science and philosophy of science evolved over 
time. Dogmatism is dogmatic about things that would never have evolved if 
dogmatism had been the scientific strategy. Of course, it could unconvincingly be 
argued that an ahistoric state has now been reached. 
Dogmatism is immunizing arbitrarily-chosen methodological prescriptions 
against criticism. Moreover, it somewhat arbitrarily assumes that an ahistorical 
state has been reached. 
5.3 Common Sense 
Discussing the merit of methodological prescriptions, it could be argued that, as 
common sense has it, some theories are better than others. So, why not name 
"common sense" the basis of science? The argument could go something like this: 
Common sense suggests that a theory that has been successful in the past which is 
plausibly constructed and logically consistent is better than a theory for which all 
of this does not apply. If this is supplemented by the claim that there exists a 
specifically human intuition, a new basis for intersubjectivity of scientific 
statements could be found. In addition, it could be argued that it is justified to be 
optimistic that a common-sense judgement is not too far off the mark because 
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there is no way how mankind should have survived without a minimum of 
orientation in the world52 • 
Yet, the problem remains: How should conflicts between two parties be 
settled? Experience shows this supposedly common human feature to lead people 
almost anywhere. There was a time when people considered empirical evidence to 
be intuitively unimportant and then the demier cri. 
Still, the convenience of the rational approach and its confidence that 
anything could be ultimately traced back to basic postulates of reason was based 
on its claim that anybody, when exposed to the same data, either comes up with 
the same conclusion or can be convinced to do so; any other option would be 
called irrational. In truth, however, if human intuitive sensitivity - the whole of 
human rationality, emotions, senses - is the criterion, two parties could very well 
disagree with both citing common sense as the basis for their statement. 
If two parties could disagree and still cite common sense as the basis for 
their statement, this approach practically leads to relativism. 
5.4 An Axiomatic Approach 
If an absolute justification for scientific statements could have been given, such 
statements could have been labelled "absolutely true". Although such an absolute 
justification was not found, it was said that some statements could still be better 
than others. However, the common way to think about truth is that something is 
either true or false. There is no place for a middle ground. To say that something 
is more true or less flawed than something else and therefore an approximation of 
absolute truth amounts to a masquerade upholding the word, devoid of its idea; 
but as the notion of absolute truth thus defined is an idea without any practical 
relevance, it should be abandoned. Note that the author is quite pedantic about his 
insistence on abandoning this notion and not redefining it. This is because the 
notion of analytical truth, which can be thought of as truth relative to stated 
premises, is very meaningful. There is truth in the sense that everybody is forced 
to agree in the formal sciences. This very important concept should not become 
blurred by association with some newly defined "absolute truth" capturing elusive 
concepts like "superior intuitive appeal". It is therefore suggested to abandon the 
notion of absolute truth in order to preserve the notion of analytical truth. 
52 see II4.l 
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In the previous Section it was deplored that if everybody could cite his 
intuition as the basis for valid scientific statements, science would ultimately be 
based on subjective choice. This relativist position has been summed up by 
Feyerabend in the catchy phrase "Anything goes!"53 • But this does not necessarily 
mean that any form of objectivity54 must be abandoned. It could be formally 
required that a scientific statement is consistent with self-proclaimed criteria. 
Therefore, even if the criteria for theory appraisal were ultimately subjective, one 
would actually restrain arbitrariness. Any potential critic could axiomatize the 
proposed argument and then check for consistency. If the consistency rule is 
violated, the proposed statement can be rejected. By axiomatising an argument, 
the critic is actually creating an explicit set of axioms which constitute the first 
principle of the argument. Anything else can be derived analytically. 
Alternatively, one could imagine a group of people explicitly setting a 
number of basic assumptions. They could fix the criteria that they consider to be 
necessary for accepting a statement to be valid. They could engage in discussions. 
Each party could try to persuade others that a given criterion was vital. Yet, in the 
end, if they agree on a set of axioms, a possible conflict about whether a specific 
statement is valid or not can be analytically settled. This is extremely convenient. 
Therefore, it is proposed for reasons of methodological convenience that a 
scientific argument should be divided into two spheres: The sphere of first 
principles, where discussions can be held in terms of persuasion, and a second 
sphere where statements can be discussed analytically and categories of true and 
false reapply in the sense that any reasonable man can be forced to agree. This 
increases transparency of the argument and thereby invites criticism. It also 
facilitates communication about scientific statements as it allows locating any 
possible source of disagreement. If people disagree about first principles, they can 
try to persuade each other. They might eventually decide to refuse entering further 
discussion, but if people disagree on the implications of first principles they can 
be confident in resolving the disagreement by means of logic. 
In order to facilitate criticism of and communication on theory, it is 
proposed that theories be presented in an axiomatized form. 
53 see Chalmers (1994), p. 135 
54 Recall that objectivity was defined as anything independent of the will, restraining arbitrariness 
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6 The First Principle55 : Its Cognitive Status 
6.1 Consequences of Relativism 
The consistency requirement allows for cnttc1sm relative to self-proclaimed 
criteria. However, if relativism is not overcome, science loses its role as a 
peaceful arbiter. The question is, therefore, whether or not it is possible to move 
beyond relativism. The consistency requirement which is embodied by the 
axiomatic approach helped to preserve a minimum of objective validity by forcing 
people to live up to explicitly or implicitly self-stated criteria; but what can be 
said about the first principle itself? 
The first principle could be set by everybody individually, but what happens 
if people disagree? A traditional claim of Enlightenment was that every 
disagreement can be rationally solved. So, even if disagreements will not always 
be solved peacefully, peaceful settlement is possible in principle without one party 
dominating the other. There is order, but at the same time perfect freedom. The 
only law that has to be followed is the natural law56 of reason which is impersonal. 
Of course, people could try to reach an agreement based on the first principle, but 
as soon as agreement is not unanimous there is domination57 • Another traditional 
claim of Enlightenment was that it is not important that people agree, but rather 
why. One person could be right while everybody else is wrong, just because the 
position of this one person derives its truth from the absolute source of truth. This 
position must also be given up if it is accepted that there is no absolute 
justification of science. These are very painful implications. 
If objectivity is restricted to the sphere of analytical truth58, disputes relative 
to but not about first principle can be settled. There would be no way to overcome 
the fundamental relativism of the first principle. This raises the question of 
whether or not it is possible to move beyond relative truth. 
The consistency requirement allows for criticism relative to self-
proclaimed criteria. But if relativism is not overcome, science loses its role as a 
peaceful arbiter. Therefore, the question is whether it is possible to move beyond 
relativism. 
55 This can also be a set of first principles, but in the following the term will be used in its 
singular. The mathematically-minded reader can think ofit as a vector. 
56 see Mader (I 992a), p. 102 
57 ··was gemeinsam akzeptiert wird, das ist wahr, wenn und solange es akzeptiert wird" see Platon 
Theaitetos cit. Mader ( 1993a), p. 102. - "What is commonly accepted is true, if and as long as 
it is accepted." (translation by the author) 
58 Confining law to the sphere of analytical truth is at the heart of Kelsen's "Pure Theory of Law". 
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6.2 Overcoming Relativism 
At least the possibility to move beyond relativism cannot be excluded. Even if it is 
not possible to logically distinguish between good and bad theories, this does not 
mean that such a distinction does not exist. The point is in the spirit of Kant: The 
existence of absolute truth cannot be proven, but also the non-existence of 
absolute truth cannot be proven. This opens the way for metaphysical 
speculation. In the following, it shall be attempted to describe what appears to be 
part of a common human idea of truth. 
Every attempt to capture what seems to be the essence of truth takes 
recourse to parables and a form of "reasoning" which is characterized by an 
increased level of vagueness. In any case it is distinct from logical reasoning. 
This is the reason why it was suggested to keep the two spheres separated. 
Interpreted in this way they would correspond to Kant's distinction of 
"V emunftwissen" and "V erstandeswissen". 
The starting point is expressed by a paradox of Pascal describing men as 
"incapable of absolute ignorance and of certain knowledge"59. The line 
parable60 of Plato defines the relationship between synthetic truth and analytical 
truth as equivalent to the relationship between a true opinion and an appearance. 
Popper uses the metaphor that several piles in a swamp can carry a construction, 
although they do not reach firm ground61 • Is it possible to further specify this 
"knowledge" which appears to be a phenomenon between scepticism and 
dogmatism? 
It appears that a central idea is objectivity in the sense of something which 
limits arbitrariness. This becomes obvious in the habit to think from first 
principle, but also in the reluctance to accept any first principle to be the same. 
Logical consistency, empirical evidence and plausibility62 appear to be tightly 
associated to the idea of objectivity. 
59 Pascal (1993), Pensee 434 : « incapables d'ignorer absolument et de savoir certainement » 
60 Plato (1993), Poleteia VI, pp. 194-198 
61 Science does not rest upon rock-bottom. The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, 
above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven down from above 
into the swamp, but not down to any natural or 'given' base; and when we cease our attempts to 
drive our piles into a deeper layer, it is not because we have reached firm ground. We simply 
stop when we are satisfied that they are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time 
being. (Popper (1959), p. 111) 
62 It can be argued that plausibility is a category of introspection. 
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A major argument against favouring one first principle over the other was 
that the danger exists to only formalize some form of psychological illusion 
based on emotionally satisfying fiction. It seems, however, that the idea of 
objectivity is not based on direct intuitive appeal or attractiveness. Quite to the 
contrary, there rather seems to be a suspicion of what looks true at first glance and 
a willingness to accept indirect arguments. 
Consider the following example: If somebody promises to make sure that 
the "farmer would receive more for his grain, the worker pay less for his bread, 
and the baker and grocer have a higher wholesale and retail margin,"63 a scientist 
will reject this promise because it is logically inconsistent although it appeals to 
wishful thinking. Or consider the classic argument of Hayek concerning 
collectivism: It could be argued that collectivism just needs a benevolent dictator 
to make just decisions. Of course, given the justness of the decision64, central 
planning should be implemented. Thus the seemingly uncoordinated activities of 
people can be rationally coordinated. The wealth of nations can be maximized by 
avoiding the inefficiencies of the market mechanism. However, it can be argued 
that it is very difficult to get all the relevant information in time. On the other 
hand, the market mechanism as a decentralized mechanism can be argued to be 
more efficient under many circumstances in processing information because 
decisions are made by persons holding the relevant information (e.g. consumers 
knowing their preferences or entrepreneurs knowing their cost structure). The case 
for central planning is another example of an argument which is very attractive at 
first sight: First of all, one must only flatter oneself into believing that oneself is 
an example of a benevolent dictator. Then, one would certainly find many 
instances where the market system produces unjust and inefficient results. Finally, 
rational planning is very attractive because it suits very well the human mind -
especially the mind of the intellectual - which prefers putting things in order. 
Still, for all its first-hand attractiveness, even socialist scientists like Lange are 
said to have acknowledged the problem of information, although they thought it 
could be solved. 
It could be argued that there is a difference between a merely subjective 
decision and a subjective decision, which is made in intellectual honesty against 
the backdrop of the idea of truth65 • So, the point is not the fact that people decide 
63 see Drucker (1939), p. 18 citing a speech of Goebbels in 1932 
64 The problem of aggregation of preferences is ignored here 
65 The idea is taken from Kant, who considered "ideas" not to be constitutive but regulative of 
scientific knowledge. See Mader (1993a), p. 211. This distinction is also what Rousseau had in 
mind when opposing the "volonte de tous" and the "volonte generale" (see: Rousseau ( 1762), 
pp. 30f). 
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but that they do it with an "opinio veritatis" following a kind of "categorical 
imperative"66• It is suggested that this common idea of truth allows a certain 
communication context. Honest dialogue could be a means to expose objective 
criteria analoguous to rational discourse. Yet, this time it is more comprehensive 
and not just limited to the categories of reason. 
James suggests that an acting individual should show a "will to belief'67 for 
the premisses that he establishes. If he does not, the theories will do nothing to 
calm the mental unease of acting. In practice, this will often lead to dogmatism. It 
is suggested here that the premiss should indeed reflect a belief. One cannot take 
for granted that others will always share this belief, but one has experienced that 
by exchanging views with others one is persuading and is being persuaded. So, it 
should be an open belief drawing not only from personal experience but also from 
the experiences of others by means of dialogue against the backdrop of the 
common idea of truth. Still, this dialogue should not be a modus toward achieving 
a convention that is automatically binding for everybody. It is more a chance to 
learn from others. 
This last point is problematic and requires judgement. It addresses the 
problem of whether there is a bridge, which the author thinks exists, between the 
idea of truth and the practical possibility of overcoming relativism by a set of 
enforceable rules. One can either solve the problem by accepting that the ultimate 
yardstick is set by convention of the relevant community, or one preserves the 
anarchist quality of science by providing no such ultimate yardstick. If people 
could credibly commit68 to always deciding in good faith, mechanisms as majority 
rule or a broad consensus within the relevant community could indeed be viable, 
helping to filter out individual distortions due to error. But there is no way to 
credibly commit to this69• Any mechanism designed to state rules which are 
binding for everybody therefore balances the need for order against the potential 
blindness or corruption of power. In scientific practice, it is argued that a strong 
dose of anarchism should be accepted as long as the individual scientist offers a 
consistent argument and is open for criticism. This is because of the pragmatic 
66 Kant (1786), Was heiBt: Sich im Denken orientieren. See Mader (1993a), p. 218 
67 This is the title ofa famous essay by James (1896). 
68 The problem of commitment is the fundamental problem of contract theory that will be treated 
in this thesis. 
69 Indeed, the religious concept of a world hereafter and divine justice can be seen as an 
"institution" dealing with this problem. 
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consideration that, in science, more than anywhere else, too much order does 
more harm than too little70• 
The impossibility to either prove or disprove the existence of an absolute 
justification opens the way for metaphysical speculation. This is distinctly 
different from logical reasoning. The notion of scientific validity, however, 
appears to be tightly associated with the idea of objectivity which is different 
from direct emotional appeal. Therefore, it is argued, it is possible to distinguish 
between merely subjective decisions and decisions made against the backdrop of 
the common idea o/truth. This common idea offers a basis/or communication. 
Yet, the willingness to engage in honest dialogue is merely a moral imperative 
and cannot be taken for granted. Hence, no set of enforceable rules can expose 
"truth'm. Any mechanism that is designed to state rules which are binding for 
everybody therefore balances the need for order against the potential blindness 
or corruption of power. In scientific practice, it is argued that a strong dose of 
anarchism should be accepted, as long as the individual scientist offers a 
consistent argument and is open for criticism. 
7 Methodological Implications 
The author was careful to choose phrases like "sharing thoughts" or "inviting 
others to join" when referring to the discussions about first principle. This might 
look unnecessarily contrived. The intention, however, is clear: having shown that 
an absolute basis for science in the strictest sense of the word cannot be proven, 
some ground shall be regained beyond the notion of relative truth. 
The suggested approach of dividing science into two spheres has the 
following properties: A scientist is willing to name his premisses and thereby 
invites criticism. This provides at least some objectivity in the sense that he 
accepts principles which might ultimately become effective against his will. His 
premisses are nothing else than the criteria relative to which he is willing to have 
his theories accepted and refuted72 • 
70 The need for order is arguably higher in society as a whole, yet the concept of classical 
liberalism can be viewed as arguing for restraint. 
71 The quotation marks are set, in relation to the earlier argument that the notion of absolute truth 
should be abandoned. 
72 Of course in many cases, these premisses will be shared by the scientific community. 
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In order to facilitate theory choice of the individual, it is good to be 
transparent about the methodological principles underlying the theory that is 
developed. It is then possible for an individual to easily find out if a theory 
corresponds to his standards. A scientist does not claim to possess absolute truth. 
He is not dogmatic. Still he may cling to his principles and refuse to engage into 
discussion with someone, who does not share the same principles if he cannot be 
persuaded to adopt them. 
By structuring science into two spheres, it is possible to locate where people 
differ in their views. If it is in the sphere of first principle, one will refuse to 
quarrel in terms of logic. One can only persuade73 • However, if one is in 
agreement with first principle one can be confident in resolving the disagreement 
by means of impersonal rules74. This is the merit of keeping the two spheres 
separated. It is a structured approach to facilitate communication about theories. 
By replacing the ultimate justification with a first principle, it is possible 
to give the idea of the critical role of science at least some room. The scientific 
undertaking will be based on certain principles. Relative to these principles, 
there is a meaning to "true" and ''false". These principles are made 
transparent This facilitates the decision process of whether or not to accept a 
given theory, but it also provides a structured approach for locating the area of 
dissent. By explicitly referring to the foundation of science as a first principle, 
one is also taking a firm stand against dogmatism. Discussion of principles can 
only be led in terms of persuasion and not in terms of logic. It is proposed here 
that only these formal criteria be used to distinguish science from non-science. 
73 In the sense of Pascal's "The art of persuasion" see e.g. Mader (1993a), pp. 190f 
74 It is always possible to set axioms such that no problem ofunderdetermination arises. 
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III The Method of Economics and Contract Theory 
1 Introduction 
Looking at economic dissertations, one realises that most authors, visibly harassed 
when asked to reflect methodology, take a "let's get it over with" approach. They 
usually declare themselves ardent supporters of this or that author of methodology 
(mostly resulting in Popperian falsificationism in its most naive form), bravely 
ignoring all criticism that has been voiced against it, and - what is even more 
astonishing - ignoring altogether the newly found champion in methodology 
when pursuing their own research. 
Here, the intention is to not only lay down the principles which are to 
govern this dissertation, but also to share some thoughts about the merits of this 
choice. By the way, this choice is not at all revolutionary. It is well within the 
framework of traditional choices made by many other scientists in the field of 
microeconomics, although some differences might become apparent along the 
way. 
Kuhn argues that one should not waste time thinking too much about 
methodology. Discussions about methodology rather pertain to a fledgling 
science. Normally, most scientists within a given discipline have only tacit 
knowledge of the paradigm they are using, confident that their socialization within 
the scientific community they grew up in will intuitively lead them in the most 
generally accepted direction. It can be argued that this is better than to study the 
philosophical premisses of the paradigm, leaving more time for actual problem 
solving75 • 
If, however, there are competing paradigms within a discipline, or if one 
intends to oppose mainstream thinking, it is justified and even necessary to work 
out explicitly what that paradigm is all about. Kuhn circumvents this by declaring 
consensus on method76 constitutive for science. Therefore, by Kuhn's definition, it 
is highly controversial whether social sciences are scientific at all. It is sometimes 
claimed that in social sciences every scientist is following his own approach. This 
is certainly an exaggeration. Yet, it is true that there is no generally accepted 
paradigm77 • Methodological considerations are therefore more important in the 
social sciences than in the natural sciences. 
75 Chalmers (1994), p. 94f 
76 Chalmers (1994), p. 92f 
77 Although the rational paradigm of economics might be an exception. 
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As a general rule, explicitly stating one's methodological premisses is all 
the more important if it is not clear what methodology to expect. This is why a 
social scientist has to take a methodological stand. 
2 Overview 
Chapter 3 argues that economic theory, although allowing for some 
instrumentalism, relies relatively more on the realism of its assumptions than is 
the case for the natural sciences. This is because predictions are difficult to test 
and every social phenomenon can ultimately be traced back to human action, 
opening the way for methodological individualism. 
This approach and its specifically economic formulation in terms of rational 
choice are discussed in Chapter 4. Defending rational choice, it ultimately 
becomes an empirically empty template, largely upheld for its analytical 
convenience (4.2.). Section 4.3 makes a brief remark on the properties of game 
theory stressing that its structural rigidity can be overcome by taking an 
instrumentalist approach to assumptions. Although economics as a formal science 
can be defended (4.4), realism of assumptions becomes an issue as soon as 
statements about reality are made 4.6. Economics is, in principle, not dogmatic 
about the traditional homo oeconomicus assumption, which assumes pursuit of 
wealth, opportunism and a high degree of rationality. Still, Section 4. 7 discusses 
reasons why one should be cautious to modify them. In defense of homo 
oeconomicus it can be shown that phenomena sometimes only appear to 
contradict assumptions. Moreover, there may be specific situations where these 
assumptions fit quite well, while still falling short of capturing the whole of 
human behaviour. Finally, it could be argued that, especially in institutional 
matters like contracts, it is safer to assume a worst case scenario. A prominent 
criticism of the homo oeconomicus approach is the high degree of rationality 
assumed. Section 4.8 presents an evolutionary argument which plausibly argues 
that agents in institutional economics can be assumed, in some situations, to act 
unconsciously rational. A methodological programme can be derived from this 
evolutionary approach. Shortly discussing Popper's piecemeal social engineering 
in Section 4.9, the objection of historicism against evolutionary concepts is 
subsequently addressed in Section 4.10. 
Chapter 5 makes the case for using introspection in the social sciences in 
addition to empirical methods. Section 5.1 provides the fundamental rationale: 
Social sciences ultimately deal with human action. Contrary to the natural 
sciences wherein observation exhausts the phenomenon, human action has both an 
external and an internal dimension which cannot be readily observed. In addition, 
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by looking at the internal dimension of human action one can hope to find more 
stability. Section 5.2 discusses the inflexibility of blackbox models of human 
behaviour compared to introspection using an example from management theory. 
In Section 5.3, it is argued that introspection should be considered an independent 
source of cognition and not just a heuristic. This contradicts the common view 
that, in the end, only rigorous empirical testing can corroborate a theory. Section 
5.4 exposes the fact that the method of introspection rides on the assumption that 
there is a strong commensurability between the human perceiver and the 
perceived object, in this case human action. Mises' a priorism draws very extreme 
conclusions from this assumption which are generally regarded as dogmatic. 
Finally, the method of psychological reduction is discussed, hinting at the 
different cognitive status of statements derived by this method as opposed to 
statements of the "exact" sciences. 
The issue of the use of empirical methods and the problems associated 
therein is treated in Chapter 6. Section 6.2 mentions two approaches which can be 
seen as attempts to defend a unified approach to science (monism). Both dispute 
introspection as being an independent source of knowledge in the social sciences. 
The first is the theory of revealed preferences, which claims that the preference 
structure of individuals can - in principle - be derived by systematic observation. 
The second is panphysicalism, which claims that everything including 
psychological processes will eventually be explained in terms of the natural 
sciences. It is agued that both approaches are not very fruitful. Section 6.3 briefly 
mentions the role of interviews as a method to explore people's motivation, but 
also to get hold of facts or make use of their judgement. The last point can be seen 
as a "market test" for theories. Although controlled experiment has a rather 
limited role in economics, it is argued in Section 6.4 that it can be used to test 
microanalytical models, and especially models of human behaviour. Alternatively 
economics resorts to historical experiment (6.5). In order to make different 
situations comparable and to isolate relevant factors, econometric techniques can 
be used; but the multitude of factors and the presence of very little data of low 
quality make the use of such techniques problematic. Section 6.6 therefore argues 
in favour of focusing less on the single, formal and decisive test, but rather on a 
broad range of informal empirical evidence. Having discussed the problems of 
testing predictions in economics by either controlled experiment or econometrics, 
it is argued that the validity of economic models relies to a large extent on their 
microanalytical foundation. Yet, economic phenomena are the product of many 
interrelated effects. Section 6. 7 argues, that due to potentially countervailing 
qualitative effects, aggregate predictions can only be "derived" by making use of 
judgement. Aggregation sometimes seems totally unfeasible. In an attempt to 
avoid both the problem of aggregation and the problem of the multitude of 
relevant factors, Section 6.8 explores the possibility of focusing on relationships 
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on a macrolevel (between aggregated entities); but even this approach cannot 
completely ignore demands for providing at least some micro-foundation. The 
closing Section 6.9 revisits the issue of verificationism vs. falsificationism. This 
time, however, the focus is not on epistemological problems, as in part I but on 
the different normative prescriptions that can be derived from these two 
approaches. 
Chapter 7 deals with applied microeconomics. Applied theory is sometimes 
seen as an art rather than a science. It is argued in Section 7.1 that applied theory 
indeed has a different cognitive status than pure science. But this does not mean 
that pure science and applied science should be separated as two entirely different 
subjects. It is also vigorously disputed that pure science is useless in the social 
sciences. Applied science is rather judgement within an objective framework, 
while pure science is the attempt to provide this framework knowing that it will be 
applied. Yet, this distinction is not as clear-cut as it might seem. In Section 7 .2, it 
is argued that there is a convergence between microeconomic contract theory 
based on recent microeconomic developments such as economics of information 
and game theory and German "Betriebswirtschaftslehre", which traditionally is an 
interdisciplinary theory of the firm rather than just "management theory". 
The objective of Chapter 8 is to discuss the approach of optimal contract 
design. Section 8.1 defines the problem: Institutional design in general examines 
the choice of constraints rather than the choice within constraints. Stuck in a 
situation where they only achieve sub-optimal outcome, contracting parties set 
constraints which will allow them to achieve higher levels of outcome. Solutions 
are obtained by an exercise of comparative institutional analysis 8.2 or by more 
general control theory models. The problem favours microanalytical treatment 
8.3. As contracting is complex, a major problem will be to find a reasonable level 
of detail. Theories risk being either too general or too specific. It is argued that the 
best approach is to switch from the very abstract to the casuistic leaving out the 
intractible middle ground 8.4. 
The closing Chapter 9 shares some thoughts on the relationship between 
theory and practical life. It is argued that theory and practical action are 
structurally the same. Therefore, the gap between theorists and practitioners is a 
problem of different time horizons and a willingness on the part of theorists to 
engage in the study of very abstract fundamental problems which do not directly 
lead to better technologies. It is suggested that in some fields the potential value 
of theory is higher than in others. Still, some unnecessary barriers exist like e.g. 
the theorist's frequent neglect in making theories more robust to imprecise 
information. 
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3 Instrumentalism vs. Realism 
3.1 Introduction 
The question of whether there is an outside world is deemed irrelevant by some 
rationalists because nothing can be said about it. Yet, there is a simple story which 
illustrates why brushing aside this question seems problematic: Imagine someone 
running trough a "forest". He would like to take the shortest way and runs in a 
straight line. He eventually hits an obstacle. It is not necessary to be able to define 
or even name the obstacle (although he will probably call it "tree"). The point is 
that he is running into "something" and that this "something" is independent of 
his will or knowledge78 • It is this encounter with things independent of one's will 
which makes such a strong case for realism. 
Different approaches concerning the relationship between the human 
construction79 and the world as it is differ to the extent to which they require 
correspondence between the two spheres80• For scientists subscribing to 
representative realism, which is realism in its strictest form, it is not enough that 
the single statements derived from a theory or a model are true. A theory or model 
will only be accepted if its individual elements are true, i.e. correspond to 
something in the real world. This idea of truth is referred to as the 
"correspondence theory of truth". Thus, every element of the model is actually 
seen to be a representation of something real. A structural symmetry between 
reality and its model is required: Reality and a good model are supposed to be 
isomorphic. 
The extreme counter position referred to as instrumentalism maintains that 
only empirical success of a theory's implication counts no matter which 
assumptions a theory is based on. The terms in which a theory is formulated 
depend only on their suitability to organise thinking81 • A main argument against 
instrumentalism in this extreme form is that it does not explain why one should be 
interested in experiments. If theory only links perceptions, why should it be 
78 The presentation of the basic distinction between realism and instrumentalism is taken from 
Chalmers (1994), p. 163 
79 As was already argued, what the human mind takes as reality is actually a construction of the 
human mind itself. 
80 see Chalmers (1994), pp. 147f. 
81 see Chalmers (1994), p. 149 
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attempted to predict novel facts and then to test them82? Irrelevance of 
assumptions in economics was most forcibly argued by Friedman83 • 
One particular problem poses itself whenever empirical success of a theory 
stands in contrast to its unrealistic or at least arcane assumptions. Should a 
successful theory be discarded because it does not meet the standards of 
representative realism? So, the question really is: On which levels should a good 
theory be consistent with empirical evidence, just in its conclusions or all the way 
from assumptions to conclusions? 
A rather unspectacular interpretation of instrumentalism which needs no 
further discussion is the simple statement that every theory necessarily is an 
abstraction of reality. Some variables are included and some are left out implying 
that a judgement is made about the relevance of different variables. There is broad 
consensus that abstraction is a feature of theory. Even Friedman, having 
presented a reductio ad absurdum of slavishly descriptive realism acknowledges 
that "the notion of a completely realistic theory is in part a straw man"84 and 
therefore not worth being argued against. Any attempt to match reality in its 
complexity is certain to "render a theory utterly useless"85• 
However, the allegation of unrealistic assumptions could also refer to 
models, which are based on statistically derived entities with no visible 
connection to the problem. For instance, it is possible that share price models 
based on some statistical variables yield better predictive results than models 
which are based on fundamental or macroeconomic variables with larger intuitive 
explanatory power, although it is unclear why86• 
In the natural sciences, it frequently happens that two models have good 
predictive success despite their incompatible assumptions. This is the case for 
Newtonian mechanics, the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics87• This is 
82 Bhaskar, R. (1975) cit. Chalmers (1994), p. 154fand p. 161 
83 see Friedman (I 966), pp. 1-16, 30-47 
84 Friedman ( 1966), p. 32 
85 Friedman ( 1966), p. 32 
86 see Connor ( 1995) 
87 Chalmers attributes the use of this example to Kuhn and Feyerabend. see Chalmers (1994), p. 
162 
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also the case for several models in electrical engineering and optics88 • To make 
matters worse, none of the models is superior to the others for all purposes. There 
are, in fact, circumstances where one of these models has better predictive power 
than the others. So, there is the old problem: If the realist sticks to his view of 
science he must renounce the use of theories that yield practical results. Often he 
would still hold on to his view but use the theory nonetheless. Unfortunately, this 
divorce of theory and practice is quite common. 
A milder version of realism called non-representative realism89 addresses 
this problem. It does not claim an isomorphic relationship between reality and the 
model. It does not even require models to be compatible in their assumptions. It 
does, however, require them not to contradict each other in their predictions if 
they overlap. If there is some contradiction it requires the divergence to be 
systematic, i.e. it wants there to be a correction rule which is able to transform 
predictions of one model into the predictions of the other90• 
3.2 Natural vs. Social Sciences91 
It will be argued here that in the social sciences it is more important for 
assumptions to be realistic to a certain extent than in the natural sciences. For one 
thing it will in some instances be quite difficult in economics to test predictions92 • 
This is different in natural sciences where controlled experiments are frequently 
88 Some models are based on the idea that there are electromagnetic fields. Others assume a 
substance called aether and still others rely on a concept of flowing electrons (see Chalmers 
(1994), p. 164). The same applies for optics. Some models rely on a particle flow concept, 
others assume light waves. These models are clearly incompatible in a realist framework. Light 
cannot at the same time consist of flowing particles and travel in waves. See Chalmers (1994), 
S. 156 
89 see Chalmers ( 1994 ), pp. 161-165 
90 A prominent example where this could be achieved is the relationship between Newtonian 
physics and Einstein's theory of relativity. Newtonian physics can, in many cases, be seen as a 
pretty good approximation to theory of relativity in their respective predictions. 
91 It is argued that this distinction is meaningful, even if it is not mentioned in most text books. 
"The reason is simple: The hegemony of American social sciences in the post-Second World 
War period has wiped the slate clean of any trace of an operant distinction between the 
Naturwissenschajien and the Geisteswissenschafien."(Mirowski (1994), p. 54). Mirowski 
continues - in the pages following - to give an overview of the different layers of this 
discussion. The author's presentation in this dissertation is largely influenced by v. Mises 
(1949) 
92 see Caldwell ( 1994 ), p. 146; He claims that also Blaug and Hausman agree on this point. 
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readily available. Therefore, social sciences can rely relatively less on empirical 
testing of overall predictions. 
This has been vigorously disputed by Friedman: "The difficulty in the social 
sciences of getting new evidence [ ... ] and of judging its conformity with the 
implications of the hypothesis makes it tempting to suppose that other, more 
readily available, evidence is equally relevant to the validity of the hypothesis - to 
suppose that hypotheses have not only "implications" but also "assumptions" and 
that the conformity of these "assumptions" to "reality" is a test of the validity of 
the hypothesis different from or additional to the test by implications. This widely 
held view is fundamentally wrong and productive of much mischief."93 
Friedman offers a number of arguments that are meant to support his view. 
The first argument simply reiterates the truism that a theory in order to be useful 
"abstracts the common and crucial elements from the mass of complex and 
detailed circumstances surrounding the phenomena"94• But as Friedman himself 
earlier acknowledges that nobody seriously advocates slavish realism, this 
argument is irrelevant and will not be further discussed. 
The second argument claims that "the two supposedly independent tests [ ... 
on the level of assumptions and on the level of implications] reduce to one test"95 • 
This is because "the relevant question to ask about the "assumptions" of a theory 
is not whether they are descriptively "realistic", for they never are, but whether 
they are sufficiently good approximations for the purpose at hand. And this 
question can be answered only by seeing whether the theory works, which means 
whether it yields sufficiently accurate predictions."96 Yet, Friedman does not take 
sufficiently into account that there is not only a negative reason for increased 
reliance on the realism of assumptions due to difficulties in testing, but there also 
is also a positive argument for why realism is more important in social sciences 
than in the natural sciences: 
Consider an example of optics97 : There are models which interpret light in 
terms of particle flow and others in terms of waves. Yet, nobody has seen these 
waves or particles. They are merely narratives helping to organize thoughts. One 
93 Friedman (1966), p. 14 
94 Friedman (I 966), p. I 4 
95 Friedman (I 966), p. 15 
96 Friedman (1966), p. I 5 
97 see footnote 88 
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can therefore easily live with the fact that light is interpreted in different terms 
depending on the situation. As the realism attributed to assumptions is indeed very 
limited, the only thing that will be demanded is a correction rule or workable 
delineation of the scope of application of the respective model 98• This is, however, 
different in the social sciences. It is an irrefutable fact that all social phenomena, 
however complex, are the product of individual human action99• Human action 
exists, and one has some very clear ideas about it. This is the rationale of 
methodological individualism where predictions are derived by aggregating 
models of human behaviour100• 
What most people advocating "realism of assumptions" actually claim is 
that they favour assumptions that yield plausible implications on the level of 
human behaviour. They do not claim to provide an accurate description of the 
psychological process within the human brain. Later on, it will also be seen that 
for reasons of analytical tractability some instrumentalism in modeling is 
accepted101 • For instance, it is possible in game theory to model behaviour where 
individuals differently process the same information by assuming that they 
process information identically but have different information. Thus, in order to 
keep assumptions about information processing simple, it is assumed that they are 
exposed to different information. This is an instrumentalist idea. But on the level 
of the behavioural model, realism is preserved. 
Friedman's argument that there is only "one test" is ill-conceived because 
implications arise on the level of human behaviour as well as on the level of 
aggregated predictions. Representative realism is therefore viable in economics on 
the level of human behaviour. Thus, in the natural sciences the requirement for 
realistic assumptions will be lower than in the social sciences. One only has to 
point to Friedman 's argument that the question whether "the magnitude of 
businessmen's costs" or the "color of their eyes" is more important for their 
decisions can only be tested "by prediction"102 to see that he utterly ignores the 
possibility of introspection: If the author asks himself whether he would make 
98 This is in the spirit ofnon-representative realism. 
99 Mises ( 1949), p. 43 
100 see Hausman (1994), p. 208: "The only methodological principle governing economics and 
the other social sciences for which one finds much explicit argument is methodological 
individualism - the insistence that explanatory laws in economics concern features of human 
beings." 
101 as long as it can be argued to be innocuous 
102 Friedman ( 1966), pp. 32f 
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business decisions based on the colour of his eyes he would not have to resort to 
prediction and experiment to answer this question. 
Moreover, Friedman argues that the question of what is "realistic enough"103 
and what is too unrealistic can only be answered by considering the phenomenon 
that shall be explained. He cites the vacuum assumption104 which is appropriate 
when throwing a stone but less appropriate when throwing a feather. Maki 
criticizes that the vacuum assumption is not a peripheral assumption of the model 
whereas profit maximization which Friedman has in mind is a core assumption of 
economics. So, the correct analogy would have been between profit maximization 
and gravitational attraction. But it is difficult to see how the argument could be 
upheld in this setting105 • 
In addition, Friedman's argument implicitly resides on an unbounded 
empirical optimism assuming that tests can ultimately attain unambiguous results. 
His concessions to the contrary106 thus reduce to pure lip service. It is an 
unbalanced conclusion to say that realism of assumptions should be abandoned 
because of methodological difficulties, when at the same time the problems of 
empirical testing are largely ignored. Why should it be abandoned to assume that 
altruism will play a larger role within families than among businessmen; or that 
information asymmetry with respect to legal competence is higher between a 
private client and a lawyer than between a lawyer and a company101? Just because 
some "test" on the basis of poor data (and economic data is always poor data!) 
suggests that this information does not matter? 
A final point is that, although every social phenomenon can ultimately be 
traced back to human action, it does not mean that methodological 
individualism is the only way to come to conclusions. Generally speaking, it is 
also possible to discern patterns of behaviour on an aggregated level 108• Yet, in 
103 Friedman (1966), pp. 41 
104 That air resistance can be abstracted from in most cases. 
105 "Friedman's mistake was to defend the core assumption of profit maximization by appealing to 
an analogy between it and the vacuum assumption, which is a peripheral assumption. The 
correct analogy would be between it and the core assumption of the gravitational attraction of 
the earth." (Maki (1994), p. 146) 
106 see Friedman ( 1966), p. 40 
107 A large company probably boasts a sophisticated legal department and just hires the lawyer to 
represent it in court. 
108 It will later be argued that in situations where there is a lot of data and problems of aggregation 
this will be the method of choice. 
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the social sciences a minimum requirement would be that these theories can at 
least be interpreted on the level of human action. It seems justified, however, to 
show some flexibility for practical reasons: For predictions, a well-functioning 
technology, which was repeatedly validated in the past, should be preferred if 
compared to a technology based on another theory even if this theory's probable 
correspondence with reality is better. Calculations on the basis of the geocentric 
concept led to far better results in the initial phase than results based on the 
heliocentric concept 1°9• It is argued here that, even if the imperfections of a model 
are known, one should continue to use it as long as it yields better solutions; but 
tension between it and the model, which is closer to reality in its assumptions, 
should be preserved. This tension is a fruitful source for further theory 
development. 
Both the realism of individual model components and predictive success 
contribute to the quality of a theory. As a general rule, modeling assumptions 
are relatively more important in the social sciences than in the natural sciences, 
where convincing experiments can often be set up to test overall prediction and 
where assumptions are more speculative. 
4 Methodological Individualism 
4.1 Introduction 
It was argued in the last Section that methodological individualism is a possible 
and potentially fruitful approach in the social sciences. It consists of modeling 
social phenomena on the basis of behavioural models which are subsequently 
aggregated. Traditionally, in economics, behavioural models are formulated in 
terms of rational choice. It is assumed that any individual has a preference 
structure reflecting everything he cares for. Then, in a given situation he chooses 
the action that maximizes utility (or expected utility in the case of uncertainty) 
subject to constraints. This is why methodological individualism is also called 
situational analysis. Mathematically, the preference structure and the situational 
context are translated into a constrained maximization problem. By solving this 
problem, behaviour can be predicted110 • 
It is doubtful whether rational choice, especially in its variety as a model of 
choice under uncertainty, is a realistic model of behaviour. Defending rational 
choice by adopting a wider concept of preferences, one will ultimately make it an 
109 see Chalmers (I 994), p. 72 
110 see Maki ( 1994), p. 244 on the centrality of constrained optimization in economics. 
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empirically empty concept' 11 • But this does not make it useless. On the contrary: 
Because it is empirically empty it can be universally applied as a template. Every 
behavioural assumption can be modelled in terms of rational choice. But the fact 
that any behaviour can be modelled in such terms does not automatically suggest 
that this should indeed be done. The criterion for this choice is methodological 
convenience. Compared with other approaches, there are good reasons for arguing 
that this approach has many methodological advantages. It will therefore be 
endorsed on normative grounds. 
4.2 Rational Choice 
4.2.1 Choice under Certainty 
Rational choice assumes that all human action is purposeful action. Never does 
anybody act if he does not think that this leads him to a more preferred state. This 
seems to be a bold statement. People quite often act in a way which does not seem 
to serve their best interest. First, it is said that people pursue goals which are 
against their "objective" interests, negatively affecting their career, health or 
moral life. Second, they sometimes demonstrate a lack of will, trading in long-
term objectives for short-term pleasure, although this long-term objective is much 
more desirable to them if directly compared to the pleasure derived from not 
pursuing it. Third, people's actions are sometimes inconsistent with prior action. 
Finally, actions chosen often seem highly inadequate to achieve a given end112 • 
All of these objections are based on the assumption that preferences are 
objective and stable, or that expectations are not rationally formed. This need not 
be the case: Of course, normative provisions can be made to dissuade individuals 
to act according to certain preferences but preferences themselves are intrinsically 
subjective 113• In a typical discussion, the concept of utility maximization would be 
attacked on the grounds of observations that people care for other things than 
money or even act altruistically. In defence it can be said that this only shows that 
these people also attribute utility to non-material things like power, respect, love, 
Ill Raffee (1974), pp. 40f 
112 Mises (1949), p. 19-22 (4.ed. 1996) 
113 If somebody states a preference, it is possible to argue against it, point to the consequences of 
such preferences that this individual possibly did not consider, attempt to manipulate his will, 
but in the end the preference is either there or it isn't. It is mentioned in this context that pan-
physical attempts are rejected by the author (see below). 
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and even the supposed preferences of others in the case of altruism 114• Also, if an 
individual has revealed preferences in one instance, it cannot be readily assumed 
that these preferences will guide his action in the future. This can be modelled by 
assuming state dependent preferences. Finally, even an action that seems 
inappropriate need not be irrational per se. It is possible that an individual wants 
to cure a sick person, but instead of using the treatment suggested by medicine 
performs a religious rite. This does not automatically suggest that he is irrational 
but could also establish the fact that this individual expected his behaviour to be 
more instrumental. 
The whole focus is therefore shifted on preferences. For if it is maintained 
that individuals act on the basis of their rational expectations with regard to the 
appropriateness of action for the promotion of their own preferences, nothing can 
be said about why they act in one way rather than in another, as long as no 
restrictions are placed on preferences. 
It becomes clear that if preferences are interpreted in the widest sense, the 
rational paradigm is empirically empty. Any conceivable behaviour can be 
modelled if only preferences are duly adjusted. Therefore, the whole focus is 
shifted on preferences 115 • 
4.2.2 Choice under Uncertainty 
The traditional concept of rational choice under uncertainty is maximization of 
expected utility. This concept depends on the assumption that uncertainty can be 
described in terms of simple lotteries116• So, whenever there is an uncertain 
situation, the assumption is that one is able to derive a list of possible states and 
assign probabilities to each of them. 
Moreover, it is assumed - in a basic consequentialist premiss' 17 - that the 
agent is able to reduce complex situations to simple lotteries. Complex lotteries 
are lotteries which consist of a sequence of simple lotteries. This assumption 
becomes ever more restricting as situations become more complex. Later on, an 
114 Altruism is thus modelled "as if' it did not exist. This is an instance of instrumentalism in 
modelling which will be discussed later. 
115 see e.g. Blaug (1994), p. 132 
116 Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green ( 1995), p. 168 
117 Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green (1995), p. 170 
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evolutionary argument118 will be presented which argues that the burden of this 
assumption may be lower than it seems at first sight. 
If the agent can establish preference relations among these simple lotteries 
that are both continuous119 and satisfy the independence axiom120, the preference 
relations can be represented by a utility function 121 which is linear in 
probabilities 122• Such a utility function is said to have an expected utility form 123• 
The utility of a compound lottery can be calculated as the expected value of the 
utilities of its individual components. If the outcomes of lotteries are expressed in 
money terms it is convenient to assume that there is a continuum of outcomes. It 
can be shown that the concept of expected utility can easily be generalized to the 
continuous case where the discrete probability distribution is replaced by a density 
function 124• 
118 Alchian (1950) 
119 Continuity e.g. assumes that if one dollar is preferred to zero, one is also willing to prefer one 
dollar and a small but positive probability of death to zero. Laboratory experiments suggest 
that this is not consistent with empirical evidence. But if instead of this artificial experiment, 
people are asked whether they prefer IO dollars right away or driving with their car to a 
location 2 miles away to pick up 200 dollars, many people would prefer to take the trip, 
although this means objectively increasing the probability of death. Whenever, one is setting 
up an experiment, one is trying to make something observable, which is not normally 
observable because of a bundle of simultaneous effects. When trying to isolate a single effect, 
problems may arise because by setting up the experiment one may unconsciously change 
relevant factors. 
120 The independence axiom assumes, that the ordering of preferences over lotteries is independent 
of a third lottery with which it is mixed. This axiom is also referred to as the independence 
axiom. Suppose that a lottery LI which offers a chance to win a corkscrew is valued less than a 
lottery L2 which offers the chance to win a bottle of orange juice. If a lottery L3 is imagined 
that is described by the chance to win a bottle of wine, then a lottery which offers a 50:50 
chance of winning LI or L3 will always be valued higher that a lottery that gives a 50:50 
chance of winning L2 or L3. The example was intendedly chosen to show that the 
independence axiom is a specific feature of choice under uncertainty. If a bundle of goods is 
compared with another bundle of goods it could very well be assumed that the bundle of 
corkscrew and wine is worth more than the bundle of orange juice and wine. But in the case of 
choice under uncertainty one will never be able to consume goods, but just either one or the 
other. 
121 Unique representation is assured by the continuity assumption. 
122 Linearity is assured by the independence axiom. 
123 see Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green (1995), pp. 171-178 
124 see Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green ( 1995), pp. 183 f 
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It is important to make a distinction between the utility function defined on 
lotteries and the utility function defined on amounts ofmoney'25 • The specification 
of the latter which captures choice behaviour is very important to the analytical 
power of the expected utility framework. It is assumed to be continuous and 
increasing126• Moreover, due to the St. Petersburg-Menger Paradox 12', it is 
assumed to be bounded above and below. A common assumption is non-
increasing marginal utility of money128 resulting in a semi-concave function. By 
Jensen's Inequality this implies that people value an uncertain prospect at or lower 
than its expected value. This is the definition of risk-averseness 129• The shape of 
the utility function can be summarized by the absolute and the relative Arrow-
Pratt coefficient of risk-averseness which is a robust measure for concavity110• 
So far it has been assumed that an objective probability distribution was 
given. But this seems very restrictive. The only concept of probability which 
arguably is objective is relative frequency131 • When asked to give the probability 
that the outcome is "tails" when throwing a coin, most people will probably agree 
that it is 50%. This is because it can be empirically verified that the relative 
frequency in a repeated random experiment converges to this number. This will be 
different in a situation where creditors assess the probability that a given company 
goes bankrupt. They know that there are two outcomes. They might even have 
statistical studies on the correlation of balance sheet ratios as leading indicators of 
insolvency. But still, it is clear that this is distinct from objective probability: 
125 Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green (1995), p. 171 refer to the first function as the v.Neuman-
Morgenstem (v-N-M) function and to the second as the Bernoulli function. But terminology is 
not consistent across the literature. 
126 More money is preferred to less. 
127 Assume a game, where the probability of the game ending is 50% after each round but the 
reward if it continues is 3 powered with the number of the round. It is clear that this is a non-
converging sequence. So the value should be indefinite, but nobody would pay an indefinite or 
even a very high sum for it. 
128 People probably value the dollar that buys them food and shelter more than the dollar that buys 
them the swimming pool for the horses. 
129 see Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green (1995) pp. 184f 
130 If one wants to model the behaviour of an agent who becomes less risk-averse to absolute 
gambles with increasing wealth, one has to choose a utility function which has a decreasing 
absolute risk-averseness. If one wants to model the behaviour of an agent who becomes less 
risk-averse to gambles proportional to his wealth, one has to choose a utility function with 
decreasing relative risk-averseness. For a discussion of the Arrow-Pratt coefficient and the 
issue of robustness see Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green ( 1995), pp. 190-194 
131 see e.g. Camerer, Weber (1992), p. 329; see DeGroot (1970), p. 4 for a short overview on the 
foundations of probability and references to further literature. 
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People may disagree. The extreme case would be to assume an urn where it is 
only known that it contains 100 balls, either black or white, and to ask agents to 
give a probability that a ball drawn from the urn is black. The two uncertainty 
situations correspond to the classical Knightian distinction between risk and 
uncertainty132, which is why the latter case will be referred to as Knightian 
uncertainty. So, in the following, the question is how choice will be made under 
Knightian uncertainty. 
Subjective probability theory, also referred to as Baysian decision theory, 
claims that it is possible to rationalize any choice behaviour under uncertainty in 
terms of expected utility maximization. So, every decision can be interpreted "as 
if' utilities were assigned to outcomes, probabilities were attached to states of 
nature and decisions were made by taking expected utilities"133 • By systematic 
observation, (implicit) probabilistic beliefs can be revealed. There are several 
problematic behavioural assumptions implicit in subjective probability theory. 
They will be sketched in the following. 
As in the case of objective probabilities, there is the consequentialist 
assumption that requires agents to recognize the underlying structure of complex 
decision problems134• Another assumption is the independence axiom which 
conflicts with plausible evidence that people try to eschew disappointment135 and 
fear taking choices which may lead them to regret136 not having taken another 
choice. Another problem is evidence of discontinuous preferences137 where very 
important goods are at stake. Moreover, for reasons of tractability the Bernoulli 
utility function is sometimes specified in a way that does not correspond to 
plausible behaviour, e.g. the widely used exponential utility function has constant 
absolute risk averseness, although decreasing absolute risk-averseness often 
seems more plausible138 • 
On a more fundamental level, the very possibility to capture Knightian 
uncertainty in terms of lotteries is questioned139• It was already said that Knight 
132 Knight ( 1921 ), Ill, VII, 48 
133 Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green (1995), p. 205 
134 see Mas-Cole!), Whinston, Green (1995), p. I 71 
135 "Machina Paradox" see Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green (1995), pp. 180f 
136 "Allais Paradox" see Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green (1995), pp. l79f 
137 also called lexicographic preferences. 
138 This is a fair assumption for local approximation. 
139 see Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green ( 1995), pp. 205f 
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proposed to distinguish between uncertainty where objective probabilities are 
given and uncertainty where no such objective probability exists140• Subjective 
probability theory in the Bayesian framework 141 treats these two cases alike142• In 
both cases agents maximize expected utility. The only difference is that under 
uncertainty people hold subjective beliefs about probabilities and no objective 
probabilities are given. But this does not accommodate for ambiguity aversion 143 
and inertia as suggested by the unwillingness to bet on subjective beliefs 
whenever they differ144• This behaviour cannot be explained by different levels of 
risk aversion145• 
In general, it is always possible to accommodate criticism "with a theory 
that defines preferences over somewhat larger and more complex theoretical 
140 Besides Knightian uncertainty ("true uncertainty" in the words of Knight) there is "sheer 
ignorance" (see Kirtzner (1997)) which can be interpreted as a consequence of bounded 
rationality. This is mentioned because the concepts of risk and uncertainty as approaches to 
formalize uncertainty do not capture sheer ignorance. There are no direct consequences for 
models of rational choice under uncertainty except the general qualitive caveat that flexibility 
is important in the face of uncertainty. 
141 People explicitly attach subjective probabilities to outcomes. If conditional probability 
distributions are objectively given prior beliefs are updated as more information becomes 
available. 
142 Bewley (2002), p. 80 
143 As suggested by the Ellsberg Paradox (Ellsberg, D. (1961)): Consider two urns denoted Rand 
H. In both urns there are I 00 balls. It is assumed that in R 51 balls are black and 49 balls are 
white. In urn H there is an unknown composition of black and white balls. Now, consider the 
lottery where one is winning if a black ball is drawn. Which of the two urns would an agent 
prefer? Many people would prefer urn R. Now consider another lottery where white wins. Here 
for reasons of consistency people would have to choose urn H. This is because, by choosing R 
over H in the first experiment they were implicitly assuming that the number of black balls is 
lower than 51 which in turn means that the number of white balls should be higher than 49. 
Experiments show, this is not always the case. There appears to be an aversion of ambiguity in 
the case of urn H. 
144 The completeness axiom that is also required for the case of utility maximization, requires 
people to either prefer one lottery over the other or to be indifferent about them. But if two 
agents hold different beliefs on the probability of outcomes and the completeness axiom is 
fulfilled, they should either be willing to change their mind or to bet on the outcome of their 
belief. But betting does not take place to the extent to which people disagree. The reason, why 
this is the case may be inertia. Something will only be accepted if acceptance is preferred to 
rejection. 
145 Bewley (2002), pp. 80f 
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objects146 than simply the ultimate lottery over outcomes [ ... ] e.g. the decision-
maker may value not only what he receives but also what he receives compared 
with what he might have received by choosing differently. This leads to regret 
theory."147 Also, defining state-dependent utilities is a case in point. 
Like in the case of utility maximization, the expected utility paradigm can 
be adjusted to accommodate any possible behaviour; but a tautology is not 
interesting if no restrictions can be placed on the structure. 
4.3 A Remark on Game Theory 
Game theory is a mathematical tool which is very useful in modelling choice 
behaviour in situations wherein people rationally interact with imperfect 
information and in a specified time ordering in which they carry out their 
actions 148• Game Theory requires that all players come to the same conclusions 
when exposed to the same information, also with respect to probability 
distributions. If they reach different conclusions, this is only because of different 
information (Harsanyi Doctrine or common prior assumption)1 49• But this is not as 
restricting as it seems. If the modeller wishes to model that players reach different 
conclusions about probabilities, he can do so by adjusting information sets. This is 
another example of the instrumentalist idea and shows the flexibility of 
mathematical tools. 
4.4 Defending Rational Choice on Normative Grounds 
As argued above, if any action can be described in terms of rational choice if only 
preferences are duly adjusted, the criterion changes: No longer is rational choice 
intended to be a descriptive theory of choice. It is rather a template for the 
organization of thinking and a means of exposition. It will be argued that using 
the concept of expected utility maximization as a template is consistent with the 
formal rules of part I. 
146 This is a departure from the realist pretension in order to allow for productive speculation (see 
Chalmers (1994), p. 165) but is consistent with the principle laid down above that realism is 
maintained only on the level of human behaviour. 
147 Mas-Colell, Winston, Green ( 1995), p. 180 
148 see Rasmusen ( 1994 ), p. 2 
149 see Kreps (1990), p. 111 
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If someone wants to predict the actions of others, he will be able to cast his 
assumptions about their likely behaviour into explicit assumptions about their 
preferences and a description of the relevant situational context. The rest is 
decision logic. This template is consistent with the author's view of good science: 
explicit statement of assumptions which are always debatable, and the use of the 
analytical power of mathematics as a guarantee for truth relative to this set of 
assumptions 150• This structuring enhances transparency, facilitates the localization 
of possible dissent, and predicts the nature of this dissent. 
These assumptions will often, indeed, stipulate monetary preferences or 
behavioural constraints consistent with the classical homo oeconomicus model. 
Yet, this is because the modeller has decided that this describes the behaviour he 
expects from the acting individuals. If someone else disagrees, he may try to 
persuade the modeller. If he does not agree, he may construct his own model. 
However, this can also be done in terms of the (expected) utility maximizing 
template. In this case, the two models will differ in the sets of assumptions and 
their disagreement becomes crystal clear151 : The second modeller might e.g. think 
that a preference for honesty needs to be taken into account, while the first 
modeller assumes opportunistic behaviour. If, however, they agree on the same set 
of assumptions, they can be confident that they will resolve their disagreement by 
means oflogic only. This will assure a maximum of transparency. 
Still, especially for choice under uncertainty, some assumptions with regard 
to incomplete preferences or the independence axiom are very difficult to 
accommodate within the framework. Some effort will always be made to 
translate behavioural assumptions into the framework 152 • Similarly, existing 
theories could be reconstructed along the lines of rational choice. Yet, if it 
becomes too tenuous, it is questionable if this does not outweigh the analytical 
convenience of the expected utility paradigm. The choice of the modeling 
framework thus depends both on its suitability to accommodate the relevant 
assumptions and on the availability of alternative concepts153 • 
Any behaviour can be described in terms of (expected) utility 
maximization. Utility maximization is empirically empty but used as a formal 
template, is consistent with the author's formal rules of good science. It should 
150 Simulations are a way to circumvent problems of tractability 
151 Samuelson called that putting one's cards on the table. 
152 Instrumentalism is accepted in the process. 
153 see Gilboa, Schmeidler ( 1989) and Bewley (2002) for concepts outside the Baysian framework 
accommodating uncertainty aversion and inertia respectively. 
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be used if translating relevant assumptions into the framework does not become 
too tenuous. 
4.5 Economics as a Formal vs. Real Science 
It was stated above that, if the rational paradigm is empirically empty, the focus is 
shifted onto preferences. If no claim is made that assumptions are adjusted in a 
way to make the ( expected) utility maximization paradigm a realistic model of 
human behaviour, microeconomics would be pure decision logic. Purely 
deductive reasoning is sometimes discarded as fruitless. The argument goes that 
no new knowledge can be found by means of deduction154. 
This is technically true. However, at least in economics, it is not justified to 
jump to the conclusion that a tautology creates no valuable insights. Indeed, this 
amounts to the same as claiming that it makes no difference if natural resources 
exist on the planet or if one is able to extract and use them. In other words: The 
conclusions derived from deductive reasoning in microeconomics are far from 
obvious by looking on the assumptions. This is like in Euclidean geometry155. The 
Pythagorean Theorem is contained in the axioms. Still the axioms will probably 
be to no avail when trying to calculate a triangle. Tautology is valuable because it 
enhances relevant knowledge by making it explicit. 
Everybody can choose for himself which assumptions to accept. But as 
mathematics guarantees truth of conclusions relative to assumptions156, the 
scientist is rendering the practitioner a service by figuring out the implications. 
The rational template of rational choice is nothing else than a transmission belt 
linking complex phenomena to simple assumptions. It provides people with a 
decision logic leaving it to them to set behavioural assumptions as it suits them. 
Or alternatively, if they are to test a given proposition about a phenomenon, it is 
possible to check its consistency with self-proclaimed behavioural assumptions. 
So the question is not whether the proposition "is true, but rather if it could be 
true"157
0 
154 see e.g. Czayka (1991 ), p. 137 
155 Mises (1949), p. 38 (4.ed. 1996) 
156 A caveat is warranted here: Mathematics also sets constraints. In order to assure tractability the 
scientist often makes assumption for technical simplification but than claims the results to be 
general. Often functions are specified. In contract theory many effects assume risk neutrality 
without giving conclusive proves why this assumption should be innocuous. 
157 see Arrow, Hahn (1971), pp. vi-vii 
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Another idea on how to avoid making assumptions about preferences is to 
set up a prescriptive, and not descriptive, decision model which would say: 
Provided that the individual wants to achieve certain aims he should take the 
recommended action. By using the expected utility framework, it is possible to 
structure situations of uncertainty and to make decisions according to 
preestablished consistency rules. Indeed, many people find it difficult to 
systematically analyse situations of uncertainty. Often there is more information 
available than is obvious at first sight. Structuring this information and deriving 
the best158 action on the basis of present information is helpfuP 59• Contingency 
plans and preliminary assumptions are helpful even in situations where there is 
Knightian uncertainty or even sheer ignorance. As more information becomes 
available it can be incorporated into the decision tree by adjusting assumptions. 
The merit of the Baysian framework as a prescriptive theory can probably best be 
described by a metaphor: If there is an orchard and birds are looking for a place 
to brood, the chance is high that they choose the tree where a nest already exists. 
Decision theory is no recipe for creativity. It does not help to catch the birds. But 
if, by chance, a bird lands, one can make the most of it. The danger with this 
approach is that people become narrow-minded about information, only taking 
into account information that was already anticipated160• Another problem is that 
as soon as there are other agents involved, prescriptive models must also be 
descriptive. 
Still, it was claimed in part I that objectivity as a common idea about 
science is often linked to empirical evidence. Therefore, if one is not content to 
"search for solutions for problems yet to be found" or to engage in a logical 
pastime, one should try to plead with the potential user of the theory that the 
presented theory tells him something about reality and problem solving. If there is 
a practical intention it would be absurd if one is not tailoring the assumptions 
about preferences and situational context to what one thinks to be relevant 
behaviour and relevant situations. 
158 Best action relative to subjective believes. 
159 see Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green (I 995), p. 178 
160 People are advised to make a map of all their future decisions. In practice, these decisions are 
not constantly updated. Rather there is a concept and an execution phase. Therefore reactivity 
to more precise information that was already expected will be high. Contingency plans even 
tend to increase reactivity because it is possible to immediately put information into context as 
soon as it arises. But, willingness to deal with unexpected information which one was totally 
ignorant about might be lower. This need not necessarily be a disadvantage (see Practical Life 
and Theory in Chapter III9 part III). 
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In a last attempt, it could be argued that assumptions about preferences of 
individuals could be avoided if one is taking the perspective of the government. 
It might be interested in the abstract question whether e.g. egoistic behaviour 
serves the public good 161 • By knowing the consequences of certain behaviour on 
society, the government can decide whether it is desirable to promote or 
discourage certain behaviour. But this only seemingly circumvents the problem. 
The described interest practically implies that the legislator thinks he could 
influence his citizen's preferences, which in turn requires anthropological 
assumptions 162• 
Microeconomics as a purely formal science is useful but too unambitious. 
As soon as it is intended to pursue economics as a real science the question of 
the realism of behavioural models cannot be circumvented. 
4.6 Realism of Assumptions 
Either one wants to show which consequences follow if one accepts certain 
assumptions. In this case, the model is a pure intellectual pastime. More 
frequently it will be held by the modeller that the assumptions describe the agent's 
action reasonably well subject to the restriction that the variety of conceivable 
preferences must be reduced according to relevance. 
To begin with, two things have to be distinguished: On the one hand, it was 
shown above that ( expected) utility maximizing behaviour is a very flexible 
template. It can be used to model any sort of behaviour if preferences and 
situational context are duly adjusted. On the other hand, there is the claim - among 
other things - that people act as if they only cared about money, disliked any 
effort, kept promises only as long as it suited them, and were able to pursue these 
aims taking a very sophisticated, far-sighted view, which considered all 
ramifications of their actions and the actions of others. 
Often the homo oeconomicus assumption is taken as a criterion to delineate 
economics from other social sciences. In the view of the author, this is indeed so 
when referring to the use of the ( expected) utility maximizing template which can 
accommodate any behavioural assumption but guarantees an argument which is 
both transparent in assumptions and potentially makes use of the analytical power 
of mathematics. 
161 see Sen (1977), pp. 319-322 
162 In another context Hutchison (I 994), p.29 notes: "Obviously, normative issues [ ... ] are 
interconnected with positive issues regarding the possibility of their achievement." 
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With respect to the second interpretation of the homo oeconomicus 
assumption, which is the traditional interpretation, economics is not in principle 
dogmatic about this assumption. On the contrary: Especially in recent years, 
large-scale efforts were made to make assumptions more realistic. There are, 
however, good reasons to essentially stick with the traditional assumptions or only 
cautiously enrich them 163 • 
The homo oeconomicus model comes in two varieties: Fist as a tautology 
which has to be judged on its methodological merit, and second, as a 
behavioural model which has to be judged on its suitability in describing 
relevant behaviour. 
4.7 Defending Homo Oeconomicus 
4.7.1 Introduction 
Given the many doubts about the validity of behavioural assumptions implied in 
the expected utility maximization concept, there are several possible conclusions 
that can be drawn. In some cases, the criticism will be accommodated and the 
behavioural assumptions are modified. Sometimes the criticism only seemingly 
contradicts the modeling assumptions. In other cases it is real but it can be argued 
that in the specific situation at hand the problems do not arise. Moreover, it could 
be argued that, even if it is possible that behaviour is different from the 
assumptions, in some situations it is safer to assume the worst case scenario. 
4.7.2 Relevant Situations 
Mill and Edgeworth already observed that the homo oeconomicus assumption did 
not accurately describe all features of human behaviour, but it was sufficient if the 
captured features were dominant in the situations considered164• Therefore, when 
setting up an economic model, one will not try to create a behavioural model 
which describes the whole of human behaviour, but rather the features that are 
held relevant for the purpose of the model. It is, for instance, observed that there is 
163 Contrary to the definition of this dissertation, some economists actually define economics as an 
area of research, where the tradition homo oeconomicus model is valid with slight 
modifications. 
164 "There is, for example, one large class of social phenomena in which the immediately 
determining causes are principally those which act through the desire for wealth, and in which 
the psychological law mainly concerned is the familiar one that a greater gain is preferred to a 
smaller." Mill (1843): 6.9.3. cit. Hausman (1994), p. 206 
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altruistic behaviour within families or within small groups. Altruism can be 
modelled by including the well-being of others in the preference function of the 
agent. But this will not usually be the case in many business relationships. 
Therefore, the traditional homo oeconomicus assumption may not be the best 
description of what happens within families but arguably a better description of 
what happens in company alliances, top-executive contracting, relationships with 
suppliers, company transactions involving consultants, investment banks, auditors 
and lawyers. In brief, following Edgeworth, in particular types of activities (war 
and contract), individuals are, to a good approximation, self-interested 165 • 
4.7.3 Scope of Concepts 
There exist many situations where agents seemingly do not act opportunistically. 
It may, however, be consistent with opportunism to keep one's promises if there is 
a long-term relationship, or if there are career concerns. Experience shows that it 
is far more dangerous to make business as a tourist with a street dealer than with 
the shopkeeper at home where one is a regular customer. This is not necessarily 
because the shopkeeper at home is not opportunistic. He could be opportunistic 
and still act the same way166• 
4.7.4 Robustness - Worst Case 
But even if one is not so sure about the correct description, it could be argued that 
one should always create the mechanism which is "robust [ ... ] designed to survive 
the 'worst case'"167• Hume expressed this thought early on by writing: "Political 
writers have established it as a maxim that, in contriving any system of 
government, and fixing the several checks and controls of the constitution, every 
man ought to be supposed a knave, and to have no other end, in all his actions, 
than private interest. By this interest we must govern him, and, by means of it, 
make him, notwithstanding his insatiable avarice and action, cooperate to public 
good [ ... ]. It is, therefore, a just political maxim, that every man must be supposed 
a knave; though, at the same time, it appears somewhat strange, that a maxim 
165 see Sen (1977), p. 318 on why Edgeworth might have portrayed individuals as self-interested 
although in fact he thinks they are not; see Hausman (1998), p. 69 
166 An interesting point can be made here: People often do not like to think about themselves as 
being opportunistic. So if one asks somebody why he acted in a certain way he will have a high 
flying moral justification. He is not lying. He has an unrocking belief in what he says (naive 
opportunist). This might be understood in terms of evolution. 
167 Hausman (1998), p. 71 emphasis added by the author 
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should be true in politics which is false in fact. " 168 A similar argument is brought 
forward by Rosenberg who, although considering economic theory to be 
predictively empty, upholds it as a "contractarian argument"169 • Brennan and 
Buchanan consent and argue that "using the best estimate of average behaviour 
leads one systematically to underestimate the welfare loss" 110, implying that rules 
assuming average behaviour are not robust in the presence of a small number of 
knaves. 
Hausman disagrees on the grounds that "if the outcomes of institutions 
designed for knaves are much worse than the outcomes designed for actual 
individuals, and the odds of everybody being a knave were low, then it would be 
foolish to choose the institutions designed for knaves"171 and concludes that 
"economics has normative value in the context of institutional design only if it has 
predictive value concerning individual behaviour within particular institutions"172 • 
Although the issue of robustness is clearly important, as it is plausible to assume 
that a society of peaceful altruists is very vulnerable to a few aggressive knaves, 
some would argue that the very assumption of people being knaves is a self-
fulfilling prophecy. 
There is e.g. the psychological concept of framing173 , which says that people 
operate in different modes and that the context determines which mode they will 
be operating in. If the context is one of friendship they will not be opportunistic. If 
the context is one of knavery they will be knaves. In such a situation, there will be 
the following dilemma: Either one can take a chance and try to create a friendship 
context. If one succeeds, gains will be high but losses will also be high in case of 
failure. Or, one introduces a scheme which is robust to opportunistic behaviour. 
One can then be rather sure that the intended result will be forthcoming. Of 
course, it could be that there is a loophole and that the other party feels entitled to 
be opportunistic if treated like a knave, whereas a greater moral barrier may exist 
otherwise. However, one could also argue that if an opportunistic party sees that it 
is treated as a friend it will lose respect and be even more opportunistic. 
168 Hurne (1741), pp. 40-42 cit. Hausman (1998), p. 67 
169 Rosenberg (1992), p. 20 cit. Hausman (1998), p. 69 
170 Hausman (I 998), p. 73 attributes this thought to Brennan and Buchanan (I 985), p. 55 
171 Hausman (1998), p. 74 
172 Hausman (1998), p. 77 
173 Lindenberg (2000), pp. 33-38 
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Weighing the arguments, the author favours the view that descriptive 
validity is not completely irrelevant to the contractarian problem. Not all 
situations, however, allow controlling the context in a way suggested by the 
theory of framing. It will certainly be easier to control the context within an 
organization than in settings where there is only a one-shot cooperation. 
There may be some doubt whether it is appropriate to always assume the 
worst case in contractarian issues, but it is probably justified to do so in non-
relational, inter-firm contracts with high stakes. It will be argued later that 
mechanisms exist where good cooperation can be assured even in the presence 
of opportunism. 
4.7.5 lnstrumentalism in Modeling 
The requirement that assumptions should correspond with reality should not be 
pushed too far. As was argued above, any model will try to keep things relatively 
simple. So, it will only capture features of behaviour which are relevant in the 
given situation. It has already been shown that, as a descriptive model, rational 
choice can be defended at the price of becoming empirically empty: Any 
behaviour can be formulated in terms of utility maximization. Thus, any 
behaviour can be modelled "as if' it was the product of maximizing behaviour. 
As another example, take the assumption that all human beings are 
essentially the same. If one observes that there are differences between them one 
could try to explain these differences by citing situational contingencies. They are 
different because they have lived through different situations and therefore their 
preferences will be predictably different. There are a sheer unlimited number of 
models: A hierarchy of needs or cultural differences due to climate or different 
experiences in the early years of childhood would all be cases in point. So, in fact, 
to keep assumptions about anthropologically derived preferences easy, 
assumptions about the situation are made more complex. This is, incidentally, 
consistent with the way many people might actually think. When asked to predict 
the behaviour of others they ask themselves how they would act in their place. 
This is a mixture of introspection and empathy. Depending on the available 
information, they will take account of different characteristics of the other person 
and will be able to put themselves in his shoes. Maybe they know him and do 
have a view about his character by having observed prior action or knowing his 
thoughts and values. Maybe there is just circumstantial evidence. So, a profile of 
his character is constructed by considering, say, his education and probable 
socialization. 
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Another example of the instrumentalist idea is how the possibility of one 
player exhibiting irrational behaviour is modelled in game theory174 : Irrational 
behaviour would first be interpreted as rational behaviour by duly adjusting the 
assumptions about the preference structure (i.e. adjusting the pay-offs for each 
outcome). Then, uncertainty in forming expectations about a person is not 
modelled on an individual level but translated into a situation where nature 
conducts a random experiment. It is clear that this modeling set-up does not 
reproduce the real situation in an isomorphic way. Take a fighting situation. If 
somebody picks a fight, although he is likely to get hurt and there is nothing to be 
gained, it could be said that this is irrational. This behaviour could of course also 
be interpreted as highly rational if it is assumed that he valued the "honour" he 
had to defend higher than the prospect of getting hurt. If one player is unsure if 
the other player will be rational or rather irrational in the sense described above, 
this could be modelled as a situation where nature chooses a type from a 
population of agents. This choice of nature is not observed, but composition of 
types is known to both players. Although the description of the situation would be 
that there is a single person and that one does not know if he is rational or not, the 
problem is first altered to the effect that one considers a single person but one 
does not know how much value he puts on his "honour". In a second step one is 
not looking at a single person any more but at a situation where there are, say, IO 
people who put high value to their "honour" and 90 people who put a higher value 
to their health. From this group, nature randomly chooses one type. For reasons of 
convenient modeling, realism is sacrificed. 
4.8 Bounded Rationality vs. Unconscious Rationality 
4.8.1 Introduction 
Often, it is said that economic models presuppose a degree of rationality that most 
people do not possess. Therefore, they cannot be good descriptions of human 
behaviour. This argument e.g. assumes that there are situations where people are 
"intendedly rational, but only limited so"175 • The bounded rationality argument is 
at the heart of economics of incomplete contracts, and is certainly a problem that 
should be taken seriously. In the following, however, a defence of rationality shall 
be mounted, claiming that people are sometimes superrational but unconsciously 
so. It will be argued that in areas where evolutionary forces are strong, people will 
174 Also the modelling of different information processing via information sets - mentioned above 
- would be an example of instrumentalism 
175 Simon (1947), xxiiif. 
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act rationally even if they just follow the maxims and routines they have learned 
in a process of socialization 176• 
4.8.2 The Evolutionary Mechanism 
Evolution of rules and routines is a fact. The crucial part of the argument will be 
to show that under some circumstances evolution will converge to the rational 
solution. Therefore, the evolutionary mechanism will have to be described. 
The two important prerequisites for evolution are variance and selection. 
The starting point is that rules and institutions evolve spontaneously within groups 
and are adopted mostly for their emotional appeal or by chance177 • These rules 
come in the form of narratives or maxims. As there are many groups (populations, 
companies), there will be variance. 
The group and with it the rule will only survive if it has a certain degree of 
success to secure resources. If there is a spectacular failure the old rule will die 
(reform, death of group, invasion by neighbour). In the end, only successful rules 
will survive because the groups which have adopted them will prevail in a process 
of selection ( competition among populations, companies). But there could also be 
a conscious selection mechanism in the form of trial-and-error178• A company 
could try out a sales structure. If it does not work the company will change it. 
Contract lawyers are transaction specialists. They assist in the formulation of 
many contracts and advise their clients. They will see that some contracts have 
worked well while others have created a lot of problems. So, when setting up 
model contracts, they will sort out the good contracts. In brief, the basic idea is 
that the "structures we observe have survived because of their merit in coaxing 
Pareto-efficient behaviour out of agents who do not know what this means"179• 
The selection process will only work for vital rules, i.e. rules which affect 
performance of the group in a crucial way. The focus of interest here is problems 
of transactions. Can rules governing transactions be regarded as vital rules? 
Information asymmetry with respect to effort, choice or quality of product leads to 
a welfare loss because the hazards of contracting will prevent the parties from 
176 see Alchian (1950) 
177 Smith (1991), p. 892 notes that "rules evolve in response to experience, not logical analysis, 
and policies that are disequilibrating (causing the manager trouble) are altered". 
178 see Smith (1991), pp. 89If for a simple scenario where this might happen 
179 Smith (1991 ), pp. 894 
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capturing potential gains of trade. If the kind of product and the business 
environment leads to information problems, the company that leaves these 
problems unattended to will make fewer profits than comparable other companies 
which are more successful in solving this problem. These companies will 
eventually drive the first company out of business (by buying it or by bidding up 
resource prices and destroying margins). Of course, companies can be imagined 
which have such an edge on their competitors that they will survive even if 
transactions are organized sub-optimally. Selection will therefore be most 
rigorous where the relevant problem (information asymmetry) is worst and no 
overwhelmingly strong competitive advantage exists. This will e.g. be true for 
supply contracts in mature industries. 
The evolutionary process converging to the rational result will only take 
place if the problem that has to be dealt with is of a general nature and will remain 
stable over time. It will be stronger if the frequency of selection is high. If this is 
the case, the key implication is that there is convergence to results that are 
commensurable with rational construction without requiring the agents to make 
complicated calculations. It is sufficient that they act according to the rules and 
maxims that they are socialized to use. Thus, contract types can be seen as the 
product of an evolution, which solved the problem of information asymmetry. If 
they are used, they are normally not used because of careful analysis but rather 
because in the given situation the contract type in question is normally used. The 
basic contract types of private law are a perfect example. In Civil Law countries, 
they are the codification and systematization of the mostly Roman legal tradition 
which was available in casuistic form. Dealing with the eternal problems of 
exchange they can be viewed as the distilled wisdom of more than two millennia. 
4.8.3 Method of Evolutionary Economics 
The question could be asked why one should bother with these problems when 
evolution is likely to take care of it. The modest answer would be: In order to 
understand institutions; the more ambitious, in order to take a short-cut within the 
evolutionary process much as in genetic engineering. Evolution comes at a price. 
It is a process of "creative destruction". So, maybe money can be saved, but 
evolutionary forces are also not equally present in all instances. Maybe there is a 
situation where evolution did not have a chance to occur because the industry is 
rather young, so that there has not been much time for evolution to take place. 
Maybe the learning process by trial-and-error does not work because every project 
is sui generis, no obvious parallels exist without a theoretical framework (general 
problem of complex phenomena) and - as a consequence - because the problem is 
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not seen, no centralized and specialized units within organizations will be created; 
but this is the prerequisite for learning and innovation to take place180• Another 
reason why the process of selection does not work is the absence of competition 
(department, monopoly). Alternatively, the problem may not be sufficiently 
severe to make the company fail. Still it can be quite severe or become more 
severe in the future when the industry becomes mature. Moreover, even if the 
solution of the problem only gives the company an additional edge it will allow 
the company to grow faster than its competitors and will therefore be indirectly 
responsible for its future survival. Less spectacularly, it may just increase profits. 
The evolutionary approach can very plausibly be defended in many contracting 
situations. Transactions are omnipresent, and they are crucially important for the 
welfare of a society based on property rights and characterized by a high degree of 
separation of labour. 
One can probably find most scope for improvement where evolutionary 
forces are weak. In such a situation, it might be very good to follow the 
recommendations that where derived analytically. In areas where evolutionary 
forces are strong, one can try to understand the institutions that have developed. 
As these are complex, they cannot be understood without a theory. The analytical 
approach provides such a theoretical framework. Insofar as the predictions of the 
model do not correspond to the observed institution, one can try to learn from the 
observed information to make the model better. The methodology of evolutionary 
economics could be sketched as follows: 
1) Analytically derive the results of human interaction relative to 
assumptions that are thought to correctly describe human action: E.g. 
neoclassical price theory assumes that there are homogenous goods, 
perfect information and perfect competition. In such a situation, demand 
and supply functions can be derived from the buyer's utility functions and 
the seller's cost functions. Horizontal aggregation yields market demand 
and supply curves. The point where they intersect allows deriving traded 
quantity and market price in equilibrium. If the economy is not in 
equilibrium it can be shown that, under some circumstances, the system is 
stable and tends to equilibrium. 
2) Understand institutions and observable behaviour in terms of this 
approach: In the case of neoclassical price theory, the problem is that 
this theory does not tell anything about the observed institutions, like 
different kinds of contracts, traders or independent experts offering 
180 Adam Smith has already argued that this was an important ingredient of innovation. 
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advice. Traditionally, economists therefore assumed that the reason for 
these institutions was market power, i.e. a divergence from optimal 
competition. 
3) In an iterative approach, assure consistency between assumptions 
and observed institutions by adjusting assumptions: Economics of 
information changed neoclassical assumptions to the extent that 
information was assumed to be costly and asymmetric. Starting from 
these assumptions, it could be shown that, e.g. in the used car market, 
market failure could arise if no independent traders and experts concerned 
about their reputation are present. Looking at the car market 181 , this 
seemed to fit quite well. 
4) Predict behaviour and institutions in other areas where evolutionary 
forces are present: The same problems exist on the art market. So, it 
could be predicted that similar institutions would be found there, which is 
the case. No such problems arise in the market for vegetables. Therefore, 
it is predicted that no such institutions will be found there 182• 
5) Critically analyse existing institutions: It is e.g. common in the Anglo-
Saxon world that there are punitive damages in private tort law. It is a 
widespread opinion that this leads to excesses. There are indeed cases 
where companies paid millions or even billions of dollars to the plaintiff, 
exceeding the original damage many times over. The US Supreme Court 
recently ruled 183 that the ratio of awarded compensation and original 
damage may not be double digit. One might argue that this is unwise: It 
should rather not exceed the inverse of the probability of detection if the 
intention is to provide efficient incentives for, say, companies to not 
pollute the environment. Of course, the argument that the functioning of a 
system requires measures which unjustly favour one person is not well 
accepted by many people 184• A second benefit is that the idea can be used 
to explain, describe and distinguish different contract types, institutions in 
company law and insolvency law, etc., by offering an outside perspective. 
It is a basis for comparative studies of law or a basis for criticism. 
181 Akerlof, G; (1970) 
182 Although in times of increased environmental concerns this may and to some extent has 
already changed. 
183 N.N. (2003), THE ECONOMIST, April 10 
184 Indeed such punishments, if well calibrated, can be argued to be extremely cheap ways to 
induce compliance with rules ( see footnote 344 ). 
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6) Design institutional arrangements from scratch where a new project 
is undertaken: If a new company organizing e.g. internet auctions like 
Ebay is set up, the question for the developers is how they shall organize 
the internet platform. In such a case it is useful to learn the lessons of 
information asymmetry and organize the system in a way that helps to 
record and make available the seller's track-record. 
The general idea is to build models starting from plausible assumptions, 
compare them to institutions that exist in well-established markets, understand 
these institutions as a product of evolution - at least in areas where it seems 
plausible that evolution could have occurred (variance, selection!), improve 
models, make predictions for other areas where evolution occurred. If this 
prediction is correct, this corroborates the model and suggests that the same 
approach can be used for social engineering where evolution has not occurred. 
4.9 Piecemeal Social Engineering 
The evolutionary assumption is in the spirit of Popper's "piecemeal social 
engineering" which is sceptical with respect to total rational reconstruction of 
reality ("utopian social engineering"). The understanding of organically grown 
institutions is a source of knowledge of its own. This is because there is the 
assumption of "concealed wisdom", not because it is old or derived from tradition 
as in conservatism, but because it must be interpreted under some circumstances 
as the result of a selection or learning process. This is distinct from the hubris of 
rationalists who want to redesign everything from scratch. 
4.10 Objection of Historicism 
There is the criticism that the idea of evolution falls prey to historicism. The 
historical school tries to find the laws that govern the course of history. The idea 
is that if it is understood how history evolves, and if it is possible to acertain 
which stage in this evolution has been currently reached, it can be predicted which 
stage will follow. Future can thus be predicted 185• Marxism is a typical example of 
historicism. The criticism of Popper186 was that historicist ideas had no empirical 
content. If the whole history of men must be interpreted as the history of class 
struggles, any system of moral values, any answer that an acting individual would 
give concerning the intention of his action will be interpreted as a narrative 
185 see the Chapter on the philosophy of August Cieszkowski in Mader (1993b), p. 123 
186 see Blaug (1990), pp. 36f 
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covering this irrefutable premiss, and indeed any such observation and interview 
can be interpreted in terms of this premiss. It is a template, not a theory. If 
somebody who is poor kills somebody who is rich, it can be interpreted as an act 
of revolt. If he does not kill him it can be interpreted as the consequence of a 
moral system devised to suppress the poor. 
Microeconomics interprets everything in terms of rational choice. This is 
also a template as was argued above. Therefore, utility maximization has no 
empirical content of its own, but it can be used to organize thinking about human 
behaviour. The benefit is transparency of assumptions and the use of mathematics. 
No such methodical benefit can be seen in Marxist theory unless it is interpreted 
as a theory with empirical content that predicts e.g. a high chance of social unrest 
if some social parameters like a certain degree of income inequality and a certain 
ratio of absolute poverty are present. If it interprets norms and values as reflecting 
the current state of property rights of productive resources this may be an 
interesting heuristic. But it only becomes a theory if one predicts how the norms 
in a certain country will be, given data about property of means of production. If 
this prediction fails, following Poppd 87, there should not be made ad hoc 
modifications to save the theory. Also, other influences like a common idea of 
justice, as expressed in the Kantian categorical imperative or in the golden moral 
rule as expressed in the biblical principle "do not do onto others what you do not 
want them to do on you", could also be considered as potential sources of the 
ethical code. Marxist theory is interesting as a heuristic, but more dangerous and 
less useful than utility maximization as a template. 
Now, what about evolutionary theory as applied to social sciences? First, 
what about evolutionary theory in biology? Evolution is a fact, both in biology 
and in the social sciences. The composition of genes in the population did evolve 
over time. Similarly, it can be seen in the history of law that also contractual 
forms evolved. Quite another thing is the evolutionary mechanism: It is argued in 
biology that there is selection according to the fitness of a population to survive. 
In the social sciences, it is argued that rules and institutions survive, if they helped 
to secure resources in a superior way. 
The criticism of historicism is justified if it was said that in history reason is 
always realised, and that all history has to be seen as the process of revealing 
reason. If in contrast, the fact is acknowledged that there is evolution and an 
evolutionary mechanism is described, which yields testable predictions, this is 
different. E.g. if it can be established that species A was fitter to withstand 
187 Blaug (1994), p. 112 
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drought than species B for, say, physiological reasons, and a change in the 
frequency of drought in a certain area was associated with the expansion of 
species A and the decline of species B, this would corroborate the theory. In the 
same way, it could be argued that in the age of industrialization, raising capital 
and employing professional managers became increasingly important. The rise of 
the public limited company suggests that there was an evolutionary mechanism at 
work. 
These arguments, however, also reveal a weakness. There obviously is the 
danger that one is just making theory and evidence fit ex post facto. This will 
always be a problem with complex phenomena188 which can only be understood if 
there is a theory in the first place. This problem can be alleviated if predictions 
about future events can be made. In fact, the strong competitive dynamic of a 
globalized economy may be a very interesting laboratory for this purpose. 
5 Introspection in Economics 
5.1 Internal dimension and Instability 
A crucial question is why a behavioural model should be considered to correspond 
with reality. The standard answer in the natural sciences would be that this 
depends on whether it is able to make successful predictions. To verify a model 
one could therefore test predictions by setting up an experiment. 
There is, however, one important difference between the natural and the 
social sciences: In the natural sciences, the fact that a stone falls when dropped 
can be observed. The observation exhausts the phenomenon. In contrast, human 
action has both an external and an internal dimension. This internal dimension is 
the intention of the agent and cannot be readily observed. It could be argued that it 
is enough to observe the external action and that intention can be safely ignored. 
The problem, however, is that action always very much depends on the situational 
context and is therefore unstable; but stability is a basic requirement for 
systematic empirical methods. 
The following example shows that a slight modification of the situational 
context may totally change the prediction: One could probably find a non-
188 "While it is certainly desirable to make our theories as falsifiable as possible, we must also 
push forward into fields where, as we advance, the degree of falsifiability necessarily 
decreases. This is the price we have to pay for an advance into the field of complex 
phenomena." Hayek (I 967), p. 29 cit. Caldwell (1994), p. 144 
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negative correlation between wealth and the riskiness of people's portfolios. One 
could argue that people tend to value the dollar which buys them food or shelter 
more than the dollar buying the swimming pool for the horses. But now consider a 
poor man who desperately wants to buy a fancy car because he thinks that only by 
having this car can he impress the woman he is in love with. It would be plausible 
to assume that he could actually be risk-loving, valuing an investment at or higher 
than its expected value. 
So, for all the empirical data that might have been collected for the average 
case, one would readily discard the resulting prediction and proceed on the basis 
of introspection. By looking at the internal dimension of action one can indeed 
hope to find more stability. This internal dimension can be thought of as the 
agent's character or his spontaneity of action. 
5.2 Blackboxing vs. Qualitative Method 
Behavioural models differ from models in the natural sciences. Although there is 
some scope for quantitative methods both by conducting controlled experiments 
and by using econometric techniques on available data, qualitative methods are an 
important basis for behavioural models. This arises from the concern that black 
box models of human behaviour seem especially problematic, as they prove to be 
very inflexible. Unfortunately, in management theory these black box models are 
very popular. 
A typical example would be a study claiming that benchmarking has proved 
to be bad. This result would be obtained by interviewing managers of several 
listed companies, asking them if they used benchmarking and running a regression 
looking for is a significant correlation between the use of benchmarking and stock 
market underperformance. If such a correlation could indeed be found, it would be 
argued that the hypothesis that benchmarking was bad is consistent with empirical 
data. It would then be common to argue for a "change of paradigm", replacing 
benchmarking by another high-flying concept called "reinventing the business 
process". Even if it is assumed that such a study has taken into account that 
benchmarking is used more often in mature (and therefore less profitable) 
industries and did actually compare companies of the same industry, the 
conclusion is utterly inadequate. A qualitative analysis would have provided the 
same result and more. If the whole incentive system of the industry is tailored to 
meet relative performance measures, this will penalize creativity and risk taking. 
This is indeed a problem if only rival companies in the same industry are 
benchmarked. Yet, benchmarking companies of other industries (e.g. the 
electricity company benchmarks the credit card company to see whether its 
63 
Alexander Stremitzer - 978-3-631-75400-9
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:25:38AM
via free access
invoicing can be improved or the automatic teller machine company which has to 
service hardware spread geographically is benchmarking the mobile telephone 
company which has to service their transmitters) may actually be an important 
step in "reinventing" the business process. So at best, such studies do not tell 
anything new and at worst they cheat the reader into believing that something that 
required so much hard-working data gathering must be correct189• 
5.3 Heuristic or Independent Source? 
An intermediary position could be considered allowing qualitative methods for 
heuristic purposes but insisting on quantitative methods to follow up on them. 
This is the standard textbook recommendation which can be summed up as: 
"Develop a formal model; derive a hypothesis and empirically test that hypothesis 
with technical econometrics"190• Of course, one could probably find - with much 
trouble - a group of people desperately in love and with a slight inferiority 
complex, run a regression and find that they are disproportionately keen investors 
in derivatives or a bit less sophisticated in lottery tickets. But what would be 
gained? It could be argued that by making the test, it was possible to verify if the 
predicted effect was actually happening. Otherwise, the qualitative approach 
would tend to be dogmatic191 • 
Consider this example from contract theory: Principal-agent models suggest 
that there is a trade-off between efficient incentive provision and risk-sharing. 
Still, an empirical study "suggest[ s] a positive relationship between measures of 
uncertainty and incentives rather than the posited negative trade-off'192• But this 
may well be, because risky situations are disproportionably situations where some 
new project is tried. New projects make it difficult to effectively monitor agents 
because there is no prior experience which would have allowed the setting up of a 
production function. If monitoring is not viable, incentive pay is the only way to 
provide incentives. Alternatively, agents in theses areas could be less risk-averse 
due to self-selection effects. 
189 This epistemic pessimism with regard to empirical studies in microeconomics seems to be 
shared by Caldwell (1994), p. 147. The reason why this seems so provocative is that "the grip 
of positivism, with its optimism and, yes, its arrogance about the methods of science, has yet to 
be completely loosened within economics" (Caldwell (1994), p. 149. This has Jong been the 
position of the Austrian subjectivists. 
19° Colander (I 994); p. 35 
191 see Czayka (1991); p. 137 
192 Prendergast (2002) 
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This example suggests that it is always possible to save a hypothesis by 
generating new hypotheses. Popper wanted to restrain these "ad-hoc" hypotheses 
to statements that could be subjected to a new test. This, however, ignores that 
introspection might be an independent source of knowledge which can validate a 
model just as consistency with empirical data could. 
5.4 The Hermeneutical Method and a priorism 
Especially if one is not concerned with an average agent, but rather with an 
individual agent in a well-defined and rather unique situation193 , one will probably 
not discard the information that might be available on this agent as irrelevant and 
use the behavioural model that was derived in a standard situation in trying to find 
out what the average agent would do. One would rather try to tentatively model 
the agent's behaviour using all the available information. There will be empirical 
facts: There will be information on the agent's background. There may be 
accounts of his actions in the past. There may even be interviews conducted with 
this person. The basic idea is that the observer will try to "understand" by asking 
himself how he would act in the given situation, taking account of the fact that the 
agent may be a quite different person. However, both are still human beings, so 
some commensurability can arguably be assumed. 
Mises claims that there is complete commensurability between the perceiver 
and the perceived object in social sciences. He argues that human action is always 
subject to rationality as the only category available to the human mind. As 
perceiving subjects, human beings have the same faculty of cognition at their 
disposal as in their role as acting individuals. So, the rational human being studies 
the consequences of rationality in human action. It is therefore not by empirical 
data that human behaviour is predicted but by mere introspection 194 • In the natural 
sciences this is quite different: There is no a priori commensurability. Perceptions 
are rationally structured and it is hoped that there is commensurability between 
193 This is precisely the emphasis of game theory, see Rasrnusen (1994), p. 2. 
194 "The real thing which is the subject matter of praxeology, human action, sterns from the same 
source as human reasoning. Action and reason are congeneric and homogeneous; they may 
even be called two different aspects of the same thing. That reason has the power to make clear 
through pure ratiocination the essential features of action is a consequence of the fact that 
action is an offshoot of reason. The theorems attained by correct praxeological reasoning are 
not only perfectly certain and incontestable, like the correct mathematical theorems. They 
refer, moreover, with the full rigidity of their apodictic certainty and incontestability to the 
reality of action as it appears in life and history. Praxeology conveys exact and precise 
knowledge ofreal things." Mises (1949), p. 39 
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the human representation of reality and the unanimated world because of the 
metaphysical assumption of the stability of nature. 
Mises therefore argues that, because there is a complete structural symmetry 
between the perceiving subject and the object of cognition in the social sciences, it 
is possible to derive a priori synthetic truths by introspection. It was, however, 
noted that even if the existence of Kantian a priori synthetic propositions is 
acknowledged, "they have a limited power to generate substantive implications 
for economic behaviour"195 • In fact, "a number of a posteriori auxiliary 
propositions are also required, such as transitivity or consistency of choices" 196• 
This highlights the importance of behavioural experiments. 
As was already mentioned, "Understanding"197 as a method proceeds by 
"psychological reduction". This is arguably an alternative way of achieving some 
kind of objectivity other than using controlled experimentation. Basically, it is 
important for the observer to reflect on his own intentionality, on the context, on 
grammatical differences, and to fade them out by becoming conscious of them. 
The objective is to put oneself in the shoes of another person in order to anticipate 
his behaviour. But, somehow, in the end, assumptions about preferences have to 
be made. Claiming that these assumptions are true regardless of the empirical 
evidence make the approach potentially dogmatic198 or arbitrary. Yet, this need not 
be the case. "Understanding" is not just, as it is sometimes claimed, a euphemism 
for arbitrariness. Behavioural assumptions are required to be "critically 
acceptable" 199• "The experts may disagree, but only on the grounds of a reasonable 
interpretation of the evidence available."200 
195 Blaug (1994), pp. 132f 
196 Blaug (1994), p. 132; It was shown in the Section on rational choice the mere fact that 
behaviour is purposeful is not enough. A number of additional axioms e.g. the independence 
axiom has to be assumed. For these assumptions, specifying rationality independent tests can 
be formulated e.g. like in the experiments that lead to the Allais Paradox. They are therefore a 
posteriori. 
197 "Verstehen" 
198 Czayka (1991), p. 137 
199 Boland (1994), p. 164 argues that many disciples of Popper claim that the notion of "critical 
acceptance" was much more important to Popper than "falsificationism" which was unduly 
emphasized by Lakatos and the subsequent discussion. 
200 Mises (1949), p. 52 
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The historical method2°1 is therefore - in the view of the author - an 
important and independent source of knowledge that is indispensable if the 
specific agents and not the average agent are considered, as is the case in 
contract theory. The cognitive status of economics is not only "empirical 
regularity" as in the natural sciences; but empirical evidence, if available, will 
always be welcome. 
6 Empirical Methods 
6.1 Introduction 
Having agued that introspection is an independent source of knowledge, the same 
is true for empirical evidence. These two sources of knowledge do not compete 
against each other but rather complement each other. 
6.2 Reviving Monism 
6.2.1 Theory of Revealed Preferences 
The theory of revealed preferences tries to show that the preference structure of an 
agent can, in principle, be derived by systematic observation. This can be seen as 
part of the neo-positivist programme of only accepting statements that are either 
directly observable or analytically derived from directly observable statements. If 
this is possible, it would question the above statement that the cognitive status of 
economics is - at least in part - introspection. 
The theory of revealed preferences, however, requires stability in the form 
of consistency-like restrictions on rational behaviour that were discussed above in 
the Section on rational choice; but even if one feels comfortable with assuming 
stability, which cannot be proven empirically, it will be practically impossible to 
derive the whole set of beliefs by observation. Therefore, it is more a theoretical 
possibility than a practical methodology to derive the preference structure. 
6.2.2 Panphysicalism 
Panphysicalism has the vision to suspend the difference between the social 
sciences and the natural sciences. If the human being can be interpreted as a 
201 In management this is often somewhat loosely referred to as "relying on (business) 
judgement". 
67 
Alexander Stremitzer - 978-3-631-75400-9
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:25:38AM
via free access
mechanical creature, it should be possible to model his behaviour by a set of 
theories from the natural sciences. The light waves from a given object would hit 
the retina, create a stimulus, would be conducted to the brain, cause chemical 
processes that eventually conclusively lead to an act of thinking, which in turn 
might elicit a physical reaction. Human behaviour would no longer be modelled 
by situational analysis as described above. Everything would be the result of a 
purely physical, material and mechanical process accessible by the method of the 
natural sciences and therefore resolving scientific dualism. So far, panphysicalism 
has shown itself to be fruitless and, even taking a very optimistic outlook, the 
prospects for it to succeed are low202• 
6.3 Interviews 
Interviews can be used to validate models both on the level of behavioural 
assumptions and on the level of overall predictions. In in-depth interviews, people 
can be asked about their motivations. So, instead of deriving the preference 
function by systematic observation as in the theory of revealed preference, one is 
directly asking people for their preference structure. The problem is that it is not 
clear if people are reflecting their choices sufficiently in order to be able to answer 
such questions; and even if they are able they might not be willing to do so. There 
will probably be much deception and self-deception, which will be difficult to 
fade out with interview techniques. 
Another reason to conduct an interview is to ask about facts. This will be 
helpful in drawing up the situational setting of a model or in verifying if a model 
can be applied. So, in contract theory for instance, it is important to know the 
details of a transaction in order to be able to devise a mechanism that deals with 
potential problems. 
The third motivation for conducting interviews would be to tap business 
judgement in order to test a theoretical solution. In applied economics it is often 
the case - as will be argued in more detail later - that there are many different 
effects which together are relevant to the problem. In this case it will be necessary 
to apply business judgement in order to weigh the different arguments. Yet, 
business judgement only arises close to the specific problems of the industry and 
will often not be available to the modeller. So, he can translate the model into a 
fictional case study and ask experts whether they think that a problem as 
described to them is adequately solved203 • 
202 see Mises (1949), p. 18 
203 Kreps (1990), p. 8 calls this the "market test". 
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6.4 Controlled Experiment 
The ideal in the empirical sciences is controlled experiment. Yet, for many 
economic models, like models of the stock market or models of the economy as a 
whole, this is not feasible. When it comes to behavioural models, however, such 
controlled experiments can indeed be made. It is e.g. possible to let people play 
the prisoner's dilemma or the repeated prisoner's dilemma in an experimental 
setting. There is evidence that the prisoner's dilemma will be played according to 
the predictions of game theory, but this is not the case for the repeated prisoner's 
dilemma with a definite ending. Specifically, the rational prediction in this case is 
that the game will unravel backwards204• Still, people normally cooperate. This 
leads to the question asked by Smith: "Why is it that human subjects in the 
laboratory frequently violate the canons of rational choice when tested as isolated 
individuals, but in the social context of exchange institutions serve up decisions 
that are consistent (as though by magic) with predictive models based on 
individual rationality?"205 
In the above case of the repeated prisoner's dilemma with a definite ending, 
a little detail in the description of the experimental setting can be changed and 
predictions will fit the evidence. Cooperation is indeed the rational strategy if 
there is uncertainty about when the game will end206 • Therefore, the question can 
be asked whether there are many situations in life where long-term relationships 
are known to have a definite ending. If this is not the case - as might plausibly be 
argued - the relevance of the above experiment is put into question. Consider the 
evolutionary argument that people do not make complicated calculations but live 
by norms and maxims which arguably converge to the rational result. So, given 
that there is frequently uncertainty about the ending of long-term relationships, 
people may just not make the distinction when confronted with artificial 
experimental settings. 
For another example in the same spirit, consider the following: If people are 
asked to name probabilities under which they prefer a gamble, stipulating l 00 
dollars or death as possible outcomes, to a gamble offering 10 dollars for sure, 
many people would refuse to name such a probability, contrary to the continuity 
assumption implicit in expected utility theory. But, if asked to either accept l 0 
dollars now or drive to a nearby location where a 100 dollar check is waiting, 
204 In the last round, the player defects, which is why there is no reason not to defect in the round 
before etc. 
205 Smith, V. (1991), p. 894 
206 Kreps (I 990), pp. 505f; Gibbons (2001), p. 9 footnote 7 
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most people would probably get into their car. This, even though driving the car 
will marginally increase their chances of death207• Once again, an artificial 
experimental setting was created. 
Another problem is self-fulfilling prophecies in the social sciences. If, for 
instance, a model predicting insolvency is widely used among banks, it will 
probably be very accurate in predicting insolvencies. This, however, does not 
automatically mean that it is a good model. If the banks act on the presumption 
that a company will "go bust" then they will call back credit lines and impose 
other restrictions, thereby actually increasing the chance of insolvency. Nature, on 
the contrary, does not care about human thinking. 
Experiments are interesting empirical checks. There are, however, good 
reasons to mistrust them in some circumstances. They should therefore be 
regarded in social sciences as a piece in the puzzle and not as the ultimate 
yardstick as in the natural sciences. 
6.5 Econometrics - Historical Experiment 
Conclusions about overall effects cannot be tested in controlled experiments. It is 
too difficult to reproduce conditions. Only historical experiments are available. 
The challenge with historical experiments is to find comparable situations. Every 
situation is unique. Of course, it can be argued that two situations are similar with 
respect to relevant factors and all other factors can be modelled as white noise, but 
this approach already presupposes a theory about all relevant factors and is 
therefore not pure data mining. 
Still, even if comparable situations are found, there are often many factors 
but only little data and low scale levels. Then, econometric methods do not 
work208• When studying capital markets it will be difficult to set up experiments. 
Yet, a lot of data is available. This makes econometric time series analysis viable. 
The problem gets more severe for the economy as a whole because, at the macro 
level, controlled experiment is usually not available as in the financial markets. 
Furthermore, compared to the financial markets, less data is available and more 
factors have to be taken into account. The multitude of factors can be reduced by 
using aggregated entities. This approach will be further explored below. 
207 see Kreps ( 1990), p. 7 6 
208 There is a general doubt if data in economics is good enough to produce telling tests ( see 
Caldwell (1994), p. 144 who refers to the book "The Inexact and Separate Theory of Science 
of Economics" of Daniel Hausman (1992)). 
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In contract theory, econometric tests are basically feasible. The problem is 
the variety of cases and the large amount of variables that have to be taken care 
of. Collecting cases will be difficult for confidentiality. Many variables and a 
small sample is, however, a bad starting point for econometric testing. 
6.6 Informal evidence 
With respect to econometrics, Summer criticized209 the tendency for ever more 
complicated formal econometric tests. He claims that they have had little impact 
on the evolution of macroeconomics and are rather driven by the fact that the cost 
of computing has dramatically decreased. He argues that it is far more convincing 
to have a multitude of informal, low-level empirical evidence than to look for the 
single, formal and decisive test. Mayer's argument is in the same vein, when 
saying that economists focus too much on the strongest links of their reasoning, 
neglecting the weakest link210• It is argued that for theory appraisal it is rather the 
consistency of the entire picture which matters. 
6. 7 The Problem of Aggregation 
In economics it is rarely possible to determine empirical success in a conclusive 
way, largely because of the impossibility of controlled experiment and the 
absence of constant relations. So, economics resides more on methodological 
individualism than on systematic empirical testing of its predictive success. 
The idea is that, if the actions of individual agents can be logically 
aggregated, it is possible to derive an aggregate prediction. This prediction will 
have empirical relevance to the extent that the underlying behavioural 
assumptions are empirically valid and the analytical construction is correct. This 
is the main idea behind the requirement to make behavioural modeling 
assumptions realistic. 
There is, however, reason not to push too far the requirement of consistency 
within behavioural models. This is especially true where the thread of causality 
wears very thin due to problems of aggregation. This is the case for situations 
where the precision of measurement is too low relative to the sensitivity of the 
model (see Chaos Theory), but there are also problems of aggregation if there are 
too many countervailing effects and the scale level of data is low. The predicted 
209 Summers ( 1991) cit. Backhouse ( 1994 ), p. 15 
210 Mayer ( 1993) cit. Backhouse ( 1994 ), p. 15 
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overall effect often results from a bundle of different effects. It is impossible to 
assign each effect its relative strength. The problem of countervailing effects is 
quite common in applied economics. Theoretical models often only consider a 
single effect, but in applied economics it is the problem and not analytical 
convenience which dictates the scope of effects that have to be considered211 • 
Consider the example of a lawyer who is working for a company compared 
to a lawyer working for a private individual. It is likely that the company is less 
risk-averse than the lawyer. It is also likely that the company is more sophisticated 
about legal matters than a private client, and that it can therefore better appreciate 
the lawyer's qualification. Better knowledge of the law will also allow the 
company to more effectively monitor the lawyer's performance. Finally, the 
chance of the company becoming a regular client and its capability to influence 
the lawyer's reputation in business circles is higher; but which effect was the 
more important? Could the news spreading capability be important while 
knowledge of law is unimportant? If it is possible to find a company which is 
sophisticated about law but for some reason not a likely future client and not well 
entrenched in business circles, and another company for which this is also the 
case, but a difference in contracting is found, this would suggest that reputation 
effects are present. But how many cases can be found where everything is the 
same except for one variable? 
If it is not possible to quantify the different effects, the problem cannot be 
solved by just taking sums. Unfortunately, predictive precision with respect to 
time and extent is bad in economics. Economic theories are most often statements 
oftendency212 • However tempting2 13, creating virtual precision214 by making strong 
assumptions will come at the heavy price of a loss of generality. Worse, the 
transparency of the model will be affected. One possibility is to circumvent the 
problem by only considering cases wherein all effects point in the same direction. 
If, however, one wants to extend the analysis to other problems, the best possible 
method to weigh the relative strength of countervailing effects is by making a 
judgement in the light of specific circumstances. The criterion for this argument 
will not be strict causality but rather adequacy within the objective framework 
defined by the model. There will, however, remain ambiguity. This idea is related 
to the idea of applied microeconomics as an art, which will be treated below. 
211 "problem orientation", see Colander (1994), p. 44 
212 see Hutchison (1994), p. 30 
213 There exists "the tendency to oversell the subject" (Blaug (1994), p. 118) to respond to the 
demands for precision from government and businesses. 
214 see Colander (1994), p. 41 who calls this a violation of "the law of significant digits". 
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One should note that problems of aggregation cannot be expected to be 
solved by simulation. The advantage of simulation is that it helps to numerically 
solve a problem for which there is no closed-form solution. Simulations can 
therefore give models more empirical validity by allowing for more complex and 
more realistic assumptions. Simulation, however, cannot overcome the problem of 
countervailing effects in the presence of statements of tendency. The only way 
this could be simulated is by specifying functions which would create artificial 
precision. 
6.8 Macro modeling: Beyond Methodological Individualism 
The alternative to micro-foundation would be to accept a model which rests on 
black box statistical regularities or patterns which can be found between different 
entities on the macro-level. If it is e.g. possible to find out that an increase in the 
money supply is correlated with economic growth and that there is at least some 
stability in the system, one could build a model around this relationship. 
Yet, it must be clear that correlation is different from causality215 • It was also 
argued above that, contrary to the natural sciences, it is an irrefutable fact that any 
aggregated effect is the consequence of human action. Therefore, it is necessary to 
assume that there is always a fine tissue of interrelated effects on the micro-level 
that exist, but which cannot be sorted out because of the complexity of the model. 
Some would argue that there should at least exist the possibility to interpret the 
model on an individual level216 without leading to absurd consequences. 
A good example of an area where micro-foundation does not look very 
promising due to problems of aggregation is the prediction of short-term share 
prices on capital markets. A full scale attempt to model share prices from the 
perspective of methodological individualism would model the interaction of 
agents and show how their interaction leads to price formation. Another approach 
would be to take factors which can be explained to be relevant in order to predict 
share prices like market-to-book ratio, GDP growth, business or consumer 
confidence and run a regression to attribute weights to the factors. Assuming 
215 There is, however, also a statistical notion of causality. It is used if a potential explinans is not 
only correlated with the explinandum but also increases the precision of prediction if added to 
the model (the variance between the model's prediction and the observed explinandum 
decreases). e.g. Granger (1969) and (I 988) 
216 Thus Modigliani's life-cycle hypothesis or Friedman's permanent income hypothesis provide 
such a microfoundation for Keynes' claim that the marginal propensity to consume is less than 
I. see Hausman (1994), p. 209 
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stability for the future, the model would then be used for prediction. Thus, 
microeconomic models are used to identify relevant factors but quantification is 
done by running regressions. Alternatively, one could ask which variables yielded 
the best ex post facto predictions accepting any variable (i.e. without restraining 
the list of possible factors to variables which are plausibly connected to the 
explinandum). Yet, the danger in trying to make the model fit the data is that it 
will fit this particular data set but nothing else. This is the reason why the obtained 
relationship must be tested with a control set of data. Only if this produces good 
results can it be hoped that a general pattern has been discovered. 
Evidence from models predicting share prices suggest that purely statistical 
models derived by data mining are more successful than models based on 
macroeconomic variables or fundamental company data217• This leads to the old 
dilemma: What should be valued more, past predictive success, which might as 
well be purely coincidental, or plausible construction? As stated above, tension 
should be preserved to stimulate further research. The recent surge in behavioural 
finance can be seen in this context. The phenomenon of overshooting is a good 
example of this. It can be established by statistical methods that prices tend to 
overshoot in financial markets, suggesting that trends are self-reenforcing, but the 
underlying herd behaviour can also be explained on the individual level. It is like 
choosing between two restaurants. One is recommended in the guide, but maybe 
in the neighbouring restaurant there are more people. If it is assumed that these 
people also make choices on the basis of the best information available to them, it 
is reasonable to distrust the information in the guide. So by interpreting the 
actions of others, it is rational to go into the other restaurant. But this will shift the 
bias in favour of that restaurant even more for the next potential guests. So a 
random choice by the first guests, if interpreted in the described way by 
subsequent guests, may create herd behaviour. 
In situations where aggregation is problematic, statistical correlation 
between aggregated entities may replace microanalytical modeling, which is 
causality research in a traditional sense218 • 
217 see footnote 86 
218 Caldwell (I 994 ), p. 151 observes that, "it is significant that the field in which economists are 
most likely to take data seriously is the branch that is most distant from standard 
microeconomic theory." 
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6.9 Verificationism vs. Falsifications: A Normative Evaluation 
A general point shall be made on empirical methodology: It was shown above that 
falsificationism, despite its popularity, does not solve the major epistemological 
problems as it originally claimed. In the following it is analysed in which way 
falsificationism differs from the verificationist brand of empiricism in its practical 
prescriptions (as a methodology)219• 
If by falsifiability of theories it is meant that theories which cannot be tested 
are not scientific, this would be potentially harmful. Testing methods could not be 
available or theories not yet sufficiently operational. If, however, it is only 
demanded that theories are falsifiable in principle, this is nothing else than asking 
for theories to say something about reality. This is neither spectacular nor new: A 
theory that is not excluding a subset of the set of all possible outcomes is 
apparently useless. This led Caldwe//220 to claim that falsificationism, if 
interpreted narrowly, is too restrictive and, if interpreted broadly, loses its 
normative value. Hausman is even more critical in claiming that "falsificationism 
as a purely logical relation between theories and basic statements [ ... ] is irrelevant 
to any important questions concerning science," and that "Popper's relevant views 
concerning falsificationism as a methodology [ ... ] are unfounded and 
unacceptable. "221 
It is true that falsificationism circumvents the problem of inductivism. Still, 
there is not that much difference between the two approaches as it might appear at 
first sight. A bold new theory is bold and new because it is saying something 
different about reality than the original theory. So, falsification is just the flipside 
of verification. If a bold new theory is falsified, this is automatically a verification 
of the old theory. Obviously, verification of a bold new theory and falsification of 
an old existing theory are among the more spectacular findings222• So, all the fuss 
made about falsification boils down to the simple prescriptio that a scientist 
should rather focus on bold new theories challenging the traditional ways of 
thinking than spend his time finding corroborating evidence for already 
established theories. 
219 see Caldwell (1994), p. 144 refers to Hausman (1988,1992) for this two-pronged criticism of 
Popper (epistemological, methodological argument). 
22° Caldwell (I 982), p. 236 
221 see Hausman (1988), p. 65 
222 Chalmers (1994), pp. 56 ff 
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Is this a wise prescription? Emphasis on bold new theories certainly 
promotes creativity and change. In fact, repeating the experiments of Galileo all 
over again in order to prove the law of gravity makes everybody yawn, but 
emphasis on adapting old theories and making incremental changes sometimes 
helps fledgling theories to develop to their full potential223 • It is an often-cited 
example that, by Popperian standards, the heliocentric theory of Copernicus 
which ultimately led to Newtonian mechanics would have been falsified right 
away because it initially produced inferior predictions224• Fortunately, people like 
Galileo continued to work on it. 
This fundamental criticism was addressed by Lakatos ' methodology of 
scientific research programmes. In fact, the heliocentric view would have been 
falsified because many auxiliary hypotheses that were needed to test it were 
actually false225• This is an example of the so-called Duhem-Quine thesis, which 
"demonstrates that it is just as difficult to conclusively falsify a hypothesis as to 
verify it because every test of a hypothesis is in fact a joint test of the hypothesis 
in question, the quality of the data, the measuring instruments employed, and a 
host of auxiliary hypotheses"226 In the event of falsification there is an 
identification problem: One cannot unambiguously blame the central hypothesis. 
Therefore, a structured approach to falsification is proposed by Lakatos. If e.g. it 
is stated that information asymmetry leads to market failure and this theory is 
applied to a client-consultant relationship where information asymmetry exists, 
and no market failure is observed, one should rather assume that in this case 
reputation effects did in fact offset the predicted effect than discard the whole 
theory. In the terminology of Lakatos: the "theoretical core" is surrounded by a 
"protective belt" of hypotheses227 • If a prediction is falsified, hypotheses in the 
protective belt should be adjusted but not the theoretical core. By adjusting 
hypotheses, new testable predictions are made. This is done as long as the 
theoretical core is "progressive" (i.e. leads to the prediction of novel facts228), but 
glancing through the history of science, this criterion seems difficult to apply229• 
223 Popper admitted that Kuhn had opened his eyes on the importance of "normal" science, which 
tries to fully unfold the potential of a given paradigm without challenging its central tenets. 
224 see Miiki ( 1994 ), p. 254 - Miiki makes reference to Rosenberg ( 1992), Chalmers ( 1994), p. 70f 
225 Some planets were not yet discovered, the assumed distance between Earth and the fixed stars 
was wrong. 
226 Blaug (1994), p. 111 
227 Blaug (1994), p. 114 
228 Blaug (I 994 ), p. 115 
229 see Chalmers (1994), pp. 82f 
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Popperian falsificationism and the traditional verificationist approach are 
not as different as they seem. Their difference is merely a difference of emphasis 
on how science should best be advanced. For a falsificationist the emphasis is on 
bold new theories, whereas for the verificationist it is on developing the full 
potential of existing theories. 
7 Applied Microeconomics 
7.1 Applied Microeconomics as an Art 
John Neville Keynes understood applied economics as the formulation of "maxims 
for practical guidance" and called it an "art"230• Mises likened it to the historical 
method of understanding: "Everybody uses understanding in dealing with the 
uncertainty of future events to which he must adjust his own actions. The 
distinctive reasoning of the speculator is an understanding of the relevance of the 
various factors determining future events. And [ ... ] action necessarily always 
aims at future and therefore uncertain conditions and thus is always speculation. 
Acting man looks, as it were, with the eyes of a historian into the future." 231 There 
is an objective framework, but the rest is the careful weighing of arguments. The 
historian first "analyzes [ ... ] each object of [ ... his] studies with the aid of the 
mental tools provided by all other sciences. Having achieved this preliminary 
work, [ ... he] faces [ ... his] own specific problem; the elucidation of the unique 
and individual features of the case by means of understanding"232 • The solution is 
not exact. It is rather rationally acceptable, transparently argued, appropriate and 
defendable within the objective framework. Therefore, the cognitive status of 
scientific analysis and practical judgement is different233 • Judgement involves 
problem orientation. It is only possible to weigh the importance of the arguments 
under the specific circumstances. Therefore, the reasoning is close to the specific 
problem. The process tries to combine analytical reasoning, which provides an 
objective framework, with judgement. As art starts, where scientific analysis ends 
and judgement begins, scientific reasoning and judgement should not be separated 
in applied microeconomics234. 
230 see Colander(l994),p. 35; Keynes,J. N.; (1891),p. 29 
231 Mises (I 949), p. 58 
232 Mises ( 1949), p. 5 I 
233 see Schiilein; Reitze (200 I), pp. I 92f who make the distinction between "denotative" and 
"connotative" theories to capture roughly the same issues. 
234 Clausewitz makes some very interesting remarks on this issue in his famous book "On War". 
Clausewitz (1832), II.2.ii. p. 134 "Schwierigkeit, das Erkennen vom Urteil zu sondem" Note 
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Schiilein/Reitze suggest that the problem of finding an appropriate scientific 
method for a given field of interest is actually to find an approach which 
represents the right kind of mixture235 between the two elements. They argue that 
in the social sciences there is no scope for fruitful analytical reasoning236• The 
author disagrees: Economic theory developed tools that can be applied to complex 
social settings. Especially since the 1980's, the advent of game theory led 
economics to switch from "generalizing" to "exemplifying theory"237• Instead of 
telling what will happen, game theoretic models tell "Stories that Might be 
True"238• This is actually criticized by Fisher because by telling different stories, it 
is difficult to know which of the stories are relevant to the real world239• On the 
other hand, Rasmusen points out that "there are also a great many 'Stories that 
Can't be True'"240• Therefore, analytical modeling helps to weed out incoherent 
descriptions. The most fruitful method of economics, in the view of the author, is 
to combine pure analytical reasoning, starting from axioms and very specific 
treatment of real world problems in case studies and leaving out the middle 
ground. 
In the quest for the optimal contract, judgement will be involved at two 
stages. The first is the subsumption of a real world case under the situational and 
behavioural assumptions of the model. This is comparable to the analogical 
reasoning of law241 • The second is to solve the problem of countervailing effects. 
The model will allow the derivation of a scorecard of situational variables that 
will allow the assessment of the suitability of a given project for variable fee 
contracts. The weighing of the different effects has to be done by judgement: 'The 
historian can enumerate all the factors which cooperated in bringing about a 
known effect and all the factors which worked against them, and may have 
resulted in delaying and mitigating the final outcome. But he cannot coordinate 
except by understanding the various causative factors in a quantitative way to the 
effects produced."242 So, the scorecard gives an objective framework, but within 
that Graham very inadequately translates ,,Erkennen" with "perception" which should rather be 
"cognition". 
235 see Schiilein, Reitze (200 I), p. 203 
236 see Schiilein, Reitze (200 I), p. 197 
237 see Fisher (I 989) 
238 see Rasmusen (I 994), p. 3 
239 see Backhouse (1994), p. 15 in his interpretation of Fisher's article. 
240 Rasmusen (1994), p. 3 
241 see Rasmusen (1994), p. 3 
242 Mises ( I 949), p. 56 
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this framework there is need for arguments "to assign to the various [ ... ] factors 
their relevance"243 and to come to a final recommendation. The criterion will be 
adequacy and not exactness. 
It could, of course, be argued that it may well be that there is no better 
method available for the solving of practical issues, but that such a method could 
still not be called scientific. Such arguments would define a scientific method 
(e.g. some sort of econometric test) and subsequently declare every problem that 
is inaccessible by this method to be situated outside the scope of science. It is 
certainly fruitless to quarrel about words, but if one believes, like the author, that 
the main virtue of science is the use of reason, such a narrow definition of science 
would divulge large areas of interest to irrationality. 
7 .2 Convergence of Applied Microeconomics and BWL 
Microeconomics was traditionally price theory. Starting from assumptions 
like complete information and perfectly competitive markets, it can be shown that 
a general equilibrium can be obtained which is Pareto optimal. More realistic 
assumptions were brushed aside as irrelevant complications. Economists were 
confident that, in Marshall's words, "natura non facit saltum"244 • Even if the 
assumptions did not fully describe reality, it was nevertheless argued that small 
deviations from the assumption would not change the model. This claim was more 
a dogmatic credo than a critically reflected insight. However, it was not only 
unrealistic assumptions that questioned the empirical relevance of microeconomic 
models; it was also its complete silence concerning important phenomena. 
Institutions, for instance, could not be explained. Firms were simply summed up 
as production functions. The standard answer to their existence, if it could not be 
explained by technological requirements, was the suspicion that they had 
something to do with market power. 
On the other hand, it was the field of management which consisted largely 
of generalizing practical experience and recording best practice. The German 
"Betriebswirtschaftslehre" was more ambitious. It set out to create an 
interdisciplinary science, drawing from all fields that were relevant to the firm 
with the objective of creating tools while attempting to explain and understand. 
This also included microeconomic theory, especially for market pricing and 
production, but otherwise microeconomics could safely be ignored. 
243 Mises (1949), p. 67 
244 see Stiglitz (2000), who recalls the motto on the title page of Principles of Economics, 
Marshall 
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The advantage of the microeconomic approach is its formal properties, as 
was argued above. It is flexible and transparent. Moreover, the analytical power of 
mathematics can be used. This is achieved by separating the sphere of 
assumptions and the sphere of analytical truth. The advantage of 
"Betriebswirtschaftslehre" is its long tradition as an interdisciplinary science and 
its intricate knowledge of real-world institutions. For the field of contract theory, 
it is argued that there is a convergence of the two approaches. 
Microeconomics has gone a long way over the last two decades. One 
development has been the economics of information. It was shown that the claim 
that the assumption about complete information was innocuous could not be 
upheld. Major discontinuities could be shown to arise for small informational 
imperfections245 • The second notable development was the use of game theory, 
which boosted the use of the rational paradigm in areas outside the impersonal 
market mechanism. The third development was the interdisciplinary opening of 
microeconomics. With all these developments, the microanalytical method could 
be extended to other social sciences like sociology, law and political 
philosophy246• Specifically, a microeconomic theory of the firm evolved. 
"Betriebswirtschaftslehre" has traditionally been very open to all approaches247 • At 
the same time, a certain development can be recognized towards stricter 
methodological standards. 
One major difference between Betriebswirtschaftslehre and theoretical 
microeconomics is that the latter is often concerned with modeling isolated 
effects, whereas the former is problem oriented. Problems, however, will not be 
confined to a single effect. A bundle of different effects has to be considered in 
order to develop solutions for problems. This creates difficulties for the economic 
approach as the axiomatic closed-form approach cannot simultaneously capture 
all relevant effects. Moreover, the status of microeconomic predictions most 
frequently is that of qualitative248 statements of tendency. Thus, effects cannot 
simply be added. Therefore, judgement is required to weigh the relative strength 
of the different effects. 
245 "Within information economics discontinuities abound." Stiglitz (2000), p. 1456 
246 Major proponents are Gary Becker (sociology), Richard Posner (law) and James Buchanan 
(political philosophy). This has contributed to the image of"economic imperialism". 
247 see e.g. Gutenberg's Production Theory 
248 see Blaug (1994), p. 118 who attributes the distinction between "quantitative" and "qualitative 
calculus" to Samuelson. 
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By taking the insights of "Betriebswirtschaftslehre" to microeconomics, one 
can actually increase the empirical relevance of microeconomics. This is because 
only if recommendations for realistic problems are given, theories can be tested. 
In addition, by drawing on the large descriptive base of "Betriebswirtschaftslehre" 
better models can be created, also with respect to micro-foundation. 
By taking the approach of microeconomics to "Betriebswirtschaftslehre" it 
becomes a more rigorous science, which in tum will help to build theories. 
Contrary to common prejudice, the microeconomic approach is not necessarily 
reductionist. It is as large or reductionist as the modeller wants it to be. On the 
other hand, there are problems of tractability. These can partly be overcome by 
simulation, but in every case where quantification creates artificial precision, it is 
better to restrict oneself to qualitative modeling. 
Therefore, at least with respect to contract theory, it can be said that good 
applied microeconomics must be "Betriebswirtschaftslehre" and good 
"Betriebswirtschaftslehre" must be microeconomics. 
8 Model of Optimal Contract Design 
8.1 Economics of Institutions 
Following the standard microeconomic approach, it is possible to analytically 
derive the behaviour of economic agents starting from their preference structure 
and assumptions about the situational context. It has been shown above that any 
behavioural assumption can be cast into this framework. If it is possible to change 
the situational context, the agent's behaviour can be influenced. This is especially 
interesting in situations where it can be shown that the agent's behaviour leads to 
undesirable consequences. 
Institutional arrangements like contracts play a special role in this respect. 
They are part of the situational context, but they are not "given" by nature like 
other situational parameters. If two parties conclude a labour contract, they cannot 
change the nature of the job: A salesman will have to move around, making it 
difficult for his company to monitor his performance. But it is easy to decide to 
use a variable fee contract instead of a flat fee contract. The main idea in 
institutional economics is to interpret institutional arrangements as a tool to 
maximize welfare. The approach is analogous to Buchanan's constitutional 
economic analysis which "attempts to explain the working properties of 
alternative sets of legal-institutional-political rules that constrain the choices and 
activities of economic agents, the rules that define the framework within which 
the ordinary choices of economic and political agents are made.[ ... T]he whole 
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exercise is aimed at offering guidance to those who participate in discussions of 
constitutional change [ ... C]onstitutional economics offers a potential for 
normative advice to members of the constitutional convention [ ... ] It examines 
the choice of constraints as opposed to the choice within constraints."249 Similarly, 
the contract is sometimes aptly called the "lex contracta" in legal theory, 
underscoring that the contracting parties are in the position of the "constitutional 
assembly", passing the laws applicable to their relationship. Therefore, contract 
theory, as it is understood in this dissertation, potentially offers counsel to the 
parties of a contract. Stuck in a situation wherein they achieve only suboptimal 
outcomes, they strive to set constraints which will allow them to achieve higher 
levels of outcome. Thus, contrary to what is commonly assumed, writing a 
contract is not mainly a legal problem. As in all problems "de lege ferenda" 
economic issues will play a role. For parties concluding a contract, existing law 
and the judicial system are just some restrictions among others that have to be 
taken into account250• Consider the example of two parties who could realise gains 
of trade by exchanging goods in their possession. If no mechanism can be found 
to ensure that the counter party performs once the first party has performed its 
part, no transaction will take place, resulting in a welfare loss. By concluding an 
enforceable contract this problem would be solved. Yet, sometimes not just any 
contract would do the trick. The problem of the optimal contract can thus be 
defined as the contract maximizing welfare, given situational parameters and the 
agents' preference structure. 
8.2 Solving for the Optimal Contract 
There are a multitude of different effects which can lead to problems in 
transactions and need to be dealt with in order to capture the potential gains of 
trade. These effects can be captured in models which assume an abstract 
situational setting and which analytically derive the consequences for given 
assumptions about the preference structure of the agents involved. 
For concreteness, consider the case of "moral hazard with hidden action" 
which can be summarized in the following story: If A hires B to perform a certain 
task, it is often plausible to assume that B, whose effort is relevant to the outcome 
of the project, is better informed about his decisions with respect to effort than A. 
If A pays B a flat fee, regardless of outcome, it is easy to see that B has no 
249 Buchanan (1989), p. 64; emphasis added 
250 Except for the legislator, who can change the law, but also the legislator's problem could be 
seen as an economic problem. He will, however, also pursue other goals which are not 
primarily concerned with maximizing welfare. 
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incentive to exert any effort at all, assuming that he dislikes effort. If no effort is 
exerted, many projects are likely to result in a loss for A: The pay-off from the 
project is lower than the flat fee paid to B. A, anticipating low effort, will not hire 
B at all. The project, however, might be profitable for A and B if only B could 
commit to exerting effort. This is because, in the situation where B exerts high 
effort, there exists a salary low enough for A to make a profit and high enough for 
B to prefer the salary over leisure. Failure to provide appropriate incentives thus 
prevents the parties from capturing potential gains of trade resulting in a welfare 
loss. If it is possible to show that a variable fee contract does create incentives for 
B to exert effort at no extra cost, it can be said that introducing variable fee 
contracts results in higher welfare. Therefore, variable fee contracts would be 
better than fixed fee contracts in situations wherein B has private information with 
respect to his actions. 
Effectively in this approach, optimization occurs through a two-step 
procedure. First, a finite set of candidates for optimal contract is set up. Then, 
these contracts are ranked and the highest ranking contract is taken as the optimal 
contract. This is an exercise of comparative institutional analysis. An alternative 
approach is to mathematically solve for the optimal contract by using control 
theory models. Yet, it will be seen that only very few general constraints can be 
imposed on the shape of the optimal contract. Still, a very general result can be 
derived showing that, in some situations, the optimal contract will be variable fee 
and flat fee respectively. In order to derive more meaningful constraints additional 
restrictions are made. To reduce arbitrariness, arguments will be given for these 
restrictions ( e.g. why only linear contracts are considered and others are 
discarded). 
The objective of this dissertation is to identify situations in which variable 
fee contracts are preferable to flat fee contracts. On an abstract level, the method 
is therefore straightforward: By inverting the function of the optimal contract, 
each contract from the set of optimal contracts can be assigned at least one setting 
for which it is optimal. If all contracts are either flat fee or variable fee, the 
problem is solved by summarizing the settings associated with flat and variable 
fee contracts respectively. 
Besides "moral hazard with hidden action", other relevant models of 
contract theory include "moral hazard with hidden information", "adverse 
selection" and "incomplete contracts"251 • 
251 There is no commonly accepted taxonomy of contracting models. Rasmusen (1994), pp. 165f 
e.g. treats "signaling" and "screening" as separate models, while others treat them under 
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8.3 The Rationale for the Micro-foundation 
In contract theory, problems of aggregation exist, but are significantly less severe 
compared to stock market models or models of the economy as a whole. Modelled 
effects are more clear-cut and closer to individual action. Often a limited number 
of agents interact, so the approach of methodological individualism appears 
feasible. Especially in the case where a theory of contract design shall be 
developed, it is important to make use of all the relevant information concerning 
the specific contract partner and the situation, and not just an average agent and an 
average situation. As was argued above, this individualization makes it difficult to 
take recourse to black box models. Methodological individualism is therefore the 
method of choice. Even if a microanalytical model fails as a predictive model for 
share prices it can still offer insights into issues involving the microstructure252 of 
capital markets, like transaction costs for example. 
8.4 A Structured Approach 
Contracting problems are very complex. Propositions are therefore either too 
abstract or too specific253 • To develop a model for each conceivable situation 
would not be economical. This problem is familiar to lawmakers. They want to 
write a text which is concise and rigorous but they face nothing Jess diverse than a 
multitude of human relations. Their solution is to switch from the abstract to the 
casuistic, leaving out the intractible middle ground, and to have legal experts in 
between who are essentially trained in the method of creating the link between 
these two poles. Similarly the method used in optimal contract design will follow 
a structured approach. 
Colander suggested that the development of positive theory and applied 
economics were two entirely different areas. This would allow a separation of 
laoour between the theoretical and the applied researcher. The applied researcher 
would just have to try to stay up-to-date on the theoretical developments and than 
apply them to real world problems254• The author does not believe that such a 
separation is sensible. First of all, modeling assumptions have to be clearly 
understood, especially where the model derives its legitimacy from 
"adverse selection". The theory of "incomplete contracts" is often seen as a completely 
different kind of model as it assumes bounded rationality. 
252 see Loistl, Vetter (I 999); Casey (2000) 
253 see Colander (1994), p. 40: He expresses a similar thought by criticising theory which "is too 
formal for applied policy work and not formal enough for good positive economic work". 
254 Colander (I 994), p. 43 
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microfoundation. Sometimes, searching and understanding among existing 
models is more time consuming than simply setting up one's own model. Often 
when studying existing models it is more a given modeling principle than the 
specific model which is interesting for problem solving. So, the objection that this 
is like "redevelop[ing] the wheel"255 is not always warranted. Colander objects 
that the adaptation of the model should follow the more loose methodology of 
applied economics right from the beginning256• This presupposes that theoretical 
models are robust, but this is unfortunately not the case. One cannot simply take 
price theory and then somewhat loosely adjust the model to take account of 
information asymmetry. This would ignore the major discontinuities257 which can 
only be understood by analytical modeling. Therefore, analyzing robustness of 
theoretical models will be an important prerequisite for applying theory258 • A 
theorist who loses contact with application will be likely to forget that. So, while 
agreeing with Colander on the different methodological rules to be followed in 
the two areas, a strict separation of labour is not indicated. 
The models restrict attention to a small set of abstract situational variables. 
Sometimes it is difficult to see how the described effect is relevant to the specific 
relationship under consideration, like the client-consultant relationship. A solution 
to this problem is to further specify the situational variables. It is, however, 
difficult to find a reasonable level of specification. If the exposition is kept too 
abstract it will be difficult for the reader to see how this thesis can be applied to 
real world problems. If it is too specific, the exposition becomes long and stuck in 
tedious detail. As will be seen, already at a general level there is considerable 
complexity. 
In the above example, the situational variable is private information about B 
with respect to his actions. If the client and the consultant work closely together 
over the project period, then private information with respect to effort is lower 
than if the client is absent. Another relevant variable (as will be seen) is risk 
averseness: Risk averseness measures the extent by which an individual's 
valuation of a risky project falls short of its expected value. If the size of the 
consultant firm in terms of equity is smaller than the client firm relative to the 
downside potential of the project, the consultant firm will be more risk averse than 
the client firm. This is still very abstract. One could go one step further: If the 
client is a huge multinational and the consultant a small partnership, and the 
m Colander (1994), p. 38 
256 Colander ( 1994 ), p. 44 
257 Stiglitz (2000), p. 1456 
258 Colander himself implies that he considers this as important see Colander ( 1994 ), p. 45 
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project is the launch of a new product line in one division of the multinational, 
then the consultant is more risk averse than the client. But this is clearly too 
specific: If the project is no new product line but rather the decision to expand to 
new markets or to build a new plant, then the consultant would still be more risk 
averse than his client. 
In this thesis an attempt is made to strike the balance by being quite abstract 
in the general part and to give very specific examples. In the general part, the 
ultimate goal is to derive a checklist that can be used to design contracts. 
Therefore, abstract situational variables of the principal-agent argument will be 
translated into the client/consultant setting, but not any further. In some instances, 
very specific examples are given purely for ease of exposition. It is indeed a 
feature of contract theory that some models look daunting if cast in abstract terms 
but can be motivated by relatively simple examples. The subject is complex 
enough without trying to make it look even more complex. 
The approach of the general part is analytical, but contrary to many 
technical papers, the emphasis is to give intuitive explanations rather than to add 
another proof by induction. The author will also refrain from making excessive 
use of "Ockham's razor" by adding steps which may be "easy to see" for many 
authors. In the conclusions, a rather specific casuistic approach is taken to 
somewhat keep the balance. This casuistic treatment is not a mechanical 
application of the scorecard, but rather a substantial part of actual contract design. 
The first difficulty is to subsume real world problems under the different effects. 
The second difficulty is to decide on the trade-offs which cannot be explicitly 
modeled 
9 Practical Life and Theory 
If theory is ultimately a guideline to purposeful action, there is no fundamental 
difference between theory and practical action. Human action, to the extent that it 
is purposeful, always implicitly uses a theory. Beliefs to the contrary among 
practitioners are an illusion. In Schumpeter 's words: "Anyone who wishes may 
deny the value of theory, but certainly not so the 'practitioner'. For he always 
practices theory and his views are mostly nothing else than theories of 200 years 
ago."2s9 
259 ,,Mag wer will den Wert der Theorie leugnen der 'Praktiker' jedenfalls darf es nicht. Denn er 
treibt immer Theorie und seine Anschauungen sind meist nichts andres als Theorien von vor 
200 Jahren." Schumpeter (I 916), pp. 321 f- translated by the author. 
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In fact, acting individuals, whatever they do, gain experience and assimilate 
certain combinations of successful behaviour. These "ad hoc" theories are 
frequently a good approximation to more sophisticated theories. Practical decision 
rules, maxims and rules of thumb can be interpreted as the product of a conscious 
learning process or unconscious evolution by group selection. In both cases, better 
rules are likely to be selected in areas where the environment is stable, the 
frequency of feedback is high and the cost of failure small. The better the 
expected rules, the lower the likely benefit of theory and the more theory can 
learn from working close to practical experience. The benefit of theory would 
then mostly lie in cautious criticism, creating explicit knowledge as needed for 
teaching and transfer of knowledge to new situations. If frequency is low, cost of 
failure is high or situations are highly unstable, then theory will provide the most 
benefit. 
As there is no essential conflict between theory and practical life, the 
obvious conflict between people who spend most of their time thinking about 
theories and others who spend most of their time taking action is not necessarily 
given. There is just a separation of labour between producers and consumers of 
theories. This being said, it has to be acknowledged that there frequently is a gap 
between these two groups. Some people mainly concerned with theory tend to 
overanalyse in situations where time is limited and marginal cost of higher 
precision exceeds marginal utility. In addition, uneasiness about lack of available 
data, insecurity, personal hardship and over-toppling events can prove a liability 
for theorists when confronted with real-life problems. 
The most striking difference that was mentioned is different time horizons. 
In practical decision making it is to a large extent the schedule which dictates the 
amount of time spent to search for a solution. In science it will be more the 
problem and standards for adequate problem solution which dictate the time 
frame, but just as chess and lightening chess will require different talents, both 
players will play by the rules of chess. 
Moreover, theoretical concepts are often very abstract. Application to 
practical problems is not always obvious. This is partly due to the fact that not 
every theory has yet achieved the state of technology. While not being directly 
relevant to practical decisions, it may, however, ultimately lead to better 
technology. Another reason why theories can become practically irrelevant is if 
they show too little resistance to limited or inaccurate information owing to an 
obsession with certain theorists to sacrifice generality for virtual precision260• 
260 Such "overselling" will paradoxically help make theories more popular in the short term but 
contribute to long-term frustration. 
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Sometimes the problem is language. Every community tends to create its own 
way of communicating, sometimes making it difficult for practitioners and 
theorists to exchange ideas. 
Practical decision rules and theory have the same structure and the same 
ultimate intention. The gap between them cannot be fully avoided due to 
separation of labour but should, as a rule, not become unnecessarily wide and 
possibly closed. Therefore, theory should in principle be user friendly: 
Unnecessarily complicated language, unwarranted abstraction and obsession with 
artificial precision should be avoided. 
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IV Analytical Agency Models 
1 Overview 
In the Section (2.1 ), a basic model is set up to analyse the situation wherein effort 
is uncontractible. It will be seen that parties will switch to output contracting. In 
the third Section (2.2) this very general result will be explicitly modelled by 
making rather strong assumptions about distributions, utility functions and the 
structure of the incentive scheme. Subsequently, in Section (2.3) a closer look is 
taken at risk-sharing, still within this very explicit framework. Section (2.4) will 
be general again. The intention is to expose the mechanics of the optimal sharing 
rule. This helps one to understand why relatively strong assumptions are needed 
to derive meaningful results. Robustness becomes an issue. Section (2.5) 
discusses some limitations of the presented models. Dealing with these limitations 
is the objective of subsequent Chapters. 
Chapter (3) deals with the consequences of error in judgement and 
bankruptcy in both input monitoring and output monitoring models. Section (3 .1) 
shows that input monitoring can theoretically achieve first best if harsh enough 
punishment is feasible and error in judgement can be excluded. Yet, if a 
bankruptcy constraint is introduced input monitoring will be costly. Alternatively, 
if error in judgement is allowed for, input monitoring will be costly even if there 
is no bankruptcy constraint. Section (3.2) deals with shifting support schemes 
which allow perfectly accurate output monitoring and achieve first best beyond 
the obvious case of a deterministic production function. Another problem 
considered will be the moral hazard with respect to risk which might arise in 
output monitoring schemes in the presence of bankruptcy constraints. In both 
cases the argument is only sketched. 
Chapter ( 4) deals with transaction cost and distortion. Section ( 4.1) 
describes sources of direct and indirect transaction cost. Section ( 4.2) discusses 
the problem of distortion which arises if there is a tension between what the 
principal wants and what the agent is rewarded for. It can be shown that distortion 
can be divided into two components: scaling and alignment. There is conflict with 
the risk-incentive trade-off as output monitoring is less distortive but generally 
more prone to error. 
Many traditional models of contract theory are one period. The subject of 
Chapter (5) will be to analyse the effect of time on contracts. The starting point of 
this discussion is the often stated thesis that time can resolve incentive issues that 
arise in one-shot relationships costlessly. Four models are presented: The first 
model deals with the advantage of long-term contracts over short term contracts. 
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Time allows lowering the cost of incentives by reducing imperfect risk-sharing of 
output-based contracts (5.2). The second and third model deal with situations 
wherein relational contracts solve problems of enforcement. The theory of 
supergames will be used to argue that time may sustain contracts with otherwise 
desirable properties, which would not be feasible in a one-shot relationship. This 
is the case wherein contract parameters are observable but not verifiable (5.3). 
The forth model introduces career concerns which induce the agent to exert effort 
although choice of effort cannot be contracted on. It will be shown that an implicit 
contract links the agent's current choice of effort to future pay-off. (5.4). In 
conclusion, it will be argued that the thesis that time solves incentive issues 
costlessly cannot be generally upheld. Time merely alters and enriches the 
insights from one-period models: Conclusions from the one-period models are not 
necessarily valid in the multi-period settings. 
2 The Classical Risk-Incentive Trade-Off 
2.1 The Basic Model 
2.1.1 Introduction 
A model will be set up to study optimal pay incentives in the principal-agent 
relationship. The following propositions will be derived: 
90 
1. If effort is contractible, compensation should not be made contingent 
on output if it is assumed that the agent is risk-averse and the principal 
risk-neutral. More generally, if effort is contractible, there is no 
rationale for output-based schemes in order to avoid shirking. The risk-
sharing argument comes fully to bear. 
2. If there is a stochastic relationship between effort and output and effort 
is not contractible compensation should be made contingent on output. 
Incentives rise in strength as compensation differentials increase. 
2.1. First best can be achieved if the agent is risk neutral. He becomes 
residual claimant. 
2.2. In the case of stochastic production functions and a risk-averse 
agent, only a second best solution can be achieved due to the risk-
incentive trade-off. 
3. In the case of a deterministic production function, output-based 
schemes achieve first best. A forcing contract can be used. 
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2.1.2 Modeling Assumptions 
It is assumed that there are two output levels, low output x1 and high output xh 261 • 
Effort can be chosen on a continuous interval within two bounds, e E [e1,eh]. 
Output stochastically depends on effort. The uncertainty is captured by a 
probability distribution over output levels262, P(x = x1) = 1- p, P(x = xh) = p. 
Effort e is a parameter of the probability distribution263 , p = p(e). As it is 
assumed that any outcome is possible under any action, the range of p( e) is the 
open interval ( 0, I) 264 • It is further assumed that the probability of high output 
strictly increases with increased levels of effort, but less than proportionately. So, 
formally, p ( e) is a strictly increasing265 and concave266 function in e ( p' ( ·) > 0, 
p"(e) < 0) on the open interval ( e1, eh). In order to avoid boundary solutions, 
p'(e,) = OC) and p'(eh) = 0. Preferences over lotteries for both the principal and 
the agent obey the von-Neumann-Morgenstem (v-N-M) axioms267. The agent's 
Bernoulli utility function u ( w, e) is known to the principal and depends on the 
261 The model roughly follows Bester (2001) p. 61-69 
262 Note that this implies that either objective probabilities are given or that the principal and the 
agent hold the same subjective probability beliefs. It was already mentioned above that this is 
the common assumption in game theory (Harsanyi Doctrine). 
263 This is the parameterized distribution formulation of the Agency problem, see Mirrlees (1974, 
1976). A more general formulation of this variety will be used in Section 5. There is also the 
state-space formulation, see Spence, Zeckhauser ( 1971) which will be used in Section 3. 
264 As p( e) is interpreted as a probability, following the axioms of Kolmogorov: 0 :<:; p ( e) :<:; I . As 
it is assumed, that there is a stochastic relationship between effort and output p ( eJ must be 
strictly lower than I and p( e,) must be strictly higher than 0. With p' ( e) > 0, it follows that 
0 < p ( e) < I for all e E [ e,, e,] . Otherwise it would be possible, at least for some output 
levels, to perfectly deduce effort. 
265 A more general version of this assumption, which also applies to settings with a continuous set 
of outcomes, would be that increased effort leads to a first-order stochastic increase of output. 
In the two output case this assumption implies another property, which is a necessary condition 
for non-decreasing compensation in effort and is called the Monotone Likelihood Ratio 
Property. In a later Chapter the case of continuous output levels will be studied. 
266 In the two output case, concavity of the probability distribution implies the concavity of the 
distribution junction condition, which is another necessary condition for non-decreasing 
compensation in effort (see Kreps (I 990), p. 597 and p. 600). Confusingly, this condition is 
also referred to as the convexity of the distribution junction condition (see Salanie ( 1997), p. 
120). The reason for this seeming contradiction is that the version as in Kreps captures the 
more intuitive concept of "probability of higher outcome" which technically is 1 minus the 
distribution function. In this thesis the terminology of Kreps is followed. 
267 In particular, the independence and the continuity axiom (see e.g. Kreps (I 990) Chapter 3 or 
Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green (1995), Chapter 6) 
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pay level w; = w(x;) where i = {l,h} and on his effort choice e. It is further 
assumed that u ( w, e) is additively separable268 in a part that depends on the pay 
level and another part which depends on his choice of effort and that the agent 
likes money and dislikes effort. Money utility for both the agent and the principal 
are given by functions u(·) which are strictly increasing, continuously 
differentiable and concave, which means that they are either risk-averse or risk 
neutral. The agent's disutility of effort d( e) is usually assumed to be strictly 
increasing and convex in e. The principal offers a contract to the agent who will 
either accept or reject it, in which case the agent's utility is his reservation utility 
u0 269 and the principal's utility is 0. 
2.1.3 Contractible Effort 
The crucial point in the subject of this thesis is to study the effect of asymmetric 
information on contracting. Contrary to this assumption it shall be assumed - as a 
benchmark case - that the effort decision of the agent is perfectly observable by 
both, the agent and the principal and therefore the contract can stipulate effort as a 
contingency. 
If the parties can contract on effort, the principal, when designing his 
optimal compensation scheme, has to solve the following optimization problem: 
The principal is risk-neutral. He is maximizing expected pay-off. The 
agent is assumed to be risk-averse. Condition (1.2) is called the agent's 
participation constraint which will hold with equality for the solution because 
otherwise the principal could lower the compensation for the agent and still 
268 This assumption was shown to be crucial by Gjesdal (1982) 
269 Market forces ensure that the agent can earn his reservation utility elsewhere. 
270 It is common to divide this problem into steps (see discussion at the end of the Section). The 
first step would be to find out the minimum cost incentive scheme to implement any given 
effort level e. Mathematically, the second step would be to choose the effort level which 
maximizes net benefit for the principal. For the implication derived in this Section it is 
sufficient to solve the first step. Therefore, a somewhat easier formulation for the objective 
function is often seen in literature: min w, + p( e )( w, - w,) (see e.g. Mas-Colell, Whinston, 
,(, ... , ... ,) 
Green (1995), p. 480. 
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induce him to accept the contract. For simplicity, e is measured on the scale of 
disutility and the reservation utility is set to O (but could as well be set to any 
other reservation utility U0 271 • 
Letting µ be the Lagrangean multiplier for constraint ( 1.2) it can be written: 
p'( e )(xh -wh)-p'( e )(x, -wh)+ 
µ[p'( e )u( wh)- p'(e)u( w, )-1] 
-p(e)+ µp(e)u'(wh) = 0 
(p( e)-1)+ µ(1-p(e))u'( w1) = 0 
Rearranging (1.4) yields: 
Inserting (1.4)' in (1.5) yields: 
u' (w,) 
(p(e)-1)-(p(e)-1)-,- = 0 
U (wh) 







For u"(·) < 0 (risk-averseness as assumed above) it can be followed from 
(1.6) that: 
(1.7) 
271 The reservation utility is the level of utility that the agent demands in order to be willing to 
work. It can be thought of as the agent's opportunity cost. It is assumed that any gains from 
trade are appropriated by the principal. This could be justified by assuming that there are more 
agents than principals, so that the zero profit condition holds for the agents. In this case, this 
assumption is taken for purely technical reasons and is totally innocuous. It is just one way to 
derive a Pareto-optimal result. 
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If effort is contractible, it is optimal for the principal to provide full 
insurance. He pays compensation independent of output. This is an intuitive 
result: The effort of the agent can be observed and contracted upon. There is no 
need to use the wage system to indirectly induce the agent to exert a certain 
effort. A contract can stipulate that the agent receives a certain payment if he is 
exerting high effort and is punished otherwise. Such a contract is called a forcing 
contract because the principal can force the agent to choose the desired effort 
level. In this case the risk-sharing argument comes fully to bear. As the 
principal was assumed to be risk neutral and the agent to be risk averse, it is 
optimal for the principal to assume all the risk272 • 
Proposition 1: If effort is contractible, compensation should not be made 
contingent on output if it is assumed that the agent is risk-averse and the 
principal risk-neutral. More generally, if effort is contractible, there is no 
rationale for output-based schemes in order to avoid shirking. The risk-sharing 
argument comes fully to bear. 
2.1.4 Uncontractible Effort 
If effort is not contractible, the principal has to offer a contract that maximizes his 
profit knowing that the agent chooses effort in order to maximize his own utility 
(i.e. if the agent maximizes utility by choosing the lowest effort level he will do 
it). If the principal knows the utility function of the agent, as was assumed, and 
if he knows the probability distribution of outcomes conditional on effort, the 
principal can perfectly predict the reaction of the agent to any offered 
compensation scheme. It will be seen that he has to trade off the benefits of 
inducing higher effort against the cost of providing incentives (the cost of 
compensating the agent for risk-taking). 
The principal has to solve the following optimization problem: 
maxn(e,w"wh) 
(w,.w,) 
s.t. e E argmaxu( e', w,, wh) 
e' 
U ( e, w1, wh) :2:: 0 
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The principal's and the agent's pay-off function are the same as in the 
previous subsection. What is new is condition (2.2). This constraint is the 
characteristic feature of problems involving hidden action. It reflects the 
impossibility on the part of the principal to directly influence the agent's effort 
decision. As the principal cannot observe effort, the agent chooses the effort level 
that maximizes his own welfare, but the principal anticipates the reaction of the 
agent. He will choose a compensation scheme that induces the agent to act in the 
desired way, by providing corresponding incentives. This is why condition (2.2) is 
called incentive constraint273 • The crucial idea behind this argument is rational 
behaviour: Even if the effort decision is taken autonomously by the agent, his 
rational behaviour of maximizing expected utility makes him predictable. The 
principal is effectively choosing a desired effort level which he implements by 
offering the appropriate compensation scheme. The agent's autonomous decision 
power is merely adding a constraint. Condition (2.3) is the participation constraint 
as encountered earlier. 
On a technical level, if the action space was finite with n possible actions274, 
condition (2.2) translates into a set of n incentive constraints275 • So, the problem is 
solved by using the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. If the action space is continuous, as 
is assumed in this Section, the set of incentive constraints becomes infinite and the 
described approach becomes analytically intractible276• Therefore, as (2.2) is itself 
an optimization problem, the first order condition for optimization must hold as 
long as there is no boundary solution (which was excluded in the assumptions 
under 2.1.2): 
Some interesting conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the first 
order condition: (2.4) only holds if u ( wh )- u ( w,) > 0 as p' ( e) > 0. But, 
u { wh) - u ( w1) > 0 , for u' ( •) > 0 277 implies w1 > w1• In addition, for any given 
level of w,: (wh -w,)t• (u{wh)-u(w,))T• p (e).J-• etVpw(e)<0. In 
273 It is also sometimes called relative incentive constraint, to underscore that the action to be 
chosen by the agent must be made relatively more attractive than all other available actions. 
274 As e.g. in Kreps (1990), p. 577-604. 
275 The optimal solution is also weakly preferred to itself, which is why there are n and not n-1 
constraints. 
276 see Kreps ( 1990), p. 605 
277 It is assumed that more compensation is strictly preferred to less. 
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words: It can be concluded from the incentive constraint that every optimal 
compensation scheme in the asymmetric information case involves wage 
differentials. What is more, the higher these wage differentials, the stronger the 
incentives (the higher e ). 
Proposition 2: If there is a stochastic relationship between effort and 
output and effort is not contractible, compensation should be made contingent 
on output Incentives rise in strength as compensation differentials increase. 
As u• = p"( e}(u( wh)-u( w1 ))and p"( e) < 0 (see assumption under 2.1.2), 
u• <O for all wh > w1. Thus, the expected utility function U ( ·) is concave and the 
first order condition (2.4) is a necessary and sufficient condition for 
maximization. It can therefore replace the maximization problem of the incentive 
constraint, considerably simplifying the overall maximization problem278 : 
max IT (e, w1, wh) = p( e)[(xh -wh)-(x1 -w1 )] +(x1 -w1) (2.5) 
w,,w,, 
s1. p'(e)[u(wh)-u(w1)]-l=O (2.6) 
p( e)u( wh)+(l- p( e))u( w1 )-e ~ 0 (2.7) 
The participation constraint (2. 7) must be binding and therefore holds with 
equality. Otherwise, the principal could lower compensations w1 , wh by the 
same amount, reducing the expected compensation without altering relative 
incentives (Note that the difference in (2.6) is unaffected.). 
Letting µ1 and µ2 be the Lagrangean multipliers for (2.6) and (2.7) 
respectively, it can be written: 
p'(e)[(xh -wh)-(x, -w, )]+ AP"(e)[ u(wh)-u(w, )] 
+µ2 [P'( e)(u( wh)-u( w, ))-1] = 0 
p(e)-l-u'(w,)p'(e)µ1 +u'(w1)(l-p(e))µ2 =0 
(2.8) 
(2.9) 
278 This approach is called the first-order approach (see discussion at the end of the Section). The 
problem is that the set of incentive constraints of condition (2.2) cannot generally be replaced 
by the first-order condition. This will only be possible if the agent's v-N-M expected utility 
function is concave (which was proven above). Generally, concavity is assured if the concavity 
of the distribution function condition holds, which was garanteed in the assumptions (see 
footnote 266 for the two output case). Proving non-decreasing wages in e - as was done in the 
preceding Paragraph - is also sufficient for the first-order approach to be viable (see Kreps 
(1990), p. 598 Lemma.). 
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Risk neutral Agent 
In the traditional model it is usually assumed that the principal is risk-
neutral and the agent risk-averse. For a moment, however, it is assumed that the 
agent is risk-neutral. An interesting result can be derived for this case from the 
two constraints: 
Risk-neutrality implies that, at any level of compensation, an increase of 
expected compensation by 1 unit is valued at exactly 1 unit. Inserting 
u '( w1) = u '( wh) = 1 into (2.9) and (2.10) yields: 
p(e)-1- p'(e)µ1 +(1- p(e))JJi = 0 
-p(e)+ p'(e)µ1 + p(e)µ2 = 0 
0-1+0+µ2 =0 
µ2 =1 
Inserting Jli = 1 in (2.10) yields: 







From µ 2 = 1 it can be seen that outcome is efficient. Investing one unit into 
compensation exactly increases outcome by one unit. Marginal cost equals 
marginal product. Fist best can be achieved. FromJLi = 0 it can be concluded 
that the incentive constraint is not binding. The principal can therefore achieve 
the same profit as under symmetric information. 
Another interesting result can be derived by setting µ 1 = 0 and µ 2 = l into 
(2.8): 
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Inserting the first order condition (2.4), this expression simplifies to: 
p'( e)[(xh -wh )-(x, -w, )] = 0 
As p'(e)>O for ee[e"eh): 
(2.8)" 
(2.12) 
From (2.12) it can be concluded, that the principal's profit is independent 
of output. He is fully insured. The agent effectively buys the project from the 
principal and is left in a residual claimant position. It can easily be seen, that this 
result also holds for risk-averse principals. 
Proposition 2.1.: In the case of a stochastic production function first best 
can be achieved if the agent is risk neutral He becomes residual claimanf79• 
Risk-Averse Agent 
It is now assumed that the principal is risk-neutral and the agent risk-averse. An 
individual is called risk-averse if he values a project below its expected value. If it 
is assumed that an individual prefers more to less (positive marginal utility), this 
implies that the individual attributes an ever smaller extra value to an additional 
unit of the good consumed (diminishing marginal utility). Formally this can be 
stated by u' {-) > 0, u" {-) < 0 280• 
Unfortunately, in this case the conditions do not simplify. From wh > w1 it 
can be followed that: 
(2.13) 
for risk-averse agents ( u "{·) < 0). Solving for the two Lagrangean 
multipliers yields: 
(1- p( e))(µ2u'( w, )-1) µ-
I - u'(w,)p'(e) 
279 Rasmusen calls this the "Selling the Shop" Result 
280 This assumption was already used above in the case of contractible effort. 
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(2.15) 
Rearranging (2.15) yields: 
I ( ) - p ( e) [ u , (WI)- u , ( wh ) ] 
µ2u WI -1+ ( ) u' wh 
(2.15)' 
Inserting (2.15)' into (2.14) yields: 
{I- p( e)) p( e)[ u'( w1 )-u '( wh )] µ - -----~----~ > 0 
1 - u'( w1 )u'( wh) p'( e) 
(2.14)' 
This expression is positive for all e •, because p ( e) e ( 0, I) , u ' ( w1 ) > 0 , 
u '( wh) > 0 (positive marginal utility), p '( e) > 0 (see assumptions under 2.1.2) 
and inequality (2. 13 ). It can easily be seen that expression (2.15) is positive for 
the same reasons. 
If the agent is risk-averse, both the incentive and the participation 
constraints are binding. The intuition for this result is the following: In order to 
induce the agent to exert effort there will have to be a wage differential. This 
implies that the agent is exposed to risk. In order to make the agent's expected 
utility from the contract meet his reservation utility level, the risk-averse agent has 
to be compensated for his risk exposure, driving up expected payments by the 
principal. Naturally, the principal will not want to pay more than necessary. 
Therefore, he will devise the wage differential so that it just induces desired 
behaviour81 but no more, since this would mean higher risk exposure for the 
agent and consequently higher cost for the principal. This is why the incentive 
constraint is binding. 
The reason why the participation constraint must be binding has already 
been given above: If it was not binding it would be possible for the principal to 
reduce the level of payments to the agent for any observed output by the 
same amount. This would not affect incentives but would lower cost to the 
principal. Therefore, this cannot be a property of the optimal incentive scheme. 
281 It is a common assumption in agency theory that if the agent is indifferent about two actions he 
will choose the one that is preferred by the principal. The reason for this assumption is 
technical: If it is assumed that the principal sweetens the desired choice just a bit, the tool of 
optimization will not work as there is no "optimal" sweetener. See Kreps ( 1990), p. 603f on 
this point. 
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The fact that the incentive constraint binds implies that expected cost for the 
principal will be higher than in the symmetric information or risk-neutrality case. 
The principal's expected net benefit will therefore be lower. As the agent's 
expected utility remains at the reservation level, over-all welfare is reduced. The 
outcome is therefore second best282• 
Proposition 2.2.: In the case of stochastic production/unctions and a risk-
averse agent, only a second-best solution can be achieved due to the risk-
incentive trade-off. 
Certainty 
In the modeling assumptions (see assumptions under 2.1.2), a stochastic 
relationship between effort of the agent and output was assumed. Effort was a 
parameter of the probability distributions of outcome. By choosing his effort level 
the agent effectively chooses a probability distribution. More specifically, it could 
not be excluded that output was low although the agent had chosen high effort. If, 
however, there is a deterministic relationship between output and effort, it is 
possible to deduce effort from output. All that has to be done is to invert the 
production function. So, even if effort may not be observable, which is why this 
case is treated as a case of uncontractible effort, observing output is equivalent to 
observing input. Therefore, the analysis of effort contractibility applies to this 
case. This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 3: In the case of a deterministic production function, output-
based schemes achieve first best. A forcing contract can be used. 
282 Formally, in the case of observable effort the principal, who wants to implement effort level e; 
has to pay the agent: w*(e;)=u(w•(e;))=u0 +e; in order to fulfil the participation 
constraint. In the case of unobservable effort, expected utility of the agent must be: 
E[u(w(x))le;]=u0 +e;. As, by Jensen's inequality, u[E(w(x)}je;]>E[u(w(x)}je;] it 
follows from the above expression that u[E(w(x))je;]>u(w*(e;)). For strictly increasing 
u(·) this implies E( w( x )}je; > ( w• ( e;) ). Therefore, the expected payments from the principal 
needed to implement any e e [ e1; eh] are lower in the case of observable effort than in the case 
of non-observable effort. see (Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green (1995), p. 486) 
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2.1.5 Discussion 
The analysis in this Section provided some basic results summarized in the 
propositions. Most importantly, it was shown that if effort is not contractible, 
compensation shall be made contingent on output. It was also shown that, in this 
case, welfare levels can never be higher than in the case of observable effort. 
Barring the unrealistic cases of a deterministic production function and risk 
neutrality of both the principal and the agent, the optimal compensation scheme 
leads to a welfare loss due to imperfect risk sharing. 
More general models than the one used in this Section can be set up283 but 
yield broadly the same results. As this dissertation does not primarily have a 
technical focus but favours intuitive arguments, the choice of this model seems 
appropriate. 
There is also a different approach to solving the optimization problem than 
the one used in this Section. This approach was developed by Grossman/Hart 
(1983)284 and is called the three-step procedure by Fudenberg/Tirole (1990)285 • 
First, one searches for the set of contracts that implement e. Then, among these 
contracts, the contract which is least costly to the principal is chosen. Finally, one 
settles for the effort level which maximizes net benefit for the principal286• Often 
not all of the steps are needed287 • Therefore, the approach often allows more 
simple and elegant analysis288 • It also stresses the importance of inducing the agent 
to choose a certain action and the fact that this inducement is costly. On the other 
hand, the approach used in this Section is more intuitive to set up. 
Another methodological choice was the use of the so-called first-order 
approach which follows from the assumption of a continuous action space289• This 
makes it necessary to replace the (infinite) set of incentive constraints with the 
283 see Grossman/Hart ( 1983) 
284 Grossman/Hart (1983) 
285 see Fudenbergffirole (1990) 
286 As step I and 2 mathematically combine to one ( see Rasmusen ( 1994 ), p. 176), the approach is 
also presented in two steps (see Kreps (1990) pp. 587-489 ). 
287 e.g. for the results in this Section, steps I and 2 would have been sufficient to drive home the 
results. 
288 see footnote (270) 
289 Rasmusen (1995), p. 176 wrongly contrasts the first-order approach and the three-step 
procedure. The first order approach follows from the continuous action space formulation and 
in this case must also be used in the three-step procedure. 
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first-order condition for optimization of the agent's utility. The problem is that 
this cannot generally be done. It will only be possible if the agent's v-N-M 
expected utility function is concave290• Generally, this is only assured if the 
concavity of the distribution function condition holds, which is not a totally 
unproblematic assumption. The advantage is that it considerably simplifies the 
analysis and is also very intuitive in stressing the autonomy of the agent's 
decision making if effort cannot be observed. It will therefore be used in many 
( albeit not all) instances in this thesis. Although Kreps (1990)291 considers it as 
pertaining to the "early literature", it is still used - possibly for its intuitive 
appeal292 • 
2.2 Risk-Incentive Trade-off for Linear Contracts 
2.2.1 Introduction 
In the following model, specific assumptions are made concerning the production 
function, the agent's utility function and the structure of the incentive scheme293 • 
The incentive-risk trade-off can then be explicitly modelled. The following 
proposition can be derived: 
4. If linear contracts are assumed it can be seen that the optimal bonus 
rate decreases for rising risk-averseness, rising project risk and rising 
curvature of the disutility function. In the case of a deterministic 
production function ( o-2 = 0 ), all the risk is assumed by the agent 
(b= 1 ). The forcing contract was excluded by the linear sharing rule, but 
it can be seen that also a linear contract can achieve first best. 
2.2.2 Modeling Assumptions 
The project production function is assumed to be linear and disturbed by an error 
term E , where y is output, a is effort, measured on the scale of expected project 
value294, and E is a random variable, which is normally distributed with zero mean 
290 see e.g. Kreps ( 1990), pp. 605f. and the literature on the first order approach: e.g. Rogerson 
(1985) 
291 see Kreps (1999), p. 604 
292 see Bester (2001) 
293 see e.g. Gibbons (2001 ), 
294 This is important, because otherwise it would be difficult to interpret negative values for a. 
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and variance cr2 • Thus, the agent controls the mean of a normally distributed 
random variable by his choice of effort295 : 
y = a + £, £ - N ( 0, c,2 ) . (3.1) 
Note that in this model not only the set of possible actions but also the range 
of outcomes is continuous. 
The incentive scheme is linear with a bonus rate b and a base salary s 296 : 
w(y)=s+by. 
The agent's utility function is an exponential v-N-M utility function297 : 
U (x ) = 1 - e -rx • 







295 This is the state-space formulation of the Agency Problem. see Spence/Zeckhauser ( 1971 ). 
Obviously, the intuition is that higher effort leads to higher mean and with the variance 
unchanged to a more favourable distribution of outcomes. However, as Stiglitz, Rothschild 
(1970) have shown, there are examples where a lottery with lower mean and higher variance is 
preferred by a risk-averse agent. The reason is, that µ, er-analysis is not generally equivalent to 
the concept of first/order stochastic dominance. Yet, in the case of a normally distributed error 
term, it is easy to see that higher effort levels are equivalent to choosing stochastically higher 
distributions of output. 
296 Linearity is, prima facie, a totally arbitrary assumption. In Sub-Section IV2.4.3 below, reasons 
are given why it might be justified to constrain the shape of the optimal sharing rule to be 
linear. 
297 The choice of an exponential Bernoulli function implies that the agent's absolute risk-
averseness is constant in wealth x and his relative risk averseness increases in wealth. Yet, it is 
often natural to assume decreasing absolute risk-averseness and non-increasing relative risk-
averseness. Otherwise the agent would e.g. only be ready to invest a constant absolute amount 
of his wealth into a risky asset. This implies that the share of his wealth invested in the risky 
asset decreases in wealth. 
298 This shows that the exponential utility function can be fully recovered from the coefficient of 
absolute risk averseness (also called Arrow/Pratt measure). 
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The agent's disutility of effort is given by c (a) and is assumed to be strictly 
increasing and convex in a : 
c(a) > 0, c'(a) > 0, c"(a) > 0. (3.5) 
The principal is risk neutral, which means that he values a project at its 
expected value. His certainty equivalent CE is therefore: 
CE =V [E <x>] =E (x). 
2.2.3 The Model 
The principal's pay-off for a contract r = (b,s) is: 
II(r,a) = (1-b)<a + &)-s 
The agent's pay-off is: 
w(a,y,c(·)) = s +b(a + &)-c(a). 
The principal's optimization problem is: 
maxrr(r,a•) = (1-b)a• -s 
r 
sJ. a• E argmaxCE (a',y,o-,c<·)) 
a' 







The principal designs the contract in order to maximize expected profit. As 
he cannot observe the agent's choice of effort, the agent will choose the level of 
effort which will maximize his own expected utility. As it is assumed that the 
principal knows the agent's utility function he will perfectly predict the agent's 
reaction to a given contract. So, one can think of the principal's problem as 
designing a contract, keeping in mind that the agent will always optimally adjust 
his effort (see above). For technical reasons the problem is stated in certainty 
equivalent and not in expected utility terms. 
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First the maximization problem of the constraint set is replaced by the first-
order condition299 which can be shown to be necessary and sufficient. 
It is a well-known result for an exponential utility function and normally 
distributed output that the certainty equivalent can be written as300 : 
rb2a 2 CE =U(E (u (a,y,c<->))) =s +ba -c<a>- - 2-. (3.12) 
The first-order condition is: 
acE ( .) ( .) --=b-c' a = O• c' a =b, aa (3.13) 
which means that for any incentive scheme the agent maximizes utility by 
choosing the effort level which sets his marginal disutility equal to the bonus rate. 
The second-order condition for a maximum is: 
a2cE "( .) 0 -2-=--c a < . aa (3.14) 
(3.14) always holds because of the convexity of the disutility function. 
Therefore (3.12) is convex and the first-order condition (3.13) is necessary and 
sufficient3°1• 
Restating the maximization problem, it can be written: 
max(l -b)a• -s 
sJ, 
sJ. c'(a·) =b • a• =c'(bf' =a• (b) 
rb2a 2 s +ba -c<a>--- ~ 0. 
2 
299 The first order approach once again is needed because of the continuous action space. 




301 The range of a is R. So one does not have to bother about boundary solutions. It is also 
assumed that the principal has to offer a contract even if his expected pay-off is negative and 
cannot set the terms of the contract so that the agent surely rejects it. Otherwise, there would be 
a problem if cost increase is to steep. 
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Remark: It can easily be seen from (3.10)' that b is positive as c' (·) > 0. It 
can also be said that optimal effort is positive, a*> 0. This is because c' (·) > 0 
implies c' 0-1 > 0. 
Inserting (3.10)' into (3.11)' gives: 
max{l -b)a" (b)-s (3.9)' 
sJ, 
rb2a 2 sJ. s +ba* (b)-c(a* (b))--2- = 0. (3.11)" 
In addition, the principal will not offer more compensation than is needed to 
assure the participation of the agent. Therefore, the participation constraint will 
be binding3°2• Letting µ be the Lagrangean multiplier for (3.11)" yields: 
aL = -a• (b) + (l -b}a* '(b} + 
ab 
µ(a* (b} +ba* '(b}-c'(a" (b})a* '(b} )-ra2b = 0 
aL -=-l+µ=0• µ=l. as 
Inserting (3.16) in (3.15): 
a• '-c'(a*)a* '-ra2b = 0. 
Inserting (3.10)' in (3.17) and rearranging yields: 
a•' 






Differentiating (3. l 0)' and solving for a shows that the marginal impact of a 
higher bonus rate on the level of optimal effort is lower the more convex the 
disutility function: 
302 As was argued above, it is possible to reduce expected cost of the principal without changing 
the incentives if the participation constraint is not binding. 
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!....c'(a• (b)) = !_b 
ob ob 
c"(a*)a•'=l (3.19) 
• I 1 a =-. 
c" 
Inserting (3.19) in (3.18) gives the optimal bonus rate303 : 
b = 1 
1 + ra2c" · 
(3.20) 
Proposition 4.: If linear contracts are assumed it can be seen that the 
optimal bonus rate decreases for rising risk-averseness, rising project risk and 
rising curvature of the disutility function. In the case of a deterministic 
production function ( a 2 = 0), all the risk is assumed by the agent (b=l). The 
forcing contract was excluded by the linear sharing rule, but it can be seen that 
also a linear contract can achieve first best. 
Total welfare can be calculated by adding the certainty equivalents of the 
agent and the principal. Inserting (3.7) into (3.6) and adding with (3.12) gives 
total surplus in the case of private infonnation: 
rb2a 2 a -s -b(a) +s +ba -c(a)---
2 
rb2a 2 =a -c(a)---. 
2 




Subtracting (3 .22) from (3 .21) gives the welfare loss in the case of private 
infonnation compared to symmetric infonnation holding the effort level constant: 
303 The same result can be obtained maximizing the joint welfare function of the two parties. This 
is mathematically more straightforward but less intuitive. 
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(3.23) 
One should note that total welfare loss will be higher. In the above case, 
effort levels were held constant. In fact, optimal effort levels in the symmetric 
information case will be higher304 but the point here was to show that in the 
asymmetric information case a welfare loss occurs. 
2.2.4 Discussion 
The main appeal of the model of this subsection is the existence of a closed-form 
solution which negatively links the use of variable fee contracts to the agent's 
level of risk aversion, the level of project risk and the convexity of the disutility 
function. The weakness of this model is its lack of generality and its unrealistic 
assumptions as e.g. the constant absolute risk-averseness of the agent's 
preferences. Especially the linear sharing rule seems to be completely arbitrary. 
Although an argument in rescue of linear sharing rules will be presented in a later 
Chapter (see 2.4.3), the main reason why this model was presented is its intuitive 
appeal and its suitability as a starting point for further analysis. 
2.2.5 Appendix 
Ad (3.12): 
The explicit expression for the following equation is needed: 
CE =U(E (U (a,y,co))}. 
(3.24) 
Inserting the utility function, one can write for expected utility: 
304 It is not necessarily the case, that optimal effort levels are lower than in the first best case. This 
is because there are two sources of loss in the second best equilibrium. One is divergence from 
the efficient effort level. The other is the cost of separation of different possible actions. These 
are low if the statistical signal is very strong. Then, it is easy to infer from a certain output level 
which action was chosen. As the chance of error is lower, and consequently the risk of being 
innocently punished, the risk premium is lower. Kreps (1990), p. 602f) constructs a simple 
example to illustrate this point. This will not be the case here, as there is no discontinuity of the 
likelihood ratios in the model discussed in this Sub-Section. 
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E ( e -rbE) can be written as: 
A known rule of integration305 is: 
Setting p = ~ and q = -rb into (3.27) yields: 
2u 
(!:!.!,:_) r 2b2u 2 = _I_e 21u' .J21ru2 = e-2-. 
u.fii 




E U = 1-e 2 • 
The certainty equivalent is defined as: 
CE =U[E (U)]. 
Inverting U (x) : y = I -e -rx yields: 
fj (x ) : X = I - e -ry. 
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Solving for y gives: 
- ln(l-x) U<x>:y =-'----'-. 
-r 
Setting x = E ( U) in (3 .31) gives the certainty equivalent: 
CE= ln(l-E(U))_ 
-r 
Inserting (3.29) into (3.32) yields: 




In 1-l+e 2 
CE=--'----------'-
-r 





It was argued above that variable fees may provide useful incentives in situations 
of hidden action, but also create imperfect risk sharing. Quite apart from any other 
consideration, a closer look at the mechanics of risk sharing is warranted: In the 
traditional agency models, the principal is always assumed to be risk-neutral, 
while the agent is assumed to be risk-averse or risk-neutral. 
This need not be the case. The assumption that the principal is risk-neutral is 
often justified by the argument that he is the economically more potent party to 
the contract. This is largely inspired by the traditional story behind principal-
agency models referring to the relationship between a company and its employees. 
There are several arguments for why the economically more potent party should 
be less risk-averse: First, it is often plausible to assume that as a person becomes 
wealthier his absolute level of risk aversion decreases. Second, if the company is 
held by an entrepreneur, he might be the less risk-averse type of person in the first 
place. In addition, employees usually only work for one company while the owner 
might hold many different companies. So, he is probably better diversified. This 
last point is especially true for publicly held companies. However, in the case of a 
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client and his consultant, things can be different. The small consultant partnership 
is clearly more risk-averse than its multinational client, but this changes if the big 
international consultancy firm provides services to a small start-up company 
through its incubator branch. Clearly, in the setting analysed so far - the case 
where, say, the principal is risk-averse and the agent risk-neutral - does not appear 
to be problematic as optimal incentive provision and optimal risk sharing are 
compatible. But what if there is a bilateral moral hazard problem? To answer this 
and other questions, one should look at risk sharing in its own right. 
In the following, two separate sources of value creation by risk sharing shall 
be explored: differences in risk attitudes which might arise from predisposition 
or different levels of wealth and differences in diversification. This will be 
modelled in a linear-normal-exponential setting and the following propositions 
are derived306: 
5. Without Diversification: 
5.1. If both parties are risk-averse, it will always be optimal to engage 
in some degree of risk sharing. Each party's share in the risky part 
of their pay-off equals the ratio of their risk tolerance and overall 
risk tolerance. The optimal bonus rate thus increases as the agent 
becomes more risk-tolerant relative to the principal. It does not 
depend on any specific distributional assumptions. 
5.2. If one party is risk-neutral while the other party is risk-averse, it is 
optimal for the risk-neutral party to assume all the risk. If both 
parties are risk-neutral, the choice of the bonus rate does not 
matter for risk sharing purposes. 
306 Technically, in line with the usual instrumentalist flexibility in creating models, it is common to 
use simple exponential Bernoulli functions, although they exhibit constant absolute risk 
aversion, even if it is assumed that there is decreasing absolute risk aversion. This is not as big 
a problem as it seems: In order to model decreasing absolute risk aversion, one is just doing as 
if the wealthy party was less risk-averse by nature and then uses the exponential Bernoulli 
function to approximate local preferences over lotteries. The same can be done to 
accommodate for diversification effects. In the case of the publicly held company, shareholders 
are not actually risk-neutral, but they are diversified. So, collectively, it is in their interest that 
the company is managed as if held by a risk-neutral individual (in the absence of financial 
distress costs). In this Section, however, diversification effects will be explicitly modelled to 
highlight the fact that the more risk-averse company might not necessarily be less diversified 
and vice versa (Take the example of a private-equity partnership). 
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5.3. It can be seen that the advantage of variable fees over flat fees 
increases for rising project risk, rising absolute levels of risk 
averseness and rising relative risk tolerance of the agent and vice 
versa. 
6. With Diversification 
6.1. The optimal sharing rule for risk sharing with diversification can 
be written as the sum of the optimal sharing rule without 
diversification and a correction term, accounting for the portfolio 
effects. 
6.2. The portfolio effect will increase the optimal bonus rate the 
stronger the diversification effect in the portfolio of the agent is 
relative to the principal's diversification effect and vice versa. 
6.3. As risk tolerance of the agent relative to the principal increases, 
the optimal bonus rate always becomes higher if the coefficients of 
correlation are positive. If adding the project actually lowers 
portfolio risk of the principal, the optimal bonus rate will possibly 
decrease for increasing risk tolerance of the agent relative to the 
principal. 
6.4. If the difference between optimal risk sharing and the flat fee case 
is taken as an indicator for the importance of risk sharing, 
importance increases for increasing project risk, lower absolute 
levels of risk tolerance of the parties involved and increasing 
differentials of "specific risk appetite" which depends on both the 
relative risk tolerance and the specific way the project interacts 
with the parties' portfolios. 
2.3.2 The Model 
In this first subsection, only differences in risk attitudes are considered. 
Diversification will enter the analysis in the next subsection as an extension to this 
basic model. Variable fees create value by improving risk sharing if the sum of 
certainty equivalents of the principal and the agent in the case of flat 
fees ( CE P +CEA) is lower than in the case of variable fees ( CE~ +CE~) : 
(4.1) 
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An alternative way to think of this condition is that value is created if by moving 
from flat fees to variable fees the certainty equivalent of the agent (CEA) is 
decreasing less than the certainty equivalent of the principal ( CEP) increases: 
CEA - CE~ < CE~ - CE p. (4.1)' 
The optimal degree of risk sharing is attained if the sum of certainty equivalents is 
maximized: 
max ( CE~ +CE~), 
b 
(4.2) 
where b represents the bonus rate of the linear incentive contract. 
Staying in the above framework of exponential utility functions and 
normally distributed outcomes, the certainty equivalents for variable fee contracts 
can be calculated as follows: 
CE~ =xp-(l-b}2 rpa 
2 
2 
CE' = x -b2 rAa 
A A 2 
2 
(4.3) 
Where xP,xA is the expected value, rP,rA is the coefficient of risk 
averseness for the principal and the agent respectively, and b is the bonus rate. 
(By setting b = 0 it becomes obvious that this formulation comprises the case of 
flat fees.) 
Inserting (4.3) into (4.2) gives: 
• _ _ 2 rpa2 2 r,ia2 b Eargmaxx +x -(l-b) ---b --. (4.4) 
b p A 2 2 
As Xp,XA do not depend on b, this can be reformulated as: 
2 2 
b• . (l b)2 rpa b2 rAa Eargmm - --+ --. 
b 2 2 
(4.5) 
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So, the problem can be thought of as choosing b in order to minimize the 
risk premium. Differentiating ( 4.5) yields the first-order condition: 
(4.6) 
Both parties are strictly risk-averse 
As both parties are strictly risk-averse and the project is risky o-2 (rP + rA) > 0. 
The objective function is therefore convex and the first-order condition is 
necessary and sufficient for a global minimum. Solving ( 4.6) for b ·, it can be 
written: 
(4.6)' 
In the literature, this expression can also be found in the form of: 
( 4.6)" 
where 't; = 1/r; and is called the coefficient of risk tolerance307• As this is the 
more intuitive concept, propositions will be derived in terms of risk tolerance. 
Interpreting condition ( 4.6)'' yields the intuitive result that the optimal 
bonus rate increases as the agent becomes more risk-tolerant relative to the 
principal. 
(4.7) 
In addition, perhaps less intuitively, the optimal bonus rate which reflects 
the agent's share in the risky part of his compensation equals the ratio of his risk 
tolerance and the over-all risk tolerance of both parties. Also, note that 
distributional assumptions play no part in the optimal sharing rule. 
307 see Kreps (I 990), p. 173 
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It can also be seen that if both parties are strictly risk-averse it will always 
be optimal to engage in some degree of risk sharing: 
O<b* <l. (4.8) 
One could easily think otherwise: If one party is more risk-tolerant than the 
other, it will suffer less disutility for taking risk than the other party. So, it seems 
plausible that it should shoulder all the risk. But this argument is flawed because 
the risk premium is convex in b. Of course, there are situations where b • is 
close to zero (for very high 'tp / 't A) or close to one (for very low •p / 't A). 
lim b' = 0, lim b' = 1. 
tp/tA.....«> tp/tA----J-0 
(4.9) 
Proposition 5.1 : If both parties are risk-averse, it will always be optimal to 
engage in some degree of risk sharing. Each party's share in the risky part of 
their pay-off equals the ratio of their risk tolerance and over-all risk tolerance. 
The optimal bonus rate thus increases as the agent becomes more risk-tolerant 
relative to the principal It does not depend on any specific distributional 
assumptions. 
Principal risk-neutral, agent strictly risk-averse and vice versa 
Setting rP = 0 the first-order condition in (4.6) becomes: 
which means that b • = 0 . 
(4.10) 
Similarly, if the agent is risk-neutral and the principal risk-averse, one gets: 
(4.11) 
which can only hold true if b' = 1. 
Thus, in line with intuition, the risk-neutral party, whether it is the principal 
or the agent, will assume all the risk. This is the result, underlying the result in 
subsection (2.1.4) which showed that first-best can be achieved in the case of a 
risk-neutral agent, even if effort is not observable. The effect of the agent's choice 
of effort can then be fully internalized, without creating inefficient risk sharing. 
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Both parties risk-neutral 
If both parties are risk-neutral, the sum of certainty equivalents is always the same 
independent of b .The choice of b does not matter for risk sharing purposes. 
Proposition 5.2.: If one party is risk-neutral, while the other party is risk-
averse it is optimal for the risk-neutral party to assume all the risk. If both 
parties are risk-neutral, the choice of the bonus rate does not matter for risk 
sharing purposes. 
Importance of risk sharing 
As an indicator for the importance of finding the optimal sharing rule, the 
difference between optimal risk sharing and the flat fee case is calculated: 
(4.12) 
Proposition 5.2.: It can be seen that the advantage of variable fees over 
flat fees increases for rising project risk ( a 2 t), rising absolute levels of risk 
averseness ( rp t) and rising relative risk tolerance of the agent ( r PI r A -1-) and 
vice versa. 
2.3.3 Model Extension: Diversification 
In this subsection, in an extension to the basic model developed above, the effects 
of different levels of diversification is studied. The crucial idea is that the relevant 
risk of a project to a party depends on the risk the project adds to this party's 
portfolio. This might be well below its stand-alone risk and might differ among 
parties. 
The basic method remains the same: First, the risk premium is calculated 
dependant on the bonus rate b. Then, the optimal bonus rate b • is derived using 
the first-order condition and checking if it is necessary and sufficient. Finally, as 
an indicator of the importance of risk sharing, the difference between optimal risk 
sharing and the flat fee case is calculated. The idea is that risk-sharing arguments 
should be given more weight if the potential value creation is higher. Interpreting 
the result, one can show which variables are driving the optimal bonus rate and 
the importance of risk sharing arguments. It will be seen that the results of the 
simple model above are special cases of this more general model. 
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As in the above case, the sum of certainty equivalents is maximized: 
max ( CE~ +CE~). 
b 
(4.13) 
The certainty equivalents now reflecting diversification can be calculated as 
follows (Note that this formulation comprises the flat fee case for b = 0 .): 
rp( u,, 2 +(1-b)2 u2 +2(1-b)dp) 
CE~= x,,, +(1-b)x-s -~-'--------~ 
2 (4.14) 
r (u 2 +b2u 2 +2bd) 




and PP is the coefficient of correlation, x., is expected value and cr,, is 
variance of the portfolio of the principal and d A, p A , x. , cr. defined 
A A 
accordingly for the agent. 
Inserting (4.14) into (4.13) yields: 
b. E argmaxx,r +x,r 
b p A 
rp [ u",2 +(1-b )2 u2 + 2(1-b)dp] 
2 
r [u 2 +b2u 2 +2bd ] A tr11 A 
2 
Reformulating ( 4.16) yields: 
• . rp[ u,,,2 +(1-b}2 u2 +2(1-b)dp] 
b e argmm--'=------------= 
b 2 
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For b. the first order condition must hold: 
(4.18) 
Both parties are strictly risk-averse 
Checking the second order condition ( o-2 ( rP + rA) > 0) , it is found that the 
objective function is concave in b and therefore b° is a global minimum. 
Rearranging, one can write for b • : 
b• = rpo-2 +rpdp -rAdA =---2.....+ rpdp -rAdA 
o-2 ( rP + rA) rP + rA o-2 ( rp + rA ) 
(4.19) 
The above case (without diversification) can of course be shown to be 
a special case of this more general version by setting d P = d A = 0 . 
Setting di= pier, er (see (4.15)), Si= -PA,., t; = 1/ti and doing some tedious 
algebra ( 4.19) can be written as: ' 
ti is the party's risk tolerance as above. Si can be interpreted as follows: 
pier, can be seen as a factor determining the project's contribution to the 
principal's overall risk. If the coefficient of correlation is l, the project's 
variance is simply added to the portfolio's variance in order to get the combined 
risk. If it is less than 1, the combined risk is lower than the sum of variances. In 
extreme cases (if pi < 0 ), the combined effect can actually lower overall portfolio 
risk. Generally speaking, the lower this expression the stronger the diversification 
effect. Therefore, Si= -pier, can be interpreted as an indicator of the strength of 
the diversification effect. (Note that the value of Si is negative as long as the 
coefficient of correlation pi is positive.) 
The effect of diversification can be studied in a first approach by setting 
T=Tp = 'A : 
(4.21) 
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It can be seen that the optimal bonus rate is higher if the diversification 
effect is stronger for the agent than for the principal. Project risk cr can be 
interpreted as a scale variable of the correction term: The higher the absolute risk, 
the lower the effect on the bonus rate as small changes already make a big 
difference. 
The assumption of equal risk averseness has been instructive. Now, the 
more general case will be considered. Rewriting and interpreting (4.20), 
the following propositions can be derived: 
Proposition 6.1.: The optimal sharing rule for risk sharing with 
diversification can be written as the sum of the optimal sharing rule without 
diversification and a correction term, accounting for the portfolio effects. 
Proposition 6.2.: The portfolio effect will increase the optimal bonus rate 
the stronger the diversification effect in the portfolio of the agent is relative to 
the principal's diversification effect and vice versa. 
As the agent becomes more risk-toleranton relative to the principal 
( -rdr A decreases), the first term on the right hand side of equation ( 4.20) 
increases. Analysing the second term is more difficult: 
If both coefficients of correlation are positive, SA, SP will be negative. So, 
decreasing •pl•A will put less weight on the negative and more weight on the 
positive part of the parenthesized expression. Therefore, the second term will also 
nse. 
If the diversification effect of the agent is so strong that SA turns pos1t1ve, 
then decreasing •pl• A will put less weight on a positive and less weight on 
another positive part of the parenthesized expression. So, the parenthesized 
expression will roughly stay the same. As the agent becomes more risk-tolerant he 
does not appreciate as much that he can actually reduce portfolio risk by accepting 
the project, but terms l and 2 combined will most likely rise. 
If the diversification effect of the principal is so strong that SA turns 
positive, then decreasing •pl• A because the principal becomes less risk-tolerant 
will actually put more weight on the negative part of the parenthesized expression. 
119 Alexander Stremitzer - 978-3-631-75400-9
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:25:38AM
via free access
So, it definitely decreases and even turns negative. Therefore, the combined effect 
of both terms will be low and can even turn negative. In extreme cases, b could 
even turn negative. 
Proposition 6.3.: As the risk tolerance of the agent relative to the principal 
increases, the optimal bonus rate always becomes higher if the coefficients of 
correlation are positive. If adding the project actually lowers the portfolio risk 
of the principal, the optimal bonus rate will possibly decrease for increasing the 
risk tolerance of the agent relative to the principal 
In this last special case, the portfolio effect would not only reduce the risk 
contribution of the project below its stand-alone risk, but make the risk 
contribution negative so that the portfolio of the agent is absolutely more risky 
before adding the project. The intuition is that the higher the risk averseness of the 
principal, the more attractive it is for him to add the project to his existing 
portfolio for its risk-reducing properties. Normally, correlations among projects 
and the portfolio will be positive, and the only question is if portfolio effects 
reinforce, mitigate or reverse the general direction reflected by different tolerance 
of risk. 
It is convenient to think of the issues raised here in terms of differentials of 
"specific risk appetite" between parties. It is specific because it is the appetite for 
the specific risk of the particular project in question, and not just any kind of risk. 
It depends on two factors: First, the parties' risk tolerance and second, the 
diversification effects in the parties' portfolio. One has to be careful to understand 
how these factors interact. Usually, ceteris paribus the "specific risk appetite" of a 
party increases as its risk tolerance increases. If, however, diversification effects 
are so strong that they turn negative, the opposite is the case. The lower risk 
tolerance, the higher will be the party's "specific risk appetite". This is the case 
where the project's contribution is not only lower than its stand-alone value but 
actually negative, i.e. the overall risk of the party's portfolio is decreased by 
adding the project308• So, in the case of diversification, situations may be imagined 
where the optimal bonus rate is O or 1, even if none of the parties is risk-neutral. It 
can even be imagined that it is lower than O or higher than 1. This suggests that 
308 If a savings and loan bank bas issued bonds with a fixed coupon and subsequently interest rates 
go down, the margins of the bank will shrink. At the same time, a property dealer will benefit 
from the lower interest rates as people will get cheaper financing or switch assets from bonds 
into property. So, the consultant could counterbalance the risk of doing a variable fee project 
with a savings and loan bank by acquiring a variable fee project with a property dealer. 
Usually, however, the consultant will not agree to performance measures that do not take 
account of such factors. 
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the parties can gain by swapping payments contingent on project outcome 
(providing insurance for other risks the counterparty holds)309• 
Principal risk-neutral, agent strictly risk-averse and vice versa 
Setting rP = 0 into the first-order condition ( 4.18) yields: 
Solving for b• and rearranging gives: 
(4.22) 
(4.23) 
So, for positive coefficients of correlation b • becomes negative. This does 
not look very realistic. Often b will be bounded to be non-negative, but the 
following interpretation can be given: If the agent is risk-averse and the risk of the 
project positively correlates with his portfolio, the parties might be interested to 
arrange an insurance contract wherein the agent pays the principal to carry not 
only the risk of the project, but also to provide further coverage for other risks the 
agent faces. 
If the principal is strictly risk-averse and the agent risk-neutral, b• can be 
written as: 
b• =1+~ (4.24) 
cr 
Analogous to above this time the principal is interested to buy insurance 
from the agent if the coefficient of correlation is positive. 
Importance of risk sharing 
The difference between optimal risk sharing and flat fees is given by: 
309 This seems very contrived. A company that wishes to do away with certain risks will probably 
more likely resort to an insurance policy or a financial engineering product. 
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Inserting dK = d8 = 0, gives: 
(rpCT2 + rpdp -rAdAr 
2a2 (rP +rA) 
(4.25) 
(4.26) 
which was exactly the result above in the model without diversification. 
Inserting d; = -.9-;CT and r; = 1/-r; into (4.25) rearranging gives: 
'tAcr+(-cP3A -'tA3P) 
2'tA 'tp ( 'tA -'tp) 
(4.27) 
Proposition 6.4.: If the difference between optimal risk sharing and the 
flat Jee case is taken as an indicator for the importance of risk sharing, 
importance increases for increasing project risk, lower absolute levels of risk 
tolerance of the parties involved and increasing differentials of "specific risk 
appetite", which depend on both the relative risk tolerance and the specific way 
the project interacts with the parties' portfolios. 
2.3.4 Discussion 
This Section inquired into what is driving perfect risk sharing and highlighted the 
parties' level of risk tolerance (both absolute and relative to each other), the 
specific quality of the risk involved as determined by its correlation with existing 
risk-exposure and the level of project risk. 
Part of the results of the first subsection (which excluded portfolio effects) 
reveals itself to be a special case for 2 individuals of a more general result of 
syndicate theory3'°: The fact that if a risk-neutral party is involved it carries all the 
risk; the independence of the sharing rule in each state of the probability assigned 
to that state; and the fact that the risky part of each party's compensation is 
310 Syndicate theory is an application ofa methodology in the theory of social choice which solves 
the social choice problem for varying weights of a Bergsonian welfare functional in order to 
get the Pareto efficient frontier. (see: Kreps (1990), pp. 169-174; the classical reference is 
Wilson ( 1968). 
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proportional to its own risk tolerance divided by the overall risk tolerance of 
society, if the parties' preferences over lotteries exhibit constant risk aversion (and 
therefore can be represented by an exponential utility function). In the model 
presented here, the exponential utility function was assumed right from the 
beginning. Moreover, a normally distributed output was assumed. The advantage 
of this set of assumptions - as was proven in the appendix to the previous Section 
- is that certainty equivalents can be calculated as a simple function of mean and 
variance. Consistent with the above-cited fact of syndicate theory, distributional 
assumptions (in this case cr2 ) proved to be irrelevant for the optimal sharing rule. 
However, this changes as soon as the possibility of portfolio effects is 
allowed for. In this case, the modeling framework chosen is extremely convenient 
as it readily admits the use of portfolio theory from finance which is cast in a 
mean-variance framework311 • 
2.4 The Optimal Contract 
2.4.l Introduction 
In the above model an important restriction was imposed. Only linear incentive 
schemes were considered. This assumption is arbitrary, unless it is possible to 
show that linearity is a feature of optimal contracts. Unfortunately, quite to the 
contrary, the following propositions can be derived: 
7. If effort is contractible, the optimal compensation is a flat fee. If effort 
is uncontractible, optimal compensation varies with outcome. 
8. If effort is uncontractible, optimal compensation depends on outcome 
through the likelihood ratio. If interpreted in terms of an inference 
process, any outcome that makes the principal revise upwards his 
beliefs with respect to the probability of high effort will be rewarded. 
311 This cannot be taken for granted, because µ,cr- analysis is not generally equivalent to the 
concept of risk averseness (see Rothschild, Stiglitz (1970)). Another example besides the 
normal-exponential setting is the quadratic utility function which admits a µ, cr - representation 
for any distributional assumption but has otherwise awkward properties such as increasing 
absolute risk averseness (see: Schneewei8 (1967), pp. 95ff.; Feldstein (1968). Better suited is a 
power function combined with a lognormal probability distribution ( see: Schneewei8 ( I 967), 
pp. 145 fl). 
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9. The relationship between the optimal sharing rule and outcome is 
working through the information content of outcome which depends 
on distributional assumptions. Physical properties of outcome (like 
quantity) are not interesting as such but only to the extent that they 
carry information. Therefore, the sharing rule which links 
compensation to outcome is very contrived and sensitive to 
distributional assumptions. 
IO. In conclusion of propositions 7-9, it can be said that few general 
constraints on the shape of optimal incentive schemes can be derived. 
Utility functions and distributions must be specified in order to arrive at 
meaningful constraints. What is more, optimal contracts are very 
sensitive to these assumptions. 
11. No natural settings seem to exist for which linearity is optimal. Linear 
incentive schemes can, however, be argued to be relatively robust to 
changing distributional assumptions and to assumptions concerning the 
richness of the action space. Transaction cost arguments also favor 
simple incentive schemes. 
12. Non-distributional assumptions like the richness of the action space 
affect optimal contracts. 
13. For y to be valuable information, it must affect posterior assessment. 
It must be a signal for effort choice without existing information being 
a sufficient statistic for y with respect to H and L. 
The proof for these propositions can only be sketched312 • 
2.4.2 Mechanics of the Optimal Sharing Rule 
The first step will be to set up a control theoretic model in order to derive 
properties of the optimal sharing rule. This will lead to a statistical 
interpretation of the basic agency model313 • This interpretation is key to the 
understanding of the mechanics of incentive schemes relevant to the following 
sections, which is why it will be treated at some length. This interpretation gives 
an intuitive explanation of the above proposition that only very few general 
312 An excellent review of the following discussion can be found in Hart, Holmstrom (pp. 79-97, 
1987). 
313 The statistical interpretation follows the treatment of Hart, Holmstrom(! 987) 
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constraints can be derived as for the shape of the optimal contract, and none of 
them very meaningful. 
The model will be slightly different from the model used above. It is 
assumed that the agent cannot choose from a continuum of actions but only 
between two effort levels. Either he can be hard-working or lazy and this time the 
agent, by choosing his level of effort, is effectively choosing two probability 
distributions over a continuous support set of signals. This allows studying more 
closely the effects of distributional assumptions by allowing a much higher 
variety of distributions. 
On a technical level, this leads to the following changes compared to above: 
As there is a finite action space, the number of incentive constraints will be finite 
(in this case there is only one incentive constraint) and therefore no first-order 
approach is needed. The continuity of the set of signals makes it impossible to 
stipulate that, for any choice of effort, any output arises with positive probability 
because probabilities then would not add up to zero. Instead, it is assumed that the 
support sets of signals are the same and that both density functions are strictly 
positive314. 
As above, the principal has to solve the following maximization problem315 : 
maxf (x-s(x))JH (x)dx (5.1) 
s.t. JC :f u(s(x))[JH (x)- JL (x)]dx-cH +cL ~ 0 (5.2) 
PC :f u(s(x))JH (x)-cH -u0 ~ 0 (5.3) 
where x is the signal (here simply output), s ( x) is the sharing rule, fH ( x), 
fL(x) are the density functions over output for effort levels Hand L respectively. 
JH strictly dominates JL in the sense of stochastic dominance ( FH ( x) > FL ( x) ). 
c H, c L is the disutility of effort for effort levels H and L respectively as measured 
on the scale of disutility. Both the principal and the agent are v-N-M expected 
utility maximizers. The principal is assumed to be risk-neutral. The agent is risk-
averse. His utility function u (,) is increasing, twice continuously differentiable 
andconcave(u'(·)>0, u"(·)<0). u0 istheagent'sreservationutility. 
314 see Kreps (1990), p. 604 (he is more formal by stipulating that the "likelihood ratios are 
uniformly bounded and bounded away from zero) 
315 This is the parameterized distribution formulation of the agency problem in a more general 
version than above, see Holmstrom (1979). Tirole (2000) also used this formulation. 
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As above, it can be argued that both constraints must be binding. The 
incentive constraint must bind because increasing compensation differentials 
above the level needed in order to induce the agent to implement the high effort 
would unnecessarily increase the risk exposure of the agent and therefore 
expected payment by the principal. Also, the participation constraint must hold 
with equality, because otherwise the principal's expected payment could be 
reduced by lowering compensation at every signal by the same amount without 
affecting incentives. 
Letting µ and J be the Lagrangean multipliers316 for constraint (5.2) and 
(5.3) respectively, it can be written: 
L{s(x),µ,J) = J (x-s(x))JH (x) + µu(s(x))[JH (x)- JL (x)] + 
(5.4) 
Ju(s(x))JH (x)+ µ(cL -cH }-J( cH +u0 }dx 
As 8L/ as ( x) = 0 , it can be written: 
-JH (x)+ µ[JH (x)- fr (x)]u'(s(x))+JJH (x)u'(s(x)) = 0 (5.5) 
Dividing both sides by JH (x)u'(s(x)) and rearranging yields the following 
condition for optimal sharing rules: 
1 A-+µ(l-/l(x)) 
u'(s(x)) JH (x) 
(5.5)' 
If effort is contractible, there will be no incentive problems (as the principal 
will use a forcing contract). Therefore, the incentive constraint will not bind. 
From the complementary slackness conditions it can be followed that this implies 
µ = 0. If µ = 0 , the optimal compensation s ( x) will be a flat fee. 
If effort is not contractible, there will be an incentive problem. The 
incentive constraint will bind. If µ = 0 the agent will choose L in violation of the 
incentive constraint. Therefore µ > 0 . But then, optimal compensations ( x) will 
vary with outcome x . 
316 If constraints cannot be argued to hold with equality, Kuhn-Tucker conditions have to be used. 
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Proposition 7: If effort is contractible, the optimal compensation is a flat 
fee. If effort is uncontractible, optimal compensation varies with outcome. 
This is the same result as in (2.1 ), only this time the expression also gives 
insight into the "mechanics" of the relationship. The sharing rule s ( x) depends on 
x through: 
This expression is familiar from statistical inference and is called the 
likelihood ratio. "It reflects how strongly x signals that the true distribution from 
which x was drawn is fl rather than JH . A high likelihood ratio speaks for L and 
a low for H."317 It can be seen that, in an optimal incentive scheme, the agent is 
punished for a high likelihood ratio and rewarded for a low likelihood ratio: 
/L((x)) t • { \ )) t • u'{s(x))t• s(x)t, for u"(·)<O. 
fH X U 1 S X 
Thus, any outcome that suggests that high effort was most likely chosen is 
rewarded, which is a quite intuitive result. 
It is possible to rewrite (5.5) in a way which stresses even more the analogy 
to statistical inference. Letting y be the prior of H and y ' ( x) the posterior of H if 
x was observed and applying Bayes' rule gives (see Exhibit 1): 
r'(x) = Prob(H Ix) 
Prob(H)Prob(x I H) 
Prob(H)Prob(x I H)+ Prob(L )ProbL (x IL) 
r JH (x) 
r JH (x)+(l-y)JL (x) · 
317 Hart/ Holmstrom (I 987), p. 80 
(5.6) 
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Prob(L) = 1- r 
Exhibit 1: Agent chooses a Distribution of Outcomes 
Rearranging yields: 
fi(x) =(-1 __ 1]..L_· 
fH (x) y' (x) l-y 
(5.6)' 
Inserting (5.6)' into (5.5)' yields: 
.........,.-1---,- =;., + µ[l -[-1-- i)-r-] u'(s(x)) r'(x) l-y · (5.7) 
Rearranging yields: 
1 =;., + µ[-r_'(_x_)-_r_l 
u'(s(x)) r'(x)(l-r) · 
(5.7)' 
It becomes clear that compensation rises if the output makes the principal 
revise upwards his beliefs with respect to the probability of high effort. 
Proposition 8: If effort is uncontractible, optimal compensation depends 
on outcome through the likelihood ratio. If interpreted as an inference process, 
any outcome that makes the principal revise upwards his beliefs with respect to 
the probability of high effort will be rewarded. 
It must be stressed that the principal does not in fact infer. He can perfectly 
predict the actions of the agent, but the optimal incentive scheme is designed as if 
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it was a reaction to the inferences of the principal. This interpretation is instructive 
to understand why there are only few general constraints318 and none of them 
meaningful: The relationship between the optimal sharing rule and outcome is 
working through the information content of outcome. In other words: The 
physical properties of the outcome (e.g. monetary success of the project) are only 
interesting to the extent that they carry information about which action was 
chosen by the agent; but this information content depends exclusively on 
distributional assumptions. It is not even possible to derive that compensation is 
always increasing in output. Consider e.g. distribution fH, f, 
where JH ( x) = JL (x + l). There is stochastic dominance ( FH > FL) but if it is e.g. 
assumed that f H , J; are bimodal then it becomes clear that there is no 
monotonicity of s(x) in x (see Exhibit 2). Of course, it is possible to make the 
assumption that the likelihood ratio is monotone in outcome319 to ensure 
monotonicity of s ( x) 320 • 
pmish reward punish rew.ud 
Output 
Exhibit 2: No Monotonicity of Compensation in Outcome despite Stochastic Dominance321 
Proposition 9: The relationship between the optimal sharing rule and 
outcome is working through the information content of outcome which depends 
on distributional assumptions. Physical properties of outcome (like quantity) are 
not interesting as such but only to the extent that they carry information. 
318 see Grossman, Hart(l 983) 
319 This is called the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP), which is attributed by some to 
Milgrom (1981) and by others to unpublished work of Mirrlees. 
320 In fact, it was already mentioned above that in the case of more than two available actions 
another assumption called the "concavity of the distribution function assumption" (see also 
footnote 266) is needed to ensure monotonicity (see Kreps (1990), pp. 596-598; Grossman, 
Hart (1983), example!). 
321 For a very intuitive display of this property see Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green (I 995), p. 486. 
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Therefore, the sharing rule which links compensation to outcome is very 
contrived and sensitive to distributional assumptions. 
Therefore, in order to derive meaningful constraints, additional 
distributional assumptions have to be made. Yet, it becomes clear from the 
above that derived optimal incentive schemes are very sensitive to these 
distributional assumptions. 
Proposition 10: In conclusion of propositions 7-9, it can be said that little 
general constraints on the shape of optimal incentive schemes can be derived. 
Utility functions and distributions must be specified in order to arrive at 
meaningful constraints. Optimal contracts, however, are very sensitive to these 
assumptions. 
2.4.3 The Case for Linear Contracts 
The sensitivity of optimal incentive schemes to distributional assumptions 
suggests a great variety of different incentive schemes322• This contrasts to the real 
world experience where only a few relatively simple incentive schemes like 
linear incentive schemes, step-functions and flat fee contracts can be found. 
One obvious reason for this conflicting evidence can be transaction cost 
arguments. Optimal contracts can sometimes be rather complex. People tend not 
to conclude such contracts. 
Yet, there are more subtle explanations. One can be the robustness of the 
incentive scheme: Some schemes may be more robust to changing assumptions 
with respect to probability distributions and utility functions323 than others. If 
these distributional assumptions require more accurate information than is 
practically available, there is an advantage to using schemes which are quite good 
for a whole range of assumptions. It can e.g. be shown that, for a linear production 
function and a normally distributed error term (a quite natural formulation), linear 
incentive schemes are always dominated by step function schemes which can 
approximate first best arbitrarily closely324. This is because, at very low outcomes, 
the likelihood ratio decreases to a point where one can almost act as if non-
compliance was determined with zero chance of error. Harsh penalties can be 
322 see Hart, Holmstrom (1987), p.91 n whose line of argument is followed here 
323 see e.g. Kreps(l990), p. 612 
324 Mirrlees (I 974) 
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inflicted for these outcomes, while the payment is a flat fee over all other 
outcomes. Therefore, perfect risk sharing can almost be achieved and the agent 
will choose high effort because low effort will increase the probability of harsh 
punishment . There are several reasons why this example is not realistic. It may 
not be possible to impose harsh enough penalties because of bankruptcy 
constraints, or maybe the likelihood ratio is bounded, but this example highlights 
a more fundamental problem: Step function schemes are an extreme case of fine 
tuning. While they are better than linear schemes in all cases if the range of 
outcomes for inflicting the penalty and the amount of the penalty are fixed at the 
optimal level, it is worse than linear schemes in most cases, where the 
assumptions are only rough estimates as is almost always the case in the real 
world. 
Another robustness argument refers to the richness of the action space. It is 
often observed in economics that measures do not work where the agents have 
enough options to circumvent them. To capture the intuition it is extremely 
difficult for a government to tax the extremely wealthy as they can always move 
their residence to another country. It is also impossible for a company to engage 
in price discrimination if reselling is permitted. In this case, any price 
discrimination is arbitraged away. Following the same rationale, it can be shown 
that step functions create path-dependent incentives. If it is assumed that an 
agent can observe progress while the project is underwaym, he will quite often 
decide that he does not need to exert effort in the step function case. This is 
because in many situations he will either conclude that he will not be able to reach 
the threshold where he is paid or that he has already sufficiently surpassed it. So, 
he will neither do his best to prevent a bad situation from turning worse nor try to 
make a good situation even better. This path dependency of incentives does not 
apply for linear incentive schemes which keep incentives fairly constant. This 
result "illustrates a more general idea namely, that complicating the nature of the 
incentive problem can actually lead to simpler forms for optimal contracts"326 • 
Proposition 11: No natural settings seem to exist where linear schemes are 
optimal Linear incentive schemes, however, can be argued to be relatively 
robust to changing distributional assumptions and to assumptions concerning 
the richness of the action space. Transaction cost arguments also favour simple 
incentive schemes. 
325 Note that this is actually a multi-period model. For more on dynamic extensions see Chapter 
IV5. 
326 Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green (1995), p. 488 
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It is questionable whether this very general conclusion in rescue of linear 
incentive schemes is justified given the very restrictive assumptions327• It can be 
argued that the main contribution of this argument was to stress the importance 
of non-distributional assumptions such as the richness of the action space, 
when deriving optimal incentive schemes. To illustrate the idea, when designing 
incentives one is actually preparing a path which is meant to channel the 
behaviour of the agent. Every time he takes the decision, there have to be walls 
erected to ensure that he stays on the path, otherwise the agent gains control of the 
game and can manipulate outcome. This, however, poses the problem of 
predicting all the relevant options available to the agent. If one fails to do so, 
the scheme may break down. 
Proposition 12: Non-distributional assumptions, like the richness of the 
action space, affect optimal incentive schemes. 
2.4.4 Valuable Information 
A precise result can be derived about which parameters should enter into an 
optimal contract in the first place. Suppose y is another signal besides output x 
and that the joint density function is ~ ( x, y) for i = L, H . Then, analogous to 
(5.5)', it can be written: 
1 .,i (i fr(x,y)) 
u'(s(x)) = +µ - JH(x,y) 





If fH (y) = fL (y), then they cancel out and the optimal contract should 
not depend on y. This is an intuitive result: The condition means that y is just 
unrelated noise with respect to H and L. It is obvious that such a variable would 
just add noise, increasing cost for the principal who has to compensate the agent 
for his risk exposure, without carrying any information. 
327 Gibbons (200 I) 
132 Alexander Stremitzer - 978-3-631-75400-9
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:25:38AM
via free access
But it was already assumed above that y is a signal. Therefore, 
fH ( y) ¢ fL ( y) . Yet, it will be shown that being a signal is just a necessary 
condition for a contract parameter to provide valuable information. 
As the condone probability of y when x was observed is: 
r ( I ) = f; ( x, y) 
,yx f;(x) (5. 10) 
Rearranging gives: 
f; ( X, y) = f; ( yj X) f; ( X) (5.10)' 
If fH (yjx) = fL (ylx) it can be seen from (5.8) that the optimal contract does 
not depend on y. This condition says that y is perfectly correlated with x with 
respect to H and L. All the information about effort choice that is contained in y 
is already contained in x. So, y offers no additional information. It is also said that 
x is a sufficient statistic for y with respect to H and L. This leads to the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 13.: For y to be valuable information it must affect posterior 
assessment It must both be a signal for effort choice and the information 
already available may not be a sufficient statistic for y with respect to Hand L. 
This result is also called the sufficient statistic result or the Holmstrom 
informativeness condition328 • 
How can this result be interpreted? When designing the incentive scheme of 
a consultant who makes a cost cutting projectm there is no use in monitoring both 
the cost saved and the number of workers laid off. There is a deterministic 
relationship between the two variables. They are perfectly or very closely 
correlated, but it may make sense to monitor the hours worked by the consultant, 
formal consistency of the report, the extent and depth of analysis, the amount of 
relevant empirical material used, the numbers of interviews concluded and the 
satisfaction of the people involved. 
This information is valuable as it increases the ability to separate between 
high and low effort. It is as if inferences become more precise. Expression (5.8) 
328 see Kreps (1990), p. 608; Mas-Cole!!, Whinston Green (1995), p. 487f; Holmstrt\m (1979) 
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predicts that as the likelihood ratio decreases the optimal compensation 
differential is very high. This is because, as inferences are very precise, the chance 
of error is low and therefore the welfare loss due to imperfect risk-sharing can be 
kept low in spite of the wage differential. The principal can severely punish the 
agent if low outcome is observed. 
Clearly there is also a cost in obtaining information and often the most 
valuable information is also the most expensive to obtain. So, directly observing 
effort would be the most valuable information, but it was assumed that it is 
uncontractible (read: can only be made contractible at prohibitive cost). If they 
came at the same cost, one would always prefer to do input monitoring to output 
monitoring. So, this result on its own only helps to determine the value of 
information but, in order to decide which parameter should enter the contract, one 
also has to consider the cost of contracting on it. 
The result highlights another important point: It is not only sufficient to look 
if information is a signal. It must also be analysed whether the signal is not 
disturbed by the same noise. Beyond the obvious case cited above, this suggests 
that there is a decreasing marginal utility of information as with a reasonable 
number of variables considered, probably most of the uncertainty that can be 
filtered out has been filtered out. The method when considering adding a signal 
therefore is to ask what the risks are that disturb the relationship between the 
choice of effort and the signal, and if these risks are of different type and origin 
than in the relationship between effort and the existing signals. If this is the case, 
the signal is likely to be valuable. 
2.4.5 Discussion 
In this Section, a control theory model was set up to determine the optimal sharing 
rule. It was possible to reprove the results of earlier sections. If effort is 
contractible, flat fee contracts will be used. If it is not contractible it will depend 
on output, but contrary to earlier results it was also possible to shed some light on 
the mechanics of the optimal sharing rule. Compensation depends on output 
through the likelihood ratio. There are two implications: The optimal sharing rule 
can be understood quite intuitively as rewarding the agent if the signal makes it 
likely that high effort was chosen. But it also explains why little general 
constraints can be derived for the shape of the optimal sharing rule: It is very 
sensitive to specifications of utility functions and distributional assumptions. 
Although the optimal contract can only be derived to be linear under awkwardly 
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improbable assumptions329, there are a number of reasons explaining the practical 
prominence of such contracts. First, there is the transaction cost argument. Setting 
up complex contracts is just too expensive. Second, linear contracts are argued to 
be relatively robust for a large number of settings. So, paradoxically, there are 
reasons to believe that adding complexity makes contracts simpler. But also non-
distributional assumptions, like the number of different options available to the 
agent, affects the optimal incentive scheme. It was also shown that information is 
only valuable if it affects posterior assessment of the effort level chosen. 
Therefore, it must be related to effort choice, but it must also be impossible to 
perfectly infer the information - to the extent that it is relevant to this assessment -
from information on variables already included into the contract. The same results 
can also be derived for the more general case of a continuous action space and a 
continuous set of outcomes330, but this complication offers no additional economic 
insights331 • 
2.5 Limitations and Extensions 
A common assumption is that there is a comparative cost advantage of output 
monitoring compared to input monitoring. Why should this be the case? In order 
to implement input monitoring, the principal has to watch the agent while 
performing the required task. This causes opportunity costs to the principal. Still 
worse, if the principal does not know the production function of the agent, he may 
well watch the agent while performing a task but will be unable to interpret his 
actions as to whether they are instrumental to achieve the required output. These 
costs are amplified by the fact that, usually, the very motivation to hire an agent in 
the first place was that the principal either did not want or could not perform the 
task himself. So, either the principal has something else to do, which means that 
his opportunity costs are high, or the performance of the task requires specialized 
knowledge that the principal does not possess. The latter case does make it 
difficult for the principal to monitor the agent effectively. Alternatively, the 
principal could hire other qualified agents to do the monitoring for him, but then 
it may be difficult to prevent these monitoring agents from colluding with the 
operative agents. For all these reasons, input monitoring is likely to be very costly 
in many circumstances. On the other hand, output monitoring should be very 
easy. One has only to look to which extent the required result was achieved, 
provided that it can be properly defined. So, if a client hires a consultant to 
329 see Hart, Holmstrom (I 987) p. 81 
330 see Kreps ( 1999). p. 608 
331 see Hart, Holmstrom (1987), p. 83 who come to this conclusion. 
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perform a cost cutting project, it will be much easier for the client to evaluate how 
much cost was reduced than to interpret the wide variety of single measures the 
consultant takes to achieve his goal. 
Having clearly established the intuition for comparative cost advantage of 
output monitoring compared to input monitoring in a wide variety of situations, it 
may come as a surprise that input monitoring can theoretically infinitely 
approximate first best. This is because the agent, in his decision on whether to 
cheat or not, will weigh the benefits of cheating (in the case of shirking reduced 
disutility of effort) against the expected value of punishment. Therefore, if harsh 
enough punishments are announced, the probability of detection and therefore 
the number and thoroughness of inspections can be infinitely reduced. This is the 
first line of attack against the model presented above on the grounds that input 
monitoring need not be more expensive than output monitoring. In this case, there 
seems no rationale for output monitoring. If it is not cheaper, it will only 
provide an additional drawback: imperfect risk sharing. 
Yet, the second line of attack against the above model disputes just that. It 
was argued that input monitoring always establishes the truth, while output 
monitoring is prone to error. This is a crucial point, because it was shown above 
that the driving force behind imperfect risk sharing in output monitoring is the 
possibility of error in judgement and the subsequent punishment of the innocent. 
If it can be shown that output monitoring can achieve perfect accuracy, or that 
input monitoring is prone to error as well this distinction breaks down. In fact, 
both can be shown to be plausible assumptions in some circumstances: Output 
monitoring will be perfectly accurate in the case of deterministic production 
functions, but also if there is shifting support'32 . Indeed, the above argument of 
Mirrlees on step-functions is in the same spirit. On the other hand, it seems 
implausible to assume that input monitoring will be able to prove cheating at 
100%. There will always be judgement, inferences, circumstantial evidence. 
Whatever the process, there is a chance of error. Therefore, the above assumption 
will need to be relaxed to allow for error in input monitoring. 
These arguments appear construed, and in fact they are. In general, input 
monitoring will be more costly and output monitoring more prone to error. 
Ignoring these arguments, therefore, seems to be a justified abstraction, but there 
is still some merit in taking them seriously. In a nutshell, they say that, regardless 
of whether one is looking at input monitoring or at output monitoring, there are 
two relevant issues: Error in judgement and cost of monitoring, and that under 
332 see next Section 
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some circumstances both schemes fare equally well or badly on these two 
dimensions. By acknowledging that there generally is a distinction between input 
monitoring and output monitoring, one is actually saying that these circumstances 
will rarely be present. Understanding why this is the case helps to identify other 
relevant situational variables which influence the problem of optimal contracting. 
Extensions to the classic agency model involve the role of the bankruptcy 
constraint, the role of error in the monitoring process which will be treated in 
Chapter (3), distortive effects of contracting333 (Chapter 4) and extensions beyond 
the one-shot relationship334 (Chapter 5). 
3 Error in judgement, Bankruptcy 
3.1 Input Monitoring 
3.1.1 Introduction 
In this Chapter it will first be argued that input monitoring achieves first best if 
harsh enough punishment is feasible and error in judgement can be excluded. 
Clearly, these assumptions are unrealistic335 • Bankruptcy and legal constraints set 
bounds to the extent of punishment. It will be shown that if a bankruptcy 
constraint is introduced, input monitoring will be costly. Alternatively, if error in 
judgement is allowed for, input monitoring will be costly even if there is no 
bankruptcy constraint. One should note the interesting twist in this argument: The 
first line of attack against costly input monitoring involves schemes with high 
punishment. It was argued before that, even if error in judgement cannot be 
excluded, it is possible to safely abstract from it because its probability is low. As 
soon, however, as schemes with very high punishments are introduced, even small 
chances of error will lead to substantial cost due to imperfect risk-sharing. 
The following propositions will be derived: 
14. Input monitoring can achieve first best if harsh-enough punishments 
are feasible and error can be excluded. 
333 see e.g. Holmstrom, Milgrom (1991), Gibbons(2001) 
334 see e.g. Bull (1987), Holmstrom (1999), Levin (2003), Lazear, Rosen (1981) 
335 It is sometimes assumed in behavioural economics that probability of detection may not fall 
below a certain threshold in order to be effective, regardless of expected value, because 
otherwise it will not be taken seriously by the agent. Having mentioned it, this criticism will 
subsequently be ignored. 
137 Alexander Stremitzer - 978-3-631-75400-9
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:25:38AM
via free access
15. If a bankruptcy constraint is assumed, there is always a welfare loss as 
the optimal frequency of inspections does not tend to zero, resulting in 
direct costs of monitoring. 
16. If there is a bankruptcy constraint and the cost of the monitoring 
technology is high enough, "efficiency wages" have to be paid in order 
to provide incentives. There are situations where no trade occurs, 
although there are potential gains of trade, resulting in welfare loss. 
This is because the principal's profit would turn negative. 
17. Monitoring cost rises in the scope of cheating ( /1 ), and decreases in the 
sum of punishment and compensation ( d + s ). This implies that 
compensation is a substitute for punishments, and "efficiency wages" 
are paid where the scope for punishment is limited due to bankruptcy 
and other legal constraints. 
18. Monitoring cost is a decreasing and concave function in agent risk 
averseness. If it is possible to impose high punishment in situations 
where potential damage from cheating is high, the cost reduction effect 
is most powerful. 
19. First best can also be infinitely approximated in the case where error is 
permitted if the agent is risk-neutral and there is no bankruptcy 
constraint. 
20. In the case of a risk-averse agent, there will be a welfare loss if error in 
judgement is allowed for, even if there is no bankruptcy constraint. 
3.1.2 Modeling Assumptions 
It is assumed that if the agent shirks he can get a benefit of /1 in addition to his 
agreed-upon compensation s . In order to prevent this from happening, the 
principal installs monitoring technology. If it is established by the monitoring 
process that shirking occurred, the agent receives no compensation s and has to 
pay a fine d. The fine will almost always be positive. It will be allowed, however, 
that d is negative. This is the case if legal constraints exist that do not allow the 
agent to be punished but only make it possible to withhold part of the agreed-upon 
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salary s 336• But d + s > 0, because never will the principal have to pay a bonus in 
excess of salary in the event of punishment. 
By choosing the monitoring technology, the principal faces a cost-quality 
trade-off. The quality of a monitoring technology is high if there is a low 
probability of error. Error occurs if the agent is not punished although he did shirk 
or if he is punished although innocent. It is assumed that the principal faces a 
monitoring technology which establishes the truth at a probability of p( c} and 
errs at a probability of 1-p ( c) , with c ~ 0 being the cost of investment in the 
monitoring technology337 • It is assumed that the probability of erring is the same 
whether the agent is innocently punished or gets away with shirking338 • Two cases 
will be considered. In the first case, the probability of erring will be zero. This is 
the traditional assumption of input monitoring. 
p=l, C=C (7.1) 
In the second case, the range of p ( c) is the half-open interval between 0,5 
and 1, with l as the upper boundary which can be infinitely approximated, but 
never reached. It is clear that the probability of establishing the truth cannot be 
less than 0,5. This is because, even if nothing is invested in the technology 
336 It can be imagined that if it is determined in court that the agent did shirk, the judge, far from 
allowing the principal to punish the agent, actually only rules a fraction of the agreed-upon 
compensation can be withheld. 
337 Later, a distinction is introduced between monitoring technology and monitoring scheme. A 
monitoring scheme is comprises of both monitoring technology and frequency of inspections. 
338 This assumption is not innocent and needs to be discussed: If the probability of error is 20%, 
then a shirking agent will get away with it in 20% of the cases and an honest agent has a 
chance of 20% to be punished nevertheless. If the agent can challenge this decision in court, 
there may be a problem with monitoring technologies that seem to be very prone to error, 
especially in a system obsessed with truth beyond doubt. So, it could be that, in case a 
punishment is imposed, the court will only uphold it in 50% of all cases. Then, the probabilities 
of error would change to 60% and 10%. This raises the interesting problem of the coexistence 
of private settlement mechanisms and public courts. Parties might agree on a rather error prone 
monitoring scheme because it is cheap and find some sort of arrangement to compensate for 
the extra risk, but if the recourse to the courts cannot be excluded, the arrangement might break 
down. The problem will decrease if monitoring schemes· error comes closer to zero. Another 
problem arises if the principal controls the monitoring process. He will then have the incentive 
to always report cheating. Reputation concerns might prevent this, but in a one-shot 
relationship this clearly is a risk. So, it has to be assumed that the monitoring process is 
objective and transparent. If necessary, procedural rules can be enforced by the courts. In 
conclusion, the assumption seems rather strong, but it can be shown that the model does not 
depend on this in its outcome, so for convenience it is upheld. 
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( c = 0 ), it cannot be worse than tossing coins. p ( ·) Is a positive, strictly 
increasing and concave function in c : 
p(c)e[0,5;1); limp(c)=l; p(0)=0,5; p'(·)>0; p"(·)<0. (7.2) 
c•"" 
The principal has a possibility to save cost, other than keeping c low. He 
can randomize inspections, which means that he carries out inspections only at a 
fraction a of cases. It is further assumed that all costs of inspection are variable. 
So the cost of the monitoring scheme will be ac . 
It is further assumed that the principal' s and the agent's preferences over 
lotteries satisfy the v-N-M axiom and that the principal is risk-neutral and the 
agent risk-averse. This is in line with traditional assumptions. 
In Exhibit 3, the pay-offs for the agent and the principal are shown for the 
different cases. Outcome is written as the vector: 
(pay-off agent ) pay-off principal 
One can now proceed to set up the maximization problem: The agent will 
only abstain from shirking if the incentive constraint is fulfilled, i.e. if the 
expected utility of not shirking is higher than the expected utility of shirking: 
Rearranging gives: 
a[ 1-p( c )]u(-d)+ (1-a[ 1-p{ c )])u(s) ~ 
[1-ap( c )]u(s+ ii)+ap( c )u(-d) 
(7.3) 
a(l-2p )u(-d)+u(s )-a{l-p )u(s )-(1-ap )u(s+ ii)~ 0 (7.3)' 
The relevant pay-off for the participation constraint and the principal's 
objective function is the pay-off in the case of "no shirking". This is because, 
otherwise, no incentive constraint would be needed and investment in monitoring 
would be zero. The agent will only accept the contract if the participation 
constraint is fulfilled: 
a(l-p )u(-d)+u(s )-a(l-p )u(s )-u0 ~ 0 (7.4) 
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shirking 
undetected ( s+~ ) 
1-ap(c) x-s-~-ac 
detected 








Exhibit 3: Pay-offs in the Input Monitoring Model 
The principal's objective function can be written as: 
maxa(l-p )( x +d)+[l-a(l-p )](x -s )-ac (7.5) 
Rearranging yields: 
maxa(l-p )( d+s )+( x -s )-ac (7.5)' 
Therefore, the maximization problem can be set up as: 
maxa(l-p )( d+s )+( x-s )-ac (7.6) 
IC: a(l-2p )u(-d)+u(s)-a(l-p )u(s )-(1-ap )u(s+ ~) ~ 0 (7.7) 
PC: a(l-p )u(-d)+u(s )-a(l-p )u(s )-u0 ~ 0 (7.8) 
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3.1.3 Absence of both Error and Bankruptcy Constraint 
In the first case that is considered, it is assumed that a perfect339 monitoring 
mechanism exists at a given cost: 
p(c)=l, c=c (7.9) 
It is further assumed that there is no bankruptcy constraint. So, any 
punishment is feasible. The principal's problem therefore is to determine the 
optimal frequency of inspections a , the optimal salary s and the optimal 
punishment d . 
Inserting (7.9), the maximization problem can be stated as follows: 
maxx-s-ac (7.10) 
a.s,d 
s.t.IC: -au(-d)+u(s)-(1-a)u(s+d)2=0 (7.11) 
PC: u(s)-u0 2=0 (7.12) 
Letting µ1 and µ2 be the Lagrangean multipliers for (7.11) and (7.12), the 
following conditions must hold for an optimal contract: 
oL =-c+µI (u(s+d)-u(-d))=O (7.13) oa 
oL 
- = -1 + µ1u'(s )-µ 1 (1-a)u'(s + d)-µ 2u'(s) = 0 (7.14) OS 
oL =µ 1au'(-d)=O (7.15) 
od 
Note that the multipliers have to be non-negative: 
(7.16) 
The complementary slackness conditions are given by: 
µ1 [ -au(-d)+u(s )-(1-a )u(s + d)] = 0 (7.17) 
µ 2 [ U ( S )- U0 ] = 0 (7.18) 
339 i.e. zero error probability 
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Solving (7.13) for µ 1 yields: 
c 
µ1=------>0 
u(s + A)-u(-d) 
(7.13)' 
which is positive as can easily be seen recalling that d + s > 0 . This also 
means that the incentive constraint binds. 
As u' ( -d) * 0 it can be followed from (7 .15) that either a or µ1 must be O. 
µ1=0 contradicts (7.13)' and a= 0 cannot be true, because it is impossible to 
induce the agent not to shirk with zero probability of inspections. Therefore, the 
Lagrangean conditions cannot bold, which means that there is no optimum 
for this problem. 
Even if there is no optimum, interesting implications can be derived: In 
order to induce the agent not to shirk, the incentive constraint must hold. Solving 





It is evident from the objective function (7.10) that a will always be chosen 
at the lowest possible level. The smallest value for a for which the incentive 
constraint holds is given by the following condition: 
u(s+A)-u(s) 
a = --'-----'--'--'-
u ( s + A)-u(-d) 













The optimal salary s • for the principal to offer if he wants the incentive 
constraint to hold for the lowest possible a must satisfy the first order condition: 
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an =-1 -1:i. c=O 
as (s· +!:i.+d)2 
Rearranging gives: 
Two cases must be distinguished: 
(1) s• +!:i.+d=-✓ci. 
(2) s• +!:i.+d=✓ci. 






The contract must also satisfy the participation constraint. Solving the 
participation constraint for s yields: 
(7.12)' 
Salary s • violates the participation constraint if: 
s• <s (7.22) 
In this case, the wage is set to the reservation level, making the incentive 
constraint loose. In other words: Whenever the wage, necessary in order to meet 
the participation constraint, is higher than is needed to induce the agent not to 
shirk, the incentive constraint will also hold. Therefore, the chosen wage will be: 
144 
s • = max [ ✓ci. - I:!. - d, s] 
Inserting into the objective function (7 .10)" gives: 
-{x+!:i.+d-2✓ci. 
TI- - I:!. -x-s----c 
s+!:i.+d 
fors < ✓ci.-1:!.-d 
otherwise 
(7.23) 
(7.I or .. 
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The optimal d must satisfy the first order condition: 
an ={1 A _ fors<.fe'i.-A-d 
---- c otherwise 
ad (s +A+d)2 
(7.24) 
It can be seen that an/ 8d > 0 . n is strictly increasing in d . Therefore, 
there cannot be a maximum. This is the same result that was obtained with the 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions above. 
As d rises s < ./fi. - A - d will not hold. Even in the extreme case where 
c • ao, A • ao with d • oo the condition will be s < -A . This never holds as 
s > 0. Therefore, the other case applies. In other words: If the participation 
constraint holds, the incentive constraint will always be loose: In any case 
where the agent accepts the contract he will also refrain from shirking. 
It was already established that no maximum exists. Yet, it can be shown that 
there is an upper boundary: 
l. ( - A -) -1m x s----c =x-s 
d• 0> s +A+d 
(7.25) 
Therefore, it is possible to infinitely approximate first best by infinitely 
increasing punishment in the case where there is no error in judgement and no 
bankruptcy or other legal constraints exist. 
Proposition 14: Input monitoring can infinitely approximate first best if 
harsh enough punishments are feasible (no bankruptcy constraint) and error 
can be excluded. 
3.1.4 Bankruptcy constraint 
In this subsection, it is still assumed that a perfect monitoring mechanism is 
available at a given cost c. However, now a bankruptcy constraint is 
introduced. This can have many reasons. The capacity of individuals to absorb 
losses is limited either by nature or by law (limited liability). Legal provisions do 
not allow certain kinds of punishment. Therefore, the extent of punishment that 
can be imposed is limited ( d ~ d ). 
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The result (7 .24) of Section (3.1.3) still holds. Il is strictly increasing in d, 
but d is bounded to reflect the bankrup_!cy constraint, d e ( -s, d] . A maximum 
now exists as a boundary solution, d = d. The maximum amount of punishment 
will be imposed. But this time, as d cannot rise indefinitely it becomes clear from 
(7.25) that the frequency of inspections does not approach zero: 
Thus, it can be concluded that: 
a= ~ • 0 
s+~+d 
(7.26) 
Proposition 15: If a bankruptcy constraint is assumed, there is always a 
welfare loss as the optimal frequency of inspections does not tend to zero, 
resulting in direct costs of monitoring. 
But this is not the only source of welfare loss. In the above argument it 
could be shown that the incentive constraint was always loose if the participation 
constraint was met. If there is a bankruptcy constraint it can be seen that: 
(7.27) 
will not always hold if for a given s and d the cost of the monitoring 
technology c is high enough. More specifically, the pay level needed to provide 
incentives not to shirk will exceed the reservation level ("efficiency wages") if 
situational parameters are such that: 
(7.28) 
If, however, the cost of investment in the monitoring technology is too 
high, the contract will not be offered by the principal at all, as his optimal pay-off 
turns negative. To prevent this from happening, the following condition must 
hold: 
x+~+J-2~ 2:0. (7.29) 
146 Alexander Stremitzer - 978-3-631-75400-9
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 05:25:38AM
via free access
From d > -s 340 and s < x 341 follows d > -( x + D.) and therefore 
( x + D. + d) > 0 . Thus (7 .29) can be rearranged to yield: 
c ~ _( x_+_h-_+ -_d )_2 
4D. 
If (7.28) holds as was assumed, (7.29)' only holds if: 
( x+h.+cif >4(s +h.+ci:)2. 
(7.29)' 
(7.30) 
It can be seen that there are situations with potential gains of trade ( x > s) 
where this condition does not hold. 
Proposition 16: If there is a bankruptcy constraint and the costs of the 
monitoring technology are high enough, "efficiency wages" have to be paid in 
order to provide incentives. There are situations where no trade occurs, 
although there are potential gains of trade because the principal's profit would 
turn negative, resulting in a welfare loss. 
3.1.5 Extension: The role of Agent Risk Averseness 
In order to study the role of risk averseness, the utility function will be 
specified. It is assumed that the agent's utility function is exponential: 
u ( X) = I - e-rx . (7.31) 
Inserting (7.31) into the expression for a. ( see (7 .11)" and rearranging 
yields (see Exhibit 4) 
l-e-r6 
a.=----
er(d+s) -e-r6 . 
(7.32) 
The sensitivity of monitoring cost a. to changes of risk averseness r is 
given by the first derivative (see Exhibit 5): 
340 It was already argued that otherwise punishment would lose its meaning. 
341 Agreed-upon salary will never be higher than the gross outcome. 
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: = er(d+s) [(~+ d+s )e-r6 -( d+s) J-~e-r6 . (7.33) 
The expressions are a bit unwieldy. As the functions were specified, it is 
convenient to depict the functions to get an intuition of the relationships: It can be 
seen in Exhibit 4 that monitoring cost rises with the scope of cheating ( ~ ), and 
decreases in the sum of punishment and compensation ( d + s ). 
a 
I\ 
Exhibit 4: Monitoring Cost 
This is a quite intuitive result. Perhaps the most surprising is that monitoring 
cost only depends on the sum of d and s . This is, however, consistent with the 
result that efficiency wages are paid where the scope for punishment is limited 
due to bankruptcy and other legal constraints. 
Proposition 17: Monitoring cost rises in the scope of cheating ( ~), and 
decreases in the sum of punishment and compensation ( d + s ). This implies that 
compensation is a substitute for punishment and " efficiency wages" are paid 
where the scope for punishment is limited due to bankruptcy and other legal 
constraints. 
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The responsiveness of monitoring cost to changing risk averseness is 
depicted in Exhibit 5. It can be seen that the cost of implementing input 
monitoring decreases as the risk averseness of the agent increases: 
aa 
-< O\id+s, \i~ 
8r 
Exhibit S: Responsiveness of monitoring cost to changing risk averseness. 
(7.34) 
If it is possible to impose high punishment in situations where potential 
damage from cheating is high, this effect is most powerful. 
In Exhibit 6 the level of responsiveness of monitoring cost to changes in 
risk attitudes is shown as a function of risk averseness. 
It becomes clear that the higher the level of risk averseness to begin with, 
the higher the decrease of monitoring cost from a small increase of risk averseness 
will be. Monitoring cost is a decreasing and concave function in agent risk 
averseness. 
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Exhibit 6: Responsiveness of Monitoring Costs to Changing Risk Averseness 
Proposition 18: Monitoring cost is a decreasing and concave function in 
agent risk averseness. If it is possible to impose high punishment in situations 
where potential damage from cheating is high, the cost reduction effect is most 
powerful 
3.1.6 Presence of Error 
If the possibility of error is allowed for, the maximization problem is a bit more 
complex: 
maxa.(1-p )( d+s )+ x -s-a.c (7.35) 
a,c,s,d 
s.t. a.(1-2p )u(-d) + u( s )-a.(1-p )u( s )-(1-a.p )u( s + ~) ~ 0 (7.36) 
a. (1-p )u(-d) + u( s )-a. (l-p )u( s )-u0 ~ 0 (7.37) 
Letting µ1 and µ2 be the Lagrangean multipliers for constraints (7.36) and 
(7.37), the following conditions must hold: 
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~ = (1-p )( d+s )-c+ µ 1 [(1-2p )u(-d)-(1-p )u(s )+pu(s + ~)] (7.38) 
+ µ 2 [(1-p )u(-d)-(1-p )u(s )] = 0 
oL =-ap'( d+s)-a+ µ 1 [-2ap'u(-d)+ap'u(s)+ap'u(s+~)J 
& 0~ 
+ µ 2 [-ap'u(-d) + ap'u(s )] = 0 
oL = a(l-p )-1 + µ1 [u'(s )-a(l-p )u'(s )-(1-ap )u'(s + ~)] 
& 0~ 
+ µ 2 [ u'(s )-a(l-p )u'(s )] = 0 
oL = a(l-p )+ µI [a(l-2p )u'(-d)(-1)] 
od (7.41) 
+µ 2 [ a(I-p)u'(-d}(-1)]=0 
Rearranging (7.38) and (7.39), it can be written: 
d+s--c-+µ 1 [(I- 2p)u(-d)-u(s)+-p-u(s+~)] 
1-p 1-p 1-p (7.38)' 
+µ 2 [ u ( -d )- u ( s)] 
-( d+s )- ~' + µ 1 [ -2u(-d)+ u(s )+u(s + ~)]+ µ2 [ -u(-d)+ u(s )] (7.39)' 
Adding (7.38)' and (7.39)' and solving for µ 1 yields: 
p'c-p+l 
µI = p' [ u ( s + ~ )- u ( -d)] (7.42) 
Rearranging (7.41) and solving for µ 2 gives: 
(7.41 )' 
It was assumed that the chance of error in judgement 1- p is a function of 
the investment in the monitoring technology c . If nothing is invested, the chance 
of error is 50% (like tossing coins). As the investment is increased, the chance of 
error decreases, but will never be zero. Therefore, p( c) must be a function which 
takes the value 0,5 for c = 0 and asymptotically approaches I as c • oo . 
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In order to facilitate the argument p ( c) is specified by a simple function, 
fulfilling these properties: 
( ) I 0,5 2c+l 
p c = - l+c = 2(l+c) 
p'(c)= 2(1:c}2 
Inserting (7.43) in (7.42) and (7.41)' gives: 
2c+l 
µ1 = u(s+d)-u(-d) 
1 
µ2 = -;--( )+ 2µ1C u -d 
Inserting (7.44) into (7.45) gives: 
I 4c2 +2c 





As c > 0, d >-sand u' ( ·} > 0 it can be followed that both µ1 and µ 2 are 
strictly positive. From the complementary slackness conditions, it follows that 
both constraints bind. 
At this point a methodological remark is warranted: Microeconomic 
analysis attempts to isolate effects. The effect of a bankruptcy constraint was 
studied above. A perfect monitoring mechanism was assumed in order to make 
sure that only the effect produced by the bankruptcy constraint is considered: 
Now, the focus of analysis is the effect of an imperfect monitoring mechanism 
which allows for error in judgement. In order to isolate this effect it is assumed 
that no bankruptcy constraint exists. Conditions (7.44) and (7.45)' will 
therefore be analysed assuming infinite punishment potential ( d • ao ). 
If the agent is risk neutral and because u ( x) = x , u' ( x) = l Vx, µ 1 and 
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It can easily be seen that for d • oo, µ1 • 0 and µ2 • 1. 
Now the case is considered, where the agent is risk averse: 
2c+l 
µ -------
1 - u(s+~)-u(-d) 
(7.44) 
1 4c2 + 2c 
µ2 = u'(-d) + u(s+~)-u(-d) 
(7.45)' 
As u ( -d) • -oo and u' ( -d) • oo for d • oo , it can easily be seen that 
µ1 • O and µ2 • O. 
Both the incentive and the participation constraint are binding, but trying to 
increase d in order to make the incentive constraint vanish ( µ1 • 0 ), the imputed 
value to the principal of giving an extra unit of income to the agent 
approaches 1 for the risk-neutral and O for the risk-averse agent. 
Therefore, for risk-neutral agents, first best can be infinitely approximated 
by increasing punishment. In the limit case, investing one unit of utility in the 
incentive scheme exactly yields one unit of utility to the principal. Marginal utility 
and marginal cost are the same and the outcome efficient. 
Proposition 19: First best can also be infinitely approximated in the case 
where error is permitted if the agent is risk neutral and there is no bankruptcy 
constraint. 
In the risk-averse case, if d is increased, the marginal utility of one unit 
invested in the incentive scheme approaches 0. Therefore, the principal will not 
choose d • oo, but then, the incentive constraint will be binding and tint best 
can no longer be achieved. To see why, one can look at the symmetric 
information case as a benchmark. Here, no incentive constraint has to be 
stipulated because compliance is assured by a forcing contract. Now, if an 
incentive constraint is added and it proves to be loose, it means that the same 
result is feasible as in the symmetric case: First best can be achieved. If it is tight, 
it means that the agent has to be compensated for the extra risk. Inducing the 
agent not to cheat comes at the price of imperfect risk sharing. 
Proposition 20: In the case of a risk-averse agent there will be a welfare 
loss if error in judgement is allowed for, even if there is no bankruptcy 
constraint. 
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The described effect can be interpreted as follows: If there is no bankruptcy 
constraint, punishment can be made very high. If punishment is very high, the 
frequency of inspections (a) can be reduced. This means that, holding monitoring 
cost ( ac ) constant, it is possible to decrease the chance of error ( 1-p ( c)) as the 
accuracy p( c) is an increasing function in c. In tum, a reduced chance of error 
decreases the loss due to imperfect risk sharing. Yet, there is a second effect: 
Holding probability of error constant, higher punishment increases welfare loss 
due to imperfect risk sharing if the agent is risk averse. There is consequently a 
direct and an indirect effect, which are countervailing in the case of agent risk 
averseness. 
The resulting trade-off is solved by balancing monitoring cost and risk 
taking simultaneously on two levels: On the first level, the accuracy of monitoring 
is an increasing but concave function in cost per inspection ( c ). Because of 
concavity there comes a point where it is better to reduce the frequency of 
inspections and consequently economize directly on monitoring cost than to invest 
into accuracy, and thereby indirectly reduce the cost of imperfect risk sharing. On 
the second level there is another problem: With the probability of error held 
constant, there comes a point where the loss of imperfect risk sharing for 
increasing levels of punishment is higher than the savings in monitoring cost by 
reducing frequency. 
3.1.7 Discussion 
The input monitoring model of this subsection incorporates bankruptcy 
constraints, monitoring cost, and error in judgement. 
It was shown that input monitoring can approximate first best even if it 
comes at a cost if there are no bankruptcy constraints and no possibility of error in 
judgement. If there is a bankruptcy constraint, there will be welfare loss because 
of direct monitoring cost and possibly efficiency wages or complete 
uncontractibility (no trade). The phenomenon of efficiency wages can be 
understood by realizing that, for purposes of incentive, provision differentials in 
agent pay-utility and not absolute pay-levels are relevant. Therefore, in the 
absence of error in judgement, increasing agent risk-averseness even helps to set 
up cheap incentive schemes. Yet, if error in judgement is permitted, problems of 
imperfect risk-sharing arise, requiring the simultaneous minimization of the cost 
arising from investment in the monitoring technology, the frequency of 
inspections and the risk premium. 
For the sake of tractability, cheating was modelled as a lump sum 
appropriated by the agent without the consent of the principal. This leaves no 
place for different degrees of shirking. Therefore, in contrast to the output 
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monitoring model, residual loss due to lower effort in equilibrium cannot be 
captured. The input monitoring model distinguishes two cases: In the first case, 
there is no input monitoring at all and the principal expects the agent to use his 
full scope of shirking. Preventing the agent to shirk would be too costly. In the 
second case, the agent does not shirk at all, but the cost of inducing him to refrain 
from shirking is modelled. It becomes clear that the model set-up is coarse in this 
respect. It does not take into account cases wherein the principal is trying to 
induce the agent to refrain from shirking only to some extent. This coarseness 
does not mean that this case is not possible. It is just a technical consequence of 
the binary fonnulation of shirking, justified by the emphasis of this model. 
3.2 Output Monitoring 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Error in judgement is a core part of the traditional model for output monitoring 
described above. Error is inevitable because of the stochastic disturbance of the 
production technology: If compensation depends on output, there is the danger 
of innocently punishing the agent. Output can be low even if effort was high 
because of bad luck. The risk-averse agent will want to be compensated for 
carrying this risk resulting in an incentive-risk trade-off. Input monitoring, on the 
other hand, was considered to be accurate but costly. Yet, the picture is more 
complex: Just as input monitoring can have a problem of imperfect risk-sharing 
because of the pitfalls of the monitoring process, there are situations where 
output monitoring is perfectly accurate and can achieve first best beyond the 
obvious case of a detenninistic production function. This will be the case for 
shifting support schemes342• Another problem considered will be the moral 
hazard with respect to risk which might arise in output monitoring schemes in 
the presence of bankruptcy constraints. 
21. Output monitoring can achieve first best if shifting support sets are 
assumed and harsh enough punishment is feasible relative to the 
actionable portion on the joint support set. 
22. The bankruptcy constraint makes variable fee schemes, which are not 
already asymmetrical in design de facto asymmetrical. This creates a 
new moral hazard problem with respect to choice of risk. 
342 This means that the above assumption that density functions are defined on the same support 
sets is relaxed (see: IV2.4.2 ). 
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3.2.2 Shifting Support 
It was said that output-based compensation leads to imperfect risk sharing if the 
agent is risk averse and the production function is stochastic. This is only true if it 
is assumed that choice of effort affects the density function but leaves the support 
set unchanged. If, however, different effort levels make the support set shift so 
that ranges of outcomes do not perfectly overlap for different effort levels, very 
harsh punishments can be announced. These schemes are called shifting support 
schemes or "boiling-in-oil contracts"343 • First best can be achieved. The intuition is 
that if certain very bad outcomes can only happen if effort is lower than desired 
by the principal, the threat of a harsh punishment for these outcomes will induce 
the agent to refrain from shirking344• 
Once again the crucial point is to exclude the possibility of error in 
judgement. This solution combines the best of two worlds. Low cost output 
monitoring and no error as in traditional input monitoring. There are, however, 
two problems: 
W=-oo Output 
Exhibit 7: Shifting Support Scheme345 
First, as for input monitoring, the introduction of bankruptcy and other 
legal constraints is harmful to the feasibility of shifting support schemes, although 
343 Rasmusen ( 1994), p. 180 
344 This result is similar to the result of Mirrlees that step-function schemes are always better than 
linear incentives. It is also the basis for the idea, that if society wants to enforce compliance 
with rules at low cost it must impose punishments out of proportion with harm (see: Becker 
(1968) for criminal law and Polinsky, Che (1991) for tort law). As was mentioned above (see 
footnote 183), the US. Supreme Court recently ruled on this matter and drew some criticism 
from economists. At the same time, there are certainly moral issues involved. A quite different 
critical argument was mentioned in footnote 335. 
345 Rasmusen ( I 994 ), p. I 80 
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the problem is less severe than in the case of input monitoring, where the 
objective was not just to create incentives for showing effort but also to drive 
down monitoring cost by decreasing the frequency of inspections. 
The second problem is more severe: It is difficult to imagine many 
situations where shifting support occurs. And if it occurs, the problem will be to 
predict the portion where the support sets of the two density functions do not 
overlap346• Given the severity of the consequences this is crucial. Otherwise, the 
problem of imperfect risk sharing reappears. Maybe there is a portion on the 
joint support set where one can say that it is possible to infer with 100% certainty 
that low effort was exerted. Yet, these portions, which will be called "actionable 
portions", tend to be very narrow. The narrower they become, the looser the 
bankruptcy constraint must be in order to provide appropriate incentives. 
Proposition 21: Output monitoring can achieve first best if shifting 
support sets are assumed and harsh enough punishment is feasible relative to 
the actionable portion on the joint support set (a narrow "actionable portion" 
requires a high bankruptcy constraint). 
3.2.3 Moral Hazard with respect to Risk 
The bankruptcy constraint makes monitoring in general more costly. This 
applies for fixed and variable fee contracts. In the case of a fixed contract, limited 
possibility to impose punishment drives up inspection cost. In the case of a 
variable contract, there is the danger of unilateral increase of risk. This may 
require putting a cap on the upside of incentive schemes, which limits their 
effectiveness. 
For an intuitive explanation, one can look at the case of the stochastically 
disturbed linear production function and a linear sharing rule. If the agent not only 
controls the mean but also the risk (variance) of the project, he can improve his 
position by increasing the risk above the optimal level. This is comparable to 
somebody holding a call option. He benefits if the risk of the underlying 
increases. For low enough expected compensation of the agent, it is preferable for 
him to choose a high risk project even if expected pay-off is lower. This causes 
potential damage to the risk-neutral principal, not only the equity holder but also 
the creditors. If e.g. the owner-manager also has limited liability, there could be 
346 This argument is analogous to the "fine tuning" - argument against step function schemes (see 
IV2.4.3). 
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collusion between the consultant and the client at the expense of the creditors who 
are the principal's principal347• 
Proposition 22.: The bankruptcy constraint makes variable fee schemes, 
which are not already asymmetric in design, de facto asymmetrical This 
creates a new moral hazard problem with respect to choice of risk, which may 
require putting a cap on the upside of incentive schemes, limiting their 
effectiveness. 
3.2.4 Discussion 
In this Sub-Section it was shown that shifting support schemes create first best 
solutions for output contracting even if the agent is risk-averse. Yet, such schemes 
are often unrealistic because of bankruptcy constraints (legal, moral, economic) 
and the problem of fine tuning, already encountered earlier in the case of step 
functions. Another point made was the asymmetry of incentive schemes due to 
bankruptcy constraints, which create problems as the agent will have the incentive 
to choose very risky projects even if they have a lower expected value than 
alternative projects. 
4 Transaction Cost, Bonding, Distortion 
4.1 Transaction Cost and Bonding 
The following propositions will be motivated in this subsection: 
23. Direct transaction costs arise for input monitoring and for output 
monitoring, though it will often be plausible that they are lower for 
output monitoring. 
24. Indirect transaction costs arise from provisions which are designed to 
lower direct transaction costs. The goal is to rationalize monitoring or 
to directly influence the agent's disutility function. This leads to 
inefficiencies because production technology is prescribed from top to 
bottom in a way that is known to be inefficient. In addition, innovation 
from bottom to top is stifled. This is a distortive effect. 
347 This is an example of a chain of principal-agent relationships and the problem of colluding. 
This can often be encountered in the real world and is a fundamental problem of corporate 
governance. 
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One of the parameters of the input monitoring model was the direct 
transaction cost for putting in place the monitoring device. Inspections have to 
be carried out either simultaneously or ex post. Not only input monitoring but also 
output monitoring may cause such extra transaction cost, though it will usually be 
lower: Required output has to be defined and provisions have to be made to record 
output thus defined, sometimes resulting in extra accounting expenses. 
Less obviously, there are indirect costs of monitoring: Bonding costs arise 
when the agents have to abide by certain strict rules. Such measures can have two 
purposes: Either they influence the disutility function by reducing distraction, or 
they rationalize monitoring. Surfing the internet, phoning privately, walking 
through the park during office hours might be prohibited. If a consultant is 
required to work on site in an office assigned to him, his disutility function is 
influenced by reducing distraction (it is not very interesting to sit in the office 
looking out of the window, while it may be very attractive to sit down and watch 
TV). In addition, it is easier to monitor his actions in the office than in the field. 
Another example is a private investor instructing his banker not to make certain 
kinds of investments. He may forgo profit opportunities ( e.g. by not allowing him 
to exceed a certain leverage), but also protects himself against the hazards of 
excessive risk taking. This actually comes close to prescribing production 
technology from top to bottom, potentially stifling innovation and forcing people 
to use inefficient technology. On the other hand, it helps to circumvent situations 
that are difficult to monitor. Bonding is thus conditioned by the monitoring device 
but it also has features of distortion, which will be treated below. 
4.2 Distortion 
4.2.1 Introduction 
The discussion so far focused on parties who want to contract on effort but may 
decide to contract on output. This is because they expect the advantage of 
observability and verifiability to outweigh the potential disadvantage of imperfect 
risk sharing348, due to the increased importance of the external factor. In fact, the 
above models of output monitoring and input monitoring serve to derive optimal 
contracts stipulating contingencies upstream in the case of input monitoring 
and downstream in the case of output monitoring. In a next step the two 
optimal contracts can be compared. In a situation where the optimal output 
monitoring contract dominates the optimal input monitoring contract, more 
348 If the agent is relatively more risk-averse. 
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downstream performance measures will be chosen and vice versa. As a by-
product of the analysis, much is said about how to specify the resulting contract. 
But, so far, one important problem was ignored: If the principal switches to 
alternative measures of performance because total contribution cannot be 
contracted upon (or only at prohibitive cost), there will not only be the potential 
problem of imperfect risk-sharing: There will also be a tension between what the 
principal desires and what the agent is rewarded for. This problem, called 
distortion, was highlighted by Kerr, when he described the "folly of rewarding A 
while hoping for B"349• The rational and opportunistic agent only has the incentive 
to perform the tasks he is rewarded for and therefore will not serve the best 
interest of the principal, or in Kerr's words: "What you measure is what you get". 
Kerr attributes this problem to the "fascination with objective performance 
measures". Therefore, "if you can't measure what you can, you end up wanting by 
what you can measure"350• 
But, the discussion above showed that there is more to this problem than a 
simple psychological trap, easily avoided by cool-headed rational thinking. What 
is wanted just may not be contractible. If this problem is unattended to, many 
potential gains of trade cannot be realised because people will not trade. So, if a 
related alternative performance measure can be found that can be contracted upon, 
some of the gains can be realised by going for this second best solution. So far, 
imperfect risk sharing, residual loss due to shirking, and direct cost of the 
monitoring mechanism were mentioned. Now, another source of loss must be 
added: distortion. The following propositions will be derived: 
25. If the weights measuring the effect of the different actions on the 
performance measure are generally higher than the weights reflecting 
the contribution of these actions to the principal's value, the bonus rate 
will be small. 
26. If the incentives are well aligned with the ultimate goal, distortion will 
be low and the bonus rate will be high. 
349 Kerr ( I 97 5) 
350 Gibbons (200 I), p. 4 
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4.2.2 The Model 
If total contribution y, or "everything the principal cares about except for 
wages"351 is not contractible, the agent's incentive will depend on an alternative 
performance measure p . "The essence of the incentive problem, is the 
divergence between the agent's incentive to increase p and the principal's desire 
to increase y"352• To clarify the effect, a model will be introduced. 
If y = a + E and p = a + tj, , and the contract specifying compensation is 
w = s + bp, there will be no such distortion. The agent, by trying to increase his 
compensation also increases the principal's utility y. It can, however, be 
imagined that two actions ( or "tasks") are required in order to promote the 
principal's interest. Consider a client who might be interested in cutting his cost 
in order to enhance his long-term profit perspectives. Thus, the tricky task for the 
consultant is to cut costs without decreasing the capability of the client to produce 
valuable products and services to his customers; it is normally straightforward to 
observe and verify cost cutting while less obvious to assess the implications on 
the company's capabilities, which will show much later, if at all. To formalize this 
situation, y is modelled to depend on two tasks y = a1 + a2 + E (in the example a1 
would be cost cutting and a2 the observance of the restriction that capabilities 
must be maintained). The performance measure will be p = a1 + tj, . It can easily be 
seen that the agent's incentive to perform one task or the other depends on the 
way a, and a 2 affect the performance measure p and on the bonus rate b. 
Therefore the agent will promote a 1, but not a2 • 
Another case is where y = a 1 + E and p = a1 + a2 + tj, . The agent will have 
an incentive to perform both tasks a1 and a 2 although a2 creates no value at all 
for the principal. An example would be the problem of "impression 
management". Agents will sometimes devote considerable resources to improve 
the impression the principal gets from them instead of pushing forward with the 
real task. Even if the agent does not know by which criterion he is evaluated, he 
will overemphasize highly visible tasks. There are some performance criteria that 
are good indicators of performance as long as they are not used as incentives. In 
order to evaluate a teacher, students' performance on standardized tests may be a 
good indicator. As soon, however, as this is used as an incentive, teachers will try 
to "teach to the test". The principal (in this case the parents or the government) 
may fail to get the good education for their children they ultimately desire. 
351 Gibbons (2001 ), p. 5 
352 Gibbons (200 I) 
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The extreme case, y == a1 + E and p == a2 + ~, is where the agent only 
performs a 2 , not creating any value at all. The models dealing with these 
problems are called "multi-task models"353 • A tractable example will be presented 
in the following354 : 
It is assumed that the value created to the principal is given by: 
And the measured performance is given by: 





The agent accepts the contract if compensation is high enough to cover his 
costs which are assumed to be: 
c(a) == 1/2a2 • (7.4) 
He will choose his actions a unobserved by the principal. The principal 
determines p 355 and pays the compensation as specified by the contract. Even if 
the principal cannot observe a , given the terms of the contract he can perfectly 
predict the choice of the utility maximizing rational agent. Against this backdrop, 
he has to choose the contract terms maximizing his own utility. This is the 
familiar agency model where the principal maximizes his expected pay-off 
subject to an incentive and a participation constraint. For simplicity it is assumed 
that both principal and agent are risk neutral, so that both maximize expected 




353 These models were originated by Holmstriim/Milgrom ( 1991) 
354 The model presented is a slightly more general version than the model presented by Gibbons 
(2001). Gibbons refers to more elaborate models: see Feltham and Xie (1994), Kulp, Datar, 
and Lambert (1999), and Baker (2000). 
355 Whether or not he observes y is irrelevant in the one-shot relationship. 
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s.t. IC: f E argm:xb(ga)+s-½a2 




The incentive constraint is a maximization problem. Therefore, the first-
order condition must bold. 
(7.8) 
Replacing the maximization problem of the incentive constraint by the first-
order condition requires it not only to be necessary but also sufficient. It can 
easily be seen that: 
(7.9) 
Therefore, the quadratic form is negative definite and EA is concave. The 
first-order condition can therefore replace the maximization problem of the 
incentive constraint. 
Inserting (7.8) and restating the maximization problem gives: 
m~fii-b(ga)-s 
b,s,a 
s.t. IC: bg - a= 0 <=> a = bg 
PC: b(ga)+s-.!..a2 =0 
2 
Solving (7.6)' for a and inserting into (7.7) gives: 
Solving (7.7)' for s yields: 
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Inserting (7.7)" and (7.6)' into (7.5) gives: 
be= b2-2 1 b2-2 _ be= I b2-2 1g - g +- g - 1g - - g 
2 2 
The first-order condition for an optimal b is therefore: 
Solving for b• yields: 
c= b•-z 0 1g- g = 
As fg = !fl lgl cos <p and lgl = .ff ~ g2 = lgl2 : 
b. = lfllglcoscp=J.1coscp 





where <p is the angle between the vectors f and g and lfJ , JgJ the length of 
the vectors. 
It becomes clear from the model that the optimal bonus rate depends on two 
important factors: scaling and alignment356 • 
If the weights357 g measuring the effect of the different actions on the 
performance measure p are generally higher than the weights f reflecting the 
contribution of these actions to the principal's value y, it means that pis 
relatively more sensitive to higher levels of action than y. One would therefore 
expect the bonus rate to be small. This is exactly what is expressed in the model. 
Proposition 25: I/the weights measuring the effect of the different actions 
on the performance measure are generally higher than the weights reflecting 
the contribution of these actions to the principal's value, the bonus rate will be 
small. 
356 Gibbons (200 l) p. 7 
357 By analogy one could speak of marginal products 
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Besides the overall scale of the weights, a relevant feature is the extent to 
which the weights of y and p have a similar pattern. If the pattern is similar, the 
distortive effect by "rewarding A, while hoping for B" will be small. This is 
because there will not be many instances where a particular action has a strong 
effect on p but not on y . For intuitive illustration, consider the graphical 
interpretation of vectors f and g, representing the weights on y and p 
respectively. In fact, the cosine of the angle between them summarizes the 
extent of pattern similarity. If the angle between them is small ( and cosine will 
be high), they roughly point in the same direction. They are well "aligned". In 
these cases, one would expect the bonus rate to be rather high since distortive 
effects are low. This is exactly what is shown in the model: The lower the angle, 
the higher cos <p and therefore the higher the bonus rate. 
Proposition 26: If the incentives are well aligned with the ultimate goal, 
distortion will be low and the bonus rate will be high. 
4.2.3 Discussion 
Distortion arises if there is a tension between what the principal wants and what 
the agent is rewarded for. Often it is not possible to eliminate this tension. What 
the principal wants just might not be contractible. As was shown in this 
subsection, distortion can be divided into two components: scaling and alignment. 
scaling refers to the relative sensitivity of the two measures to changes in the 
drivers, and alignment to the similarity of driver patterns. If a university rewards a 
scientist (by promotion or resources) according to the number of articles 
published during a certain period of time ( driver), there will be a problem of 
alignment if the university cares about both quantity and quality. Indeed, the 
researcher would have the incentive to publish many articles in low quality 
journals. If no ranking of journals to account for quality is available, rewards 
should not depend too much on the number of published articles. Now, 
considering different departments it could be that a typical researcher in, say, 
marketing has 5 times as many publications than a typical researcher in, say, 
mathematics. If the basis for the bonus is the number of published articles, a 
scaling argument suggests the bonus rate for marketing researchers to be one-fifth 
of the bonus rate for mathematicians. 
As will be elaborated later in more detail, it is obvious that there is a conflict 
with the risk-incentive trade-off. This model suggests that the bonus rate should 
be high if the observed variable is relatively undisturbed358 • This will be the case 
358 see Proposition 4 
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for upstream parameters, but these will be the most distorted which suggests that 
the bonus rate should be low. 
5 Dynamic Extensions 
5.1 Introduction 
Up to now, the analysis has been largely one period. Only in one instance did a 
dynamic idea sneak into the argument; namely, when it was argued that non-linear 
incentive schemes - in particular the step function scheme - create path-
dependant incentives359. This was taken as a favourable feature of linear 
incentive schemes. Yet, there is a more general point to be made about dynamic 
extensions. 
Many traditional models of contract theory are one period. The subject of 
this Chapter will be to analyse the effect of time on contracts. The starting point of 
this discussion is the often stated thesis that time can resolve incentive issues that 
arise in one-shot relationships costlessly, or at least can significantly reduce 
incentive costs360• Four models will be presented here to discuss this question. The 
first model deals with the advantage of long-term contracts over short-term 
contracts. Time allows lowering the cost of incentives by reducing imperfect risk 
sharing of output-based contracts (5.2). The second and third models deal with 
situations wherein relational contracts solve problems of enforcement. The theory 
of supergames will be used to argue that time may sustain contracts with 
otherwise desirable properties, which would not be feasible in a one-shot 
relationship. This is the case where contract parameters are observable but not 
verifiable (5.3). The fourth model introduces career concerns which induce the 
agent to exert effort, although choice of effort cannot be contracted on. It will be 
shown that an implicit contract links the agent's current choice of effort to future 
pay-off. (5.4). In conclusion, it will be argued that the thesis that time solves 
incentive issues costlessly cannot be generally upheld. Time merely alters and 
enriches the insights from one-period models: Conclusions from the one-period 
models are not necessarily valid in the multi-period settings. 
359 see Sub-Section IV2.4.3 
360 Fama (I 980) 
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5.2 Income smoothing 
5.2.1 Introduction 
Whenever parties are unable to contract on what they are really interested in, they 
are forced to switch to alternative perfonnance measures. Output monitoring was 
shown to be relatively cheap and undistorted, but input monitoring created less 
exposure to the external factor leading to better risk sharing. 
The Mirrlees argument361 on the superiority of step functions over linear 
incentive schemes and the "shifting support" argument both attempted to combine 
the best of two worlds: Perfect risk sharing in the presence of output monitoring. 
These solutions were mainly attacked on practical grounds. It could be established 
that such schemes were an extreme case of fine tuning362 • 
Time alters this argument. If many periods are observed, the law of large 
numbers filters out uncertainty and it becomes easier to distinguish shirking from 
bad luck. The intuition is simple: In a one-shot relationship, if the project fails and 
the agent is punished, there is a considerable risk that he is punished innocently. If 
a project fails repeatedly, the risk of this being due to bad luck decreases. Thus, 
the cost of imperfect risk sharing is lower than in the multi-period case363 • In 
practice, the principal can offer the principal a long term contract wherein the 
decision on bonus or punishment is made towards the end of the contract. Until 
then be is paid a low but regular income. If the principal can commit to such a 
scheme, the agent knows that ifhe is not shirking he will receive the bonus. In this 
Section, the following proposition will be illustrated: 
27. Long term contracts can provide cheaper incentives than a sequence of 
short term contracts if the agent has saving and borrowing constraints. 
5.2.2 The Model 
In order to further illustrate this argument, a simple model is constructed: It is 
assumed, that the agent can choose two levels of effort a, and ah representing the 
mean of a nonnal distribution ( Y, = a1 + E and Yh = ah + E, where E - N ( 0, a), 
ah > a 1 ). In the one-shot relationship the distribution of outcomes contingent on 
effort is therefore: 
361 Mirrlees (1974) 
362 Hart, Holmstrom ( 1987), S. 90/91 
363 Radner (1981) 
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Y1 ~ N(a1,cr) 
Yh ~ N(ah,cr) 
(12.1) 
The n-period relationship is modelled as the sum of n identically 
distributed, independent random variables (actions are uncorrelated): 
Y/ =nY1 
yh' = nYh 
(12.2) 
Applying the law of large numbers, the distribution of Y/ and Yh' 
respectively can be calculated to be: 
Y/ ~ N{ na 1 ,✓ncr1 ) 
Yh' ~ N ( nah, .Jncrh) 
(12.3) 
Obviously, the distance of means increases proportionately, while the 
standard error increases less than proportionately with time. Thus, separation 
between the two distributions becomes better. This will be shown in Exhibit 8, 
where the density functions of shirking vs. non-shirking in the one-shot and in the 
multi-period case are depicted: 
In the area where the chance of punishing the honest agent is infinitesimal, 
harsh punishments can be inflicted without additional monitoring or review 
procedure. The portions where this is the case are called "actionable range" in 
Exhibit 8. It becomes clear that the shirking agent expects a probability of 
punishment of about 5% in the one-shot relationship under such a scheme, 
whereas he expects a probability of punishment of about 50% in the long-term 
relationship. 5% may be enough if punishment can be high enough, but 
bankruptcy constraints are likely to render such a scheme unfeasible. Therefore, 
either imperfect risk-sharing has to be accepted or ex post monitoring (in the form 
of a revision process) has to be introduced. 
The cost of monitoring is determined by the monitoring technology and the 
probability that the monitoring process is triggered. It will be assumed for 
simplicity that ex post monitoring is accurate and comes at a given cost. So, the 
probability of revision taking place is the only cost driver. For concreteness, it is 
assumed that punishment can be made high enough to make the agent choose "not 
shirking" if the probability of detection is 66%. It becomes clear that the 
monitoring process is triggered in 50% of the cases (see area ABC) in the one-
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shot relationship and in about 8% of the cases (see area DEF) in the multi-period 
relationship. The range of outcomes triggering the revision process is referred to 
in Exhibit 8 as "control range". 









Exhibit 8: Shirking/Non-Shirking: One-shot vs. Long-term 
If it is assumed that in the one-shot relationship the actionable range will 
never be sufficiently wide to implement first best at realistic bankruptcy 
constraints, there will have to be an ex-post monitoring process. If there is a 
chance of error, punishment cannot be too high. The control range will have to be 
rather wide relative to the relevant support set (if "not shirking" is implemented, 
the relevant support set is that of "not shirking"). In the multi-period case, the 
"actionable range" may be wide enough to achieve first best at realistic 
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punishment levels. If additional monitoring is needed to avoid imperfect risk-
sharing, the control range will be small relative to the relevant support set. 
Therefore, in the multi-period case "punishment can be made harsher and the 
control range tighter"364• 
5.2.3 Discussion 
Thus, shirking can be dealt with more cheaply in the multi-period relationship, 
because the principal can engage in income smoothing for the agent. This, 
however, will only be of value to the agent if he has saving and borrowing 
restrictions which is not necessarily the case365 • Still, information problems of an 
outside party suggest that the principal of the primary relationship will often be 
the privileged counterparty for such transactions. Therefore: 
Proposition 27: Long term contracts can provide cheaper incentives than 
a sequence of short term contracts if the agent has saving and borrowing 
constraints. 
One should understand the nature of this transaction in order to preclude any 
misunderstanding. Saving and borrowing enables people to shift the present value 
of their business relationships in time. It is just the possibility for the agent to 
borrow if he knows that by bad luck he received less as he would normally 
receive and to save if he has a windfall profit higher than his effort would 
normally justify. This is no case of insurance. There is almost certainty about the 
present value, because in equilibrium the agent will not shirk, which will 
ultimately be seen by the principal366• 
364 Holmstrom, Hart (I 987) 
365 Allen (1985) 
366 Of course, if one allows for the agent to default then there might be a moral hazard if too much 
borrowing is permitted and the incentive scheme breaks down. This will also happen if 
insurance in its proper sense is possible for the agent. In this case, the agent will receive the 
same utility whatever the circumstances. In such a situation, there would be no incentives for 
the agents to exert effort. But normally, such insurance would never be offered. A well-known 
case where this might happen nevertheless is if the agent can securitize the present value of his 
claims from his business relationship and sell them. This happens when managers receiving 
stock options for incentive reasons sell these stock-options in the market in order to reduce 
Exposure, which is why there are normally restrictions to such sales in stock-option schemes. 
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5.3 Reputation Effects in Supergames 
5.3.1 Introduction 
In the last Section, time was built into an explicit long term contract and allowed 
to lower the cost of incentives by reducing imperfect risk sharing of output-based 
contracts. Output-based contracts were an answer to the uncontractability of input 
parameters. 
It was already argued that contractibility presupposes the knowledge of the 
production function, observability and verifiability. An especially interesting case 
is where parties can observe a performance measure that will not be verifiable by 
a third party like a court. There are certain situations wherein a self-enforcing 
mechanism - also referred to as an implicit contract - exists, sustaining a contract 
based on such subjective performance measures. The fundamental reasoning for 
these mechanisms is that if one of the parties makes a promise, it must be able to 
commit to this promise. Otherwise, the promise is worthless and cannot create 
incentives. In other words, it must be clear that at the moment when the party will 
have to make good on its promise it must be in its interest to do so. Otherwise, it 
can hold up the other party. Thus, the centre of interest is the decision rule of the 
party361_ 
Consider, for instance, a situation where effort is observable but cannot be 
objectively verified. The principal cannot commit to paying a bonus contingent on 
effort because it will always be in his interest to renege later. So, maybe he 
commits on something else that constrains his future action space in such a way 
that it will be in his interest to make good on his promise. The tournament 
mechanism368 is a case in point. The principal facing many agents commits based 
on the total amount of bonuses paid out. By taking away the option of saving 
money by reneging, he can also credibly commit to paying the bonus as promised 
if only an infinitesimal preference for honesty is assumed. In this Section, it is 
shown that long term relationships actually are able to create circumstances in 
which parties find it easier to commit. 
The basic intuition is simple: If one party has experienced that the other 
party acted opportunistically, it will stop doing business with this party. However, 
if the other party values the ongoing trade relationship, it will, anticipating this 
decision, not let its business partner down in the first place. It is therefore argued 
367 see Gibbons (200 I) 
368 see Lazear(l 981) 
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that long term relationships can in some circumstances support contracts that may 
otherwise not be feasible by reputation effects created between the parties369• 
In the following subsections, two models will be presented: The first model 
(5.3.2) deals with a situation where effort is observable but not objectively 
verifiable. It was argued that in such cases, parties will switch to output-based 
bonus contracts. Yet, reputation effects may make a flat fee contract based on 
observed effort feasible. This is because the agent will not engage in shirking 
because his reputation is at stake. 
The second model (5.3.3) deals with a situation where effort is not 
observable. Parties therefore switch to output monitoring, but now it is assumed 
that it is output which cannot be objectively verified, although it is observable to 
both parties. In such a case, it can be argued that it was impossible to create 
incentives because the principal cannot commit on the bonus payment. Again, 
reputation effects can make such an arrangement feasible because the principal 
might refrain from reneging because of reputation concerns. The following 
propositions will be derived: 
28. It can be seen that the agent will be less likely to renege if gains of 
trade are high (low ~ ), the agent's discount rate is low (high 8 ), the 
agent's expected growth rate for the value of the trade relationship is 
high (high cj>) and the bargaining power of the agent is high (high y ). If 
the growth rate is zero ( cj> = 1), it can be seen that condition (l 2.8)' 
always holds for a discount rate approaching O ( 8 • I) if the agent gets 
at least a tiny fraction of the gains of trade, as was stipulated in the 
assumptions ( y E {~, 1] ). In this case, first best will always be feasible 
29. Reputation effects are more likely to sustain a bonus contract if the 
value of the trade relationship ( I:!. = H - L) is high and the principal' s 
discount rate ( r) is low. 
30. The strong assumption of indefinite repetition can be relaxed by 
assuming uncertainty with respect to game's conclusion. 
369 The classic reference is Bull ( 1987) 
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5.3.2 Observable but Uncontractible Effort 
The basic idea of reputation effects is that present action influences not only pay-
off in the current period, but also in future periods370• Thus, in any period the agent 
has to take into account the payment of this period and of the following t > 't 
periods. It is assumed that the agent can decide whether to choose high or low 
effort (al, aH ), which stochastically determines output ( Yi = ai + Ei with 
i = L, H ). The disutility of effort is assumed to be a linear function of effort ( J3al , 
J3aH )37'. The principal will commit to paying a flat fee that will be between the 
expected cost to the agent (J3a0 ) and the expected value of output ( a0 ). The exact 
distribution of the gains of trade will be determined by bargaining, and depend on 
the bargaining power372 ( y ): 
J3a0 <ya• ~a• • yE(J3,l] 
Profit for the agent will therefore be: 
(12.4) 
(12.5) 
which depends on the principal's expectations (a0 ) and on the agent's 
choice of effort ( ai ). Independent of whether or not the principal agrees to a low 
or a high flat fee, the agent will profit from choosing low effort. Therefore, the 
principal will have low expectations ( a• =al). The profit for the agent will thus 
be aL (y-J3). Because al (y-J3) < aH (y-J3), profit would be higher for the agent 
if he could commit to choosing high effort ( aH ). This is impossible in the one-
shot relationship. 
However, if the parties are playing a repeated version of this one-shot game 
this might change. It is assumed that the principal plays a trigger strategy. He 
expects the agent to choose high effort until he observes that he is choosing low 
effort. In this case he will assume low effort forever after. 
370 This model is inspired by a model of Bester in an unpublished script. 
371 Disutility is usually modelled as a convex function in effort. In this model, there is another 
focus and a linear disutility function is assumed for ease of exposition. 
372 There are some models (e.g. Rubinstein 1982, see Kreps 1990, 556n) where the outcome of 
bargaining depends on the process of bargaining. An alternative to a bargaining solution would 
be to assume that the market mechanism determines a market price. It is common e.g. to 
assume that many principals compete against each other, driving the profits down to zero. As it 
is intended to apply the models to the client-consultant relationship where services are 
normally very specific to the relationship, a bargaining approach is taken. 
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The agent's discount factor373 is assumed to be o and the growth rate of the 
expected gains of trade cj> • The growth rate is introduced to model the agent's 
expectation that the business relationship with the client will increase or decrease 
in value over time. Then the agent's pay-off for choosing high effort ( aJ in 
period , is: 
., 
~)'c!>t+t (y-~)aH (12.6) 
t=O 
Doing some algebra374 this can be written as: 
(12.6)' 
On the other hand, the pay-off from defecting will result in a higher pay-off 
in the first period but in lower pay-offs forever after: 
., 
f (yaH -~aL)+ ~)'c!>'+t(y-~)aL (12.7) 
t=l 
Again, doing some algebra375 yields: 
"''[ ( _ ) (r-P)ai] 'f' r QH QL + 
1-8¢ 
(12.7)' 
The agent will choose high effort if pay-off (12.6)' is bigger than pay-off 
(12.7)': 
¢' aH(r-P) >¢'[r(a -a)+ (r-P)ai] (12.8) 
I-J¢ H i l-0¢ 
This condition can be simplified376 to: 
/3 <<5rpy 
373 The agent's reputation is at stake here. 
374 See Mathematical Appendix at the end of this Paragraph. 
375 See Mathematical Appendix at the end of this Paragraph. 
376 See Mathematical Appendix at the end of this Paragraph. 
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Proposition 28: It can be seen that the agent will be less likely to 
renege if gains of trade are high (low ~ ), the agent's discount rate is low (high 
8 ), the agent's expected growth rate for the value of the trade relationship is 
high (high ~) and the bargaining power of the agent is high (high y ). If the 
growth rate is zero(~= 1), it can be seen that condition (12.8) 'always holds/or 
a discount rate approaching O (8 • 1) if the agent gets at least a tiny fraction of 
the gains of trade, as was stipulated in the assumptions (ye (~,l]J. In this case, 





f o'r' (y-fJ)aH = ¢'Io'¢/ (y-/J)aH 
1=0 1=0 
., 
¢' (raH -fJai)+ Io',p'+r (y-fJ)ai 
1=1 
= ¢' (yaH -fJai)+¢' (y-/J)al [-1--1] 
1-8¢ 
=¢'(ya -/Ja -ya +/Ja )+..1>'(y-fJ)aL 
H L L L 'I' l-Otp 
=t/J'[y(aH -ai)+ (yl~~aL] 
¢'aH(y-f3)>¢'[ (a -a )+(r-/J)aL] 
1-8,p y H L 1-8,p 
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O > ¢[r(aH -aL)+ (r- ~)~;~ -aH)] 
0> [r(aH -al)(I-8¢)-r(aH -al)+ JJ(aH -al)] 
¢ 1-8¢ 





5.3.3 Observable but Uncontractible Output 
If effort is uncontractible, parties might switch to output-based compensation. 
However, output could be observable to the parties while not objectively 
verifiable. This raises the possibility that the principal reneges on the promised 
bonus. He might, however, decide not to renege for reputation concerns 377• 
Two possible levels of outcomes are assumed: "low outcome (L)" and "high 
outcome (H)". Effort ( a e (0, l]) is interpreted as the probability of "high outcome 
(H)". Therefore, expected outcome is: 
aH+(l-a)L = L+a(H-L) (12.9) 





Taking derivatives, one can write: 
b• = c'(a) = H-L (12.11) 
377 see Bull ( 1987), Levin (2000), Gibbons (200 I) 
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The principal promises the agent to pay a base salary s plus a bonus b in 
the event that he observes high outcome ( H ). If the principal honours the contract 
when high outcome is observed, his pay-off will be: 
H-s-b (12.12) 
If he reneges his pay-off will be: 
H-s (12.13) 
If the agent expects the principal to honour his promise his expected pay-off 
will be: 
s+ab-c(a) (12.14) 
If he expects the principal to renege: 
s-c(a) (12.15) 
The disutility of effort for the agent is a strictly increasing convex function 
in a: 
c(·)>0, c'(·)>0, cw(·)>0 limc(a)="oo" 
a• I 
(12.16) 
It is assumed that the agent is playing a trigger strategy: he expects the 
principal to honour his contract until he defects. In this case he assumes defecting 
forever after, but if the agent expects that he will not be paid a bonus, he will not 
exert effort ( a = 0) and outcome will be low in certainty. In this case the principal 
knows that his pay-off will be: 
L-s (12.17) 
An additional assumption will be included here: The project will only be 
profitable in the event of high outcome: 
L-c(0)-w. <0, (12.18) 
where w a is the agent's reservation utility. Consequently, the principal will 
not be willing to offer a contract s ~ c ( 0 )- w • . But, any other contract would 
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violate the agent's participation constraint and would therefore not be accepted: 
No trade takes place and pay-off is zero for both parties. 
Thus, if the principal defects in period • , he will have a higher pay-off in 
this period but zero pay-off for periods t > -r . If he does not renege, his expected 
pay-off for periods t > • will be L + a (H -L)- s - ab. 
Therefore, reputation concerns will induce the principal not to renege, if the 
following condition holds: 
L+a(H-L)-s-ab 
(H- s) + 0 ~ (H -s - b) +---'----'---
r 
(12.19) 
The agent's incentive constraint if he thinks that the principal will honour 
the contract is: 
a E argm.~xs+a'b-c(a') (12.20) 
Replacing the maximization problem by the first order condition (which can 
be shown to be necessary and sufficient) yields: 
b =c'(a) • a =a• (b) (12.21) 
Using (12.21), agent's participation constraint is given by: 
s+a' (b)b-c(a• (b))~ w. (12.22) 
Using (12.22) and rearranging, (12.19) can be written as 





Exhibit 9 shows this relationship (for c( a)= -a/ a -1, and L- w = 0 ). The 
shaded area represents the contracts satisfying the reneging constraint condition 
(12.23) i.e. contracts that can be sustained by reputation concerns of the principal. 
The function b* (a) represents the efficient bonus rate maximizing joint utility 
(see (12.11)). 
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"ii=R-l=b' ········· not trndc 
o-a· 
(c) 
Exhibit 9: Reputation Effects: a) First best incentives b) Second best incentives c) No trade 
It can be seen that, for a given differential between high and low outcome 
( ~ = H - L ), first best incentives are possible at a low discount rate (Exhibit 9 
(a)). From condition (12.11), it follows that the efficient bonus rate b• equals the 
differential between high and low outcome ~ . If the principal is offering b • , the 
agent will perform the efficient effort a• . He anticipates that the principal will 
honour his promise because the reneging constraint is loose (point A is within the 
shaded area). In other words: As not honouring the contract would hurt his long-
term interests, the principal can provide efficient incentives which are credible to 
the agent. As the discount rate increases, this may no longer be the case. 
In Exhibit 9 (b), the principal cannot commit on the efficient bonus rate b•. 
If the principal was to offer b• the agent believes that he will renege on his 
promise (point A is outside the shaded area) and will therefore not exert any 
effort. The principal, anticipating that, will try to induce the highest effort level 
a' <a•, not violating the incentive constraint. At the given outcome differential 
ti, a' is constructed by moving from A parallel to the abscissa until reaching B, 
which is just within the shaded area, and then projecting down onto the axis to 
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find a'. The second best bonus level is found by moving upward to C, which lies 
on b • (a) . Moving to the ordinate gives the bonus level b' < b • , which is needed 
to induce a'. Thus, second best incentives can be created. If the discount rate 
becomes very high, there may not be any bonus rate, which is small enough to 
satisfy the reneging constraint'78 • This is the case in Exhibit 9 (c). No trade will 
take place. 
It can also be seen that if the discount rate is close to zero, first best 
incentives can always be provided at any output differential ~ ( even if there is a 
small value to the trading relationship); but if the discount rate increases, first best 
contracts may still be possible if there for very high~. 
Proposition 29: Reputation effects are more likely to sustain a bonus 
contract if the value of the trade relationship ( ~ = H - L) is high and the 
principal's discount rate (r) is low. 
5.3.4 Reinterpretation of the Discount rate 
In both models, one assumption was infinite repetition of the basic one period 
game in order to create reputation effects. Assuming that the relationship ends 
after t periods, clearly in the last period t, the dominant strategy will be to defect; 
but then there will be no value to the trade relationship in the last period, meaning 
that also in period t-1 the optimal strategy will be to defect, etc. The game will 
thus unravel backwards and the argument breaks down. Indefinite repetition, 
however, seems to be a very strong assumption. 
Fortunately, the models can be saved if it is assumed that the game is not 
infinitely repeated but instead concludes at an uncertain date379• In fact, the 
discount factor 8 in Section 5.3.2 and the discount rate r in Section 5.3.3 can be 
reinterpreted as a combination of the actual discount factor [rate] and the 
probability of the game ending after each period played. If the probability of 
ending is q , the probability of the game continuing in the next period is 1 - q . 
Thus, if the actual discount factor [rate] of the party whose reputation is at stake is 
µ [ s] , the present value of a regular pay-off V is given by: 
378 In fact, for a· = 0, no contract will be offered. The intercept (D) is just the bonus that would 
minimize losses to the principal if he offered a contract. 
379 Gibbons (200 I) 
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00 1 z:µ1 (1-q)1 V= ( ) V 
t=O 1-µ 1-q 
(12.24) 
Thus, the discount factor 8 can be reinterpreted as follows: 
8=µ(1-q) (12.25) 






Inserting (12.26) into (12.25) yields: 
(12.27) 






Proposition 30: The strong assumption of indefinite repetition can be 
relaxed by assuming uncertainty with respect to the the game's conclusion. 
It seems plausible that this is very often the case in business relations, where 
parties can express their judgement of the relationship continuing rather in terms 
of probabilities than in terms of definite dates of conclusion381 • 
380 e.g. see Gibbons (200 l ), p. 9 footnote 
381 Still, experiments suggest that parties will often find some way of cooperating in games with 
finite repetition, contrary to the logic of the presented argument. Having mentioned this 
behavioural evidence for something like a "trust mechanism" it will be ignored in the 
following as this thesis stands firmly on the grounds of rational decision making and 
opportunistic behaviour in its formal part. Still, as the reinterpretation of the rational model for 
uncertain ending shows, ignoring behavioural ideas does not come at such high a price as is 
often suggested. 
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Another advantage of this reinterpretation is that it actually enriches the 
model with a further variable. It is not only the discount rate (sometimes very 
aptly called "patience" rate) of one party whose reputation is at stake, which is 
relevant, but also the probability of the relationship's continuity, which is a 
judgement involving the relationship and thus both parties. 
5.3.5 A Multiparty Extension 
A common multiparty interpretation for the models presented is to assume that, in 
the relationship between an employer and his workers, workers live for one period 
but pass their experience on to fellow workers, who will in turn act in the 
following period as if the experience of their colleagues were their own382• 
This can be easily extended to the case where the workers live more than 
one period, but are spreading the news to their fellow workers. This can be 
modelled by adding a growth rate in the spirit of Section 5.3.2., reinforcing the 
reputation effect. 
This is only one step short of assuming that there is a market reputation 
effect. The only difference, indeed, is that it is implicitly assumed in the case of 
the workers that the spreading of news is in some way facilitated by the fact that 
they work within the same organization. This highlights the importance of some 
kind of news-spreading mechanism. 
It can very well be imagined that e.g. in the consultant-client relationship, 
observed shirking or reneging can play a role beyond the original relationship. If 
the project is highly visible, public interest will make sure that judgements are 
spread, possibly by press coverage. If the client or the consultant is very well 
entrenched in business circles, they will also have plenty of opportunity to spread 
around their experience. The mechanisms in place require close scrutiny which is 
probably more a sociological task. From an economic perspective, it can be asked, 
what motivates parties to spread news. The threat to do so can help in contractual 
relationships, but the same threat can be used for blackmailing. Therefore, the 
credibility of such comments is questionable. 
Yet, the point is an important one. Consulting companies insist that their 
business is done very much on recommendation. Therefore, the argument goes, 
concerns for reputation make bonus contracts redundant. It does not, however, 
seem plausible that this argument is true to the same extent for all cases. There 
382 see e.g. Gibbons (2001), p. 9 footnote 6 
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clearly seems to be a difference if the client is a large multinational company or a 
small start-up, if the consultant is a small one person firm or a big international 
consultancy, if the project is highly visible or not. 
5.3.6 Discussion 
First best can be achieved if utilities are not discounted in an infinitely repeated 
version of the basic one period model383 • The intuition behind this argument is that 
players start by cooperating, but if one party starts to defect, they will defect 
forever after. If this is accepted to be the strategy of the players, the dominant 
strategy is to cooperate. The immediate gain from defecting is always 
overcompensated by the loss in later periods. 
The main criticism is that infinite repetition and no discounting are very 
unrealistic assumptions. This argument breaks down as soon as there is an end to 
the game. Then, the dominant strategy in the last period will be to defect. The 
game will unravel backwards. If games are finite, first best cannot be achieved 
because of backward unravelling. 
If there is a discount rate and conclusion of the game is uncertain, first best 
can only be sustained in special cases. In some cases there will also be a second-
best solution. As a general rule, the reputation effects are more likely to sustain 
contracts if the discount rate of the party whose reputation is at stake is low, if the 
judgement of this party attributes a low probability to the scenario that the 
relationship is discontinued, and if the gains of relational trade are high and 
possibly expected to rise. 
The two models discussed above can be seen as complementary: If effort is 
not contractible, but can be observed, reputation concerns of the agent can support 
flat fee contracts based on effort. If this is not possible, parties may switch to 
output-based bonus contracts; but these contracts may not be feasible if output is 
just observable and not contractible. Reputation concerns of the principal may 
solve this problem. This suggests a sequence of analysis: Only if agent reputation 
effects are too low or observability limited will bonus contracts be considered. 
The reputation mechanism may work beyond the original bilateral 
relationship. A "news-spreading mechanism" has to be assumed in these cases. 
Often it is not explicitly modelled. The relevant variables will be project visibility 
and the parties' position and credibility within the relevant community. 
383 see Radner ( 1981) 
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5.4 Career Concerns - Learning 
5.4.1 Introduction 
So far, two different kinds of arguments have been presented: First of all, it was 
shown that time can help to write explicit multi-period contracts which can reduce 
imperfect risk-sharing compared to one-period contracts. 
Then, it was argued in the theory of supergames that reputation concerns 
might allow parties to contract on contingencies which are observable but not 
verifiable. Although an explicit contract would not be enforceable, an implicit 
contract ties observed effort to future pay-offs. Pay-offs will be lower if one party 
defects because the counterparty stops trusting, which reduces the future gains of 
trade. Thus, parties may be able to eschew switching to alternative perfonnance 
measures which induce imperfect risk-sharing or are more distorted. 
Another such implicit contract which ties current effort to future pay-offs is 
described by the model of career concerns. The intuition, as fonnulated by 
Fama384, is that there is no need for explicit contracts, because the market can 
effectively police agents. This is because the agent's career will depend on his 
performance track record. The market monitors past perfonnance and only agents 
who achieve high performance levels will be promoted. So, they will exert effort 
in order to positively affect their career chances. 
This intuition is fonnalized by Holmstrom385 • He shows that Fama's 
conclusion that career concerns can provide efficient incentives will only hold 
under very special assumptions. Major inefficiencies can arise both in the short 
and in the long run. 
The model allows important insights into incentive effects in a setting where 
the market monitors the agent's output in order to learn about his productive 
capabilities. The following propositions will be derived: 
31. It can be seen that incentives are high if the discount rate is low, if the 
precision of the production technology is high, and if the disutility of 
effort does not increase too fast. 
384 Fama (1980) 
385 Holmstrom (1982 reprinted in 1999) model will be presented in the following Section. His 
reasoning will be somewhat adjusted to make it easier for the non-technical reader to 
appreciate the argument. Minor errors of the article are corrected. 
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32. Interpreting the level of incentives in the stationary state, it can be said 
that incentives will never be higher than the efficient level. They will 
always be efficient if the discount rate is zero (13 = 1) . This was Fama's 
result. The result requires that there is some noise in the competence 
process (however small). µ • < 1 • r > 0 • cr~ > 0 . As soon as the 
discount rate is different from zero, incentives will be lower than the 
efficient level. Incentives will be closer to efficiency if the discount 
rate is low, updating of beliefs is fast and utility of effort increases 
slowly. 
33. If precision of beliefs is initially lower than in the stationary state, 
speed of updating is high and therefore incentives are high. As they 
approach the stationary state over time precision increases, speed of 
updating decreases and incentives become lower. The opposite holds 
true if the precision of beliefs is initially higher than in the stationary 
state. In this case, incentives are low in the beginning and become 
higher over time. Therefore, the system is stable. 
5.4.2 The Basic Model 
It is assumed in the model of career concerns that the agent's output in each 
period y, depends on bis effort a,, his productive capability ri and a sequence of 
unrelated shocks e, representing the external factor: 
Y,=ri+a,+e, t=l,2, .. . (12.28) 
where e, is normally distributed with O mean and a variance of cr; . 
e, ~ N( O,cr;) (12.29) 
It is further assumed that both the agent and the principal do not know the 
agent's productive capability. They do, however, share the same prior beliefs. 
These beliefs are represented by an initial assessment m1 of the agent's 
capabilities and the assumed precision of these beliefs h, (which equals the 
inverse of the variance h, = 1 / cr; ). As time proceeds, these beliefs are updated on 
the basis of the agent's performance track record. In the models of signaling and 
screening it is assumed that the agents have private information on their own 
capability. In these cases it will be explored if it is possible to extract information 
from the agents. In the model of career concerns, however, it can be seen that 
information is assumed to be imperfect but symmetric: The agent and the market 
monitor the same normal learning process. 
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The focus here will be to show that, in the described setting, career concerns 
will create incentives in the absence of explicit incentive contracts. This is done 
by creating an indirect link between current effort and future compensation. The 
objective of this model set up by Holmstrom is to formalize the well-known 
argument of Fama, who went so far as to claim that career concerns will make 
explicit incentive contracts redundant by providing efficient incentives costlessly. 
It is therefore central to understand why the agent should believe that his current 
effort would positively effect his future compensation. 
First, the agent's problem is considered. His pay-off in any period t equals 
his compensation c, minus his disutility of effort g1 ( a, ) , which is assumed to be 
an increasing and convex function in effort. 
(12.30) 
where 
g,(a,) > O,g.' (-) > O,g," (·) > 0 (12.31) 
The agent is not only concerned about his current pay-off, but tries to 
choose effort in order to maximize the present value of current and future pay-
offs. It is obvious that this present value does not only depend on the current 
choice of effort, but also on all choices of effort in the future; but future decisions 
cannot be made today, because the information on which they are based is future 
information and therefore not currently available. Therefore, the agent's problem 
is to solve for the optimal decision rule which prescribes in every period t which 
decision a, will be taken contingent on the basis of the information y1_1 , which 
will then be available. This will automatically produce the optimal current choice 
of effort by setting in current information: 
a, =a,(y1-1) (12.32) 
The fact that future information is not available today also implies that the 
agent is faced with a decision under uncertainty. It is assumed that the agent is 
risk-neutral and therefore maximizing expected present value. The optimal 
decision rule is therefore the solution to the following maximization problem: 
a·o E ar~~ax tp1-1 [ Ee, -Eg, ( a,' (Y1-1) )] (12.33) 
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where ~ is the discount factor and a• ( •) is a vector representing the optimal 
decision rule. 
It will now be analysed, what determines compensation. It is assumed that 
the agent faces a competitive risk-neutral market. This implies that his 
compensation equals expected marginal output'86: 
(12.34) 
It follows from the production function (12.28) that the market determines 
compensation by adding expected capability and expected choice of effort. 
(12.35) 
It is obvious from the production function that effort is a substitute for 
capability. Therefore, the whole game played by the agent is to choose effort in 
order to bias the learning process of the market in his favour. But this is 
anticipated by the market. One might think that, because his action cannot be 
observed, asymmetric information will develop over time, but this is not the 
case387 : His maximizing behaviour makes him perfectly predictable if his utility 
function is assumed to be common knowledge, in line with the usual assumptions 
of agency theory. His is trapped. He cannot fool the market, but ifhe did not show 
maximizing behaviour he would bias the learning process against him388 • 
Therefore, expected effort choice in (12.35) equals the agent's optimal decision 
rule: 
(12.36) 
386 Note that the assumption of competitive markets is a short-cut for saying that the agent faces a 
number of principals and that there is competition among these principals, driving their profits 
down to zero. This assumption is not as strong as it seems. Indeed, the market model could be 
replaced by a bargaining model, which would make the argument more complex but would not 
change its insights. So, the zero-profit hypothesis is just a way of holding one party's utility 
constant while maximizing the utility of the other party, which insures Pareto optimality. This 
is in the same spirit as setting agents' utility to their reservation level as was done in other 
instances. 
387 see Gibbons (2001) 
388 Holmstrom (1999) calls this situation a "rat race". 
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It was also mentioned that the market assesses capability on the basis of the 
agent's performance track record. So, assessment m, in period t is a function of 
the assessment at the beginning of the last period t -1, updated by the observed 
outcome at the end of the last period y1_ 1 • As 
(12.37) 
and a,_1 can perfectly be anticipated ( at-1 =a:_,), (12.37) can be written as 
zt-1 =Yt-1 -at-1 =l]+Et-1 (12.38) 
where z, is a sequence of the agent's capability disturbed by an error term. 
Updating the market's beliefs on the agent's capability then occurs by calculating 
the weighted average of the initial belief and the observation. The weights are the 
precision of the initial belief ht-1 and the precision of the observation h,, 
respectively. 
s=l (12.39) 
The market's assessment of the agent's capability becomes ever more 
precise as the learning process continues (precision is increasing int): 
h, =h,_1 +h, =h1 +(t-l)h, (12.40) 
As the agent's maximization problem for finding the optimal decision rule 
depends on compensation (see (12.33)) but compensation in turn depends on the 
optimal decision rule (see (12.35) and (12.36)), there is an interdependence 
between the two decision problems, which means that they have to be solved 
simultaneously. Rewriting (12.33) and inserting (12.39) and (12.36) into (12.35), 
this simultaneous decision problem can be stated as: 
a•(-) e arg~ax f p•-1 [Ee, -Eg, ( a.' (y,_1) )] 
a(·) t=l 
(12.33) 
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C 1 =----'•~=1'--+a,*(y,_1) 
h, 
This is solved by taking expectation of (12.35)'389 
(12.35)' 
Ee,= h1m1 +~ f [ m1 +a, -Ea; (y,_1)]+Ea1• (y,_1) (12.35)" 
h, h, S=I 
and inserting the resulting (12.35)" into (12.33). Then, the first order 
conditions y1 , t = 1,2, ... can be written as390 : 
~ AS-I hE '( ) Y,'==,t,..,P -=g a,. 
s=t+l h, 
(12.41) 
Proposition 31: It can be seen that incentives are high if the discount rate 
is low91, if the precision of the production technology is high392 and if the 
disutility of effort does not increase too fast 
Efficient incentives are characterized by a situation where marginal product 
equals marginal cost: 
g'(a) = I (12.42) 
In the model described so far, equilibrium will be very inefficient: In the 
long run ( t • oo ) it can be seen that there will be no incentives from career 
concerns ( y 1 • 0) as the assessment will become indefinitely precise ( h, • oo ). 
This is an intuitive result: The agent will only have incentives to exert effort from 
career concerns, as long as his capability is not fully known. 
389 See Mathematical Appendix at the end of this Paragraph. 
390 See Mathematical Appendix at the end of this Paragraph. 
391 r-1.-• p t • g'(a)t• a t 
392 h, t • g'(a)t• at 
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h m (h t-1 ) Ee, =E-1 - 1 +E _._ ~), +Ea,•(y,_1) 
h, h, S=l 
hm h t-1 
=-1- 1 +_._ IEz +Ea *(y ) 
b, b, s=l s t H 
(a) 
z, can be written as: 
z, = y, - a, = ri + i::, - a, + a, = Tl+ a, + i::, - a, ( ~ ) 
Inserting ( ~) into (a) gives: 
Footnote 390: 
"' h "' h 
= O+ L ~s-i _._·1+0-g'(a,) = L ~•-< _.__g'(a,) = 0 
s=t+l h, s=t+l h, 
5.4.3 Extension: Adding Innovation 
The situation changes if a plausible assumption is added to the basic model. This 
is by assuming that competence is not invariant over time but is modelled as an 
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autoregressive process. More specifically, it is assumed that this period's 
capability equals last period's capability plus a stochastic shock: 
11, = T],_, + 3,_, (12.43) 
where the sequence of stochastic shocks is driftless with variance cr; : 
(12.44) 
The shocks can be interpreted as reflecting innovation. Innovation changes 
job characteristics. Therefore, someone who was well qualified to do the job in 
the past is not necessarily well qualified to do the job now or in the future. 
Having motivated the noise term in the competence process, it will now be 
analysed which effects this assumption has on incentives. In fact, beliefs are still 
updated by calculating the weighted average of last period's initial beliefs and last 
period's observation, with the precision of the initial beliefs and the precision of 
the observation as weights, respectively: 
where 
m, = µ1_1 m,_, + ( 1-µ1_1) z,_1 
h,_, 




What changes is the way the precision of the belief is assessed. By updating 
the initial belief it will be made more precise. 
h = h1_1 +h, (12.47) 
But the belief refers to last period's capability, which is irrelevant because 
last period's decisions have already been made before updating occurs. What is 
interesting is the current period's assessed capability. Contrary to the basic model, 
it is now assumed that last period's capability does not fully determine present 
capability. It is still the best estimate, which is why beliefs are updated in the 
same ,way. Yet, the precision of the present belief about capability will be lower 
than h because innovation adds uncertainty of whether someone who was capable 
in the past will also be capable at present and in the future. 
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1 1 ha +h,_1 +h. - = +-=--=--..;....a..--"-
h,_1 + h. ha {h,_1 + h.) ha 
(12.48) 
What happens is that first precision is increased by making another 
observation and then decreased by adding the noise ( cr; = 1 /ha) of the 
competence process. Obviously, one can try to solve for a stationary state which is 
defined as the state where decrease of noise due to learning is exactly offset by the 
increase of noise due to innovation. It will later be shown that the stationary state 
actually is a stable equilibrium. 
For technical reasons, the stationary state is calculated in terms of µs, 





In the stationary state the precision does not change anymore from one 
period to the other: 
h* =h, =h,_1 • µ• =µ, =µt-1 (12.50) 
Inserting (12.50) into (12.49) gives: 
• 1 •2 ( ) • µ = • <=> -µ + 2 + r µ -1 = 0 
2+r-µ 
(12.51) 
Solving the quadratic equation gives: 
• 1 F2 µ 112 =1+-r± -r +r 
2 4 
(12.52) 
From (12.45) follows that µ• < 1. Therefore: 
(12.53) 
393 See Mathematical Appendix at the end of this Paragraph. 
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Taking account of the modified learning process: 
(12.54) 
the market's compensation rule can once again be inserted into the agent's 
maximization problem. The first order conditions y, can be written as394 : 
00 s-l 
Y, =(1-µ,) L w-l Ilµi = g'(a,) (12.55) 
s=t+l i=t+l 
In the stationary state, first-order conditions can be further simplified395: 
(1-µ·)p 
r, = 1-pµ· g'(a,) (12.56) 
Proposition 32: Interpreting the level of incentives in the stationary state, 
it can be said, that incentives will never be higher than the efficient level: 
13(1-µ·) = '( .)<1 • g a -1-µ 13 
(12.57) 
They will always be efficient if the discount rate is zero (13 = 1). This was 
Fama's result The result requires that there is some noise in the competence 




As soon as the discount rate is different from zero, incentives will be lower than 
the efficient level Incentives will be closer to efficiency if the discount rate is 
low, updating of beliefs is fast and utility of effort increases slowly. 
394 See Mathematical Appendix at the end of this Paragraph. 
395 See Mathematical Appendix at the end of this Paragraph. 
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Updating is a very intuitive concept. It is the weight (1- µ • ) which is given 
to the most recent observation. Updating will be fast ifµ' is low, which happens if 
the precision of the production process is high relative to the precision of the 
competence process, or equivalently if the competence process is very disturbed 












(t- µ') updating speed 
The level of incentives is shown as a function of the speed of updating for 
different discount rates396• The surprising result is that Fama's prediction of 
efficient incentives becomes true for zero discount rate even at an infinitesimally 
small updating speed (if only a small amount of noise is added to the competence 
process), as was mentioned before. 
396 In this Exhibit, r represents the discount rate (not to be confused with the r in the text which 
refers to relative precision of the output process compared to the competence process). 
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h h µ =--' -= 1+__!,_ 
I h, +h, h, 
(a) 
Inserting (12.48) into (a) gives: 
( )-1 [ ( J]-1 h (h +h +h) h h µ = 1+ • 0 1-1 • = 1+__!,_ 0 +1 
1 (h,_1 + h, )h0 h0 h,_1 + h, + ::((:: + ~:T +1)J' (P) 
Solving (12.46) for h,_1 gives: 
h = h,µ,-1 
,-1 I -µ,_I 
(y) 
Inserting (r) into (P) gives: 
Setting r = h, / h0 gives: 
=---
2+r- µ 1_1 
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Footnote 394: 
1-1 1-1 1-1 
Ec1 =m1I1µi + LE{z.) TT µi {1-µ.)+ Ea1• (µ1-1) 
i=l s,,.l i=s+l 
Setting z. = TJ + a, + i:. - a. , it can be written: 
Inserting in the agent's maximisation problem and taking the derivative 
gives: 
oo s-1 
= O+ L w-l ·l· I1 µj {l-µ1)+0-g'(a1) 
s::;::t+l j""'t+I 
Therefore, the first order condition y1 can be written as: 
t0 s-1 
Yt E {l-µ1) L w-l Ilµi = g'(a1) 
s=t+l i=t+l 
(Readers comparing this result with the original Holmstrom article will note 
that there is a typing error in the original.) 
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Footnote 395: 
Applying the formula of the sum of infinite geometric sequences to the right 
hand side gives: 
Y, = ( 1-µ•) I/3' µ•1-1 = g'(a,) 
l=I 
r, = ( 1 - µ •) ~. [ 1 _ ~µ. - 1] = g' (a,) = ( 1 -µ •) ~. C !;~.) = g' (a,) 
(1-µ·)p , 
Y, = 1- /3µ • = g ( a, ) 
The trick is that, in the stationary state, µ;'s with i ~ T equal µ •. Also note 
the convention that 
5.4.4 Disequilibrium - Transient Effects 
It is important to understand what happens before the stationary state is reached. 
This will be particularly relevant in situations where updating is slow and periods 
are very long. In such a situation, not many "learning loops" are possible in a 
given span of time, the observed signal is bad and competence is very stable over 
time. So, the market tends to stick with its prior beliefs. Here, the stationary state 
might never be reached in the considered period and disequilibrium might be the 
only relevant state. 
The dynamics of incentives are studied by doing comparative statics in the 
first order conditions (12.55) of the agent's maximization problem. It can be seen 
that incentives increase in all periods if updating speed increases ( µ1 decreases )397 • 
The weight µ, is an increasing function of h, as can be seen in (12.46). Therefore, 
as precision of beliefs with respect to capability ( h,) increases, updating becomes 
slower and incentives decrease. 
397 see Holmstrom ( 1999), p. 17 4 for the formal proof by induction 
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As µ 1 is an increasing function of µ,_ 1 as can be seen in (12.49), and there 
is only one stationary state in the relevant interval ( 0, 1) , it can be seen from 
Exhibit 11398 that if last period's speed of updating was higher than in the 
stationary state ( µ1-1 < µ •) - which is equivalent to saying that the precision of 
last period's belief was lower than the precision of beliefs in the stationary state 
( h1-1 < h • ), the speed of updating will decrease ( µ, > µ,_ 1 ) or the precision of 
beliefs will increase ( h, > h1-1 ). This means that the sequence µ, will be 





Exhibit 11: Career Concerns: Incentives in Disequilibrium 





Proposition 33: If precision of beliefs is initially lower than in the 
stationary state, speed of updating is high and therefore incentives are high. As 
they approach the stationary state over time precision increases, speed of 
updating decreases and incentives become lower. The opposite holds true if the 
precision of beliefs is initially higher than in the stationary state. In this case, 
398 Taken with small modification from Holmstrom (I 999), p. 175 
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incentives are low in the beginning and become higher over time. There/ore, the 
system is stable. 
5.4.5 Discussion 
Holmstrom's formalization of Fama's argument shows that, in equilibrium, career 
concerns will provide efficient incentives only under very special conditions. The 
most notable assumption is a zero-discount rate. There also has to be some change 
of job characteristics due to innovation in order to prevent the market from 
eventually fully learning the agent's capability. 
If the discount rate is not zero, incentives will never be efficient in 
equilibrium. They will, however, be close to efficiency if the discount rate is low, 
job characteristics change considerably due to innovation, and the external factor 
in the output process is unimportant. In absolute terms, incentives will also be 
higher if the dis utility of effort rises only slowly. A useful and intuitive concept in 
this context is the speed of updating. In fact, if the noise of the production 
function is low relative to the noise of the competence process, the speed of 
updating will be high, which in tum will make incentive increase since the agent 
knows that higher effort will have an impact. If, however, talent will be expected 
to last forever, once it has been proven and potential signals to the contrary are 
very unreliable, one will stick to the prior belief. 
Therefore, if the discount rate is low and updating fast, there will be fairly 
high incentives to perform in equilibrium. The intuitive idea is that reputation is 
not worth so much, or high reputation has to be reproven very often. In this 
situation, career concerns solve the shirking problem. Conversely, if the discount 
rate is high (the agent does not care about the future) and updating is slow, there 
will be low incentives in the steady state. 
In some situations, incentives in disequilibrium will be very important. This 
is especially true in cases where updating is slow and the frequency of observation 
is low (due to a long production process). Incentives will be initially high if the 
precision of the initial belief is thought to be higher in later periods. Incentives 
will be initially low if the precision of the initial belief is thought to be lower in 
later periods. The first case will be true in most cases. In the beginning, not much 
is known about the agent. Therefore, beliefs will be relatively imprecise. 
In a situation where the noise of the production function is high relative to 
noise of the competence process, which is equivalent to a situation where there is 
little change of job characteristics due to innovations, and observation of output is 
only a very bad signal due to an important external factor, it was said that 
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updating will be slow and incentives will be much too low in equilibrium. If there 
is low initial precision it was also said that incentives will be much too high in the 
beginning. This situation will persist for quite some time as the speed of updating 
is low. Therefore, an agent working in an industry where job characteristics are 
not expected to change much and the external factor is very important, as might 
be expected for many service industries, will get very inefficient incentives from 
career concerns. 
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It was shown in Section (IV2.l) that, if effort is not contractible, compensation 
shall be made contingent on output. It was also shown that, in this case, welfare 
levels can never be higher than in the case of observable effort. Barring the 
unrealistic cases of a deterministic production function and risk neutrality of both 
the principal and the agent, the optimal compensation scheme leads to a welfare 
loss due to imperfect risk sharing. 
Section (IV2.2) derives a closed-form solution which negatively links the 
use of variable fee contracts to the agent's level of risk aversion, the level of 
project risk and the convexity of the disutility function. The weakness of this 
model is its lack of generality and its unrealistic assumptions as e.g. the constant 
absolute risk averseness of the agent's preferences. Especially the linear sharing 
rule seems to be completely arbitrary. 
So far, it has been argued that variable fees may provide useful incentives in 
situations of hidden action, but also create imperfect risk sharing. Quite apart from 
any other consideration, Section (IV2.3) looks closer at the mechanics of risk 
sharing: In the traditional agency models, the principal is always assumed to be 
risk-neutral, while the agent is assumed to be risk-averse or risk-neutral. This need 
not be the case. The assumption that the principal is risk-neutral is often justified 
by the argument that he is the economically more potent party to the contract. 
This is largely inspired by the traditional story behind principal-agency models 
referring to the relationship between a company and its employees. There are 
several arguments why the economically more potent party should be less risk-
averse: First, it is often plausible to assume that as a person becomes wealthier his 
absolute level of risk aversion decreases. Second, if the company is held by an 
entrepreneur he might be the less risk-averse type of person in the first place. In 
addition, employees usually only work for one company, while the owner might 
hold many different companies. So, he is probably better diversified. This last 
point is especially true for publicly held companies. However,ut in the case of a 
client and his consultant, things can be different. The small consultant partnership 
is clearly more risk-averse than its multinational client, but this changes if the big 
international consultancy firm provides services to a small start-up company 
through its incubator branch. Clearly, in the setting analysed so far - the case 
where, say, the principal is risk-averse and the agent risk-neutral - does not appear 
to be problematic as optimal incentive provision and optimal risk sharing are 
compatible. But what ifthere is a bilateral moral hazard problem? To answer this 
and other questions, one has to look at risk sharing in its own right. Two separate 
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sources of value creation by risk sharing are explored: differences in risk 
attitudes which might arise from predisposition or different levels of wealth, and 
differences in diversification. The result of this Section highlights the parties' 
level of risk tolerance (both absolute and relative to each other), the specific 
quality of the risk involved as determined by its correlation with existing risk 
exposure and the level of project risk as relevant factors of optimal risk sharing. If 
a risk-neutral party is involved it carries all the risk. The sharing rule is 
independent in each state of the probability assigned to that state. Finally, the 
risky part of each party's compensation is proportional to its own risk tolerance 
divided by the overall risk tolerance of society, if the parties' preferences over 
lotteries exhibit constant risk aversion (which can be assumed locally). 
In Section (IV2.4), a control theory model is set up to determine the optimal 
sharing rule. It is possible to reprove some of the results of earlier sections. If 
effort is contractible, flat fee contracts will be used. If it is not contractible it will 
depend on output. However, contrary to earlier results, it is also possible to shed 
some light on the mechanics of the optimal sharing rule. Compensation depends 
on output through the likelihood ratio. There are two implications: The optimal 
sharing rule can be understood quite intuitively as rewarding the agent if the 
signal makes it likely that high effort was chosen, but it also explains why little 
general constraints can be derived for the shape of the optimal sharing rule: It is 
very sensitive to specifications of utility functions and distributional assumptions. 
Although the optimal contract can only be derived to be linear under awkwardly 
improbable assumptions, there are a number of reasons explaining the practical 
prominence of such contracts. First, there is the transaction cost argument. Setting 
up complex contracts is just too expensive. Second, linear contracts are argued to 
be relatively robust for a large number of settings. But also non-distributional 
assumptions like the number of different options available to the agent affects the 
optimal incentive scheme. So, paradoxically, there are reasons to believe that 
adding complexity makes contracts simpler. It is also shown that information is 
only valuable if it affects posterior assessment of the effort level chosen. It must 
therefore be related to effort choice, but it must also be impossible to perfectly 
infer the information - to the extent that it is relevant to this assessment - from 
information of variables already included into the contract. 
A common assumption is that there is a comparative cost advantage of 
output monitoring compared to input monitoring. Why should this be the case? In 
order to implement input monitoring, the principal has to watch the agent while 
performing the required task. This causes opportunity costs to the principal. Still 
worse, if the principal does not know the production function of the agent he may 
well watch the agent while performing a task but will be unable to interpret his 
actions as to whether they are instrumental in achieving the required output. 
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These costs are amplified by the fact that usually the very motivation to hire an 
agent in the first place was that the principal either did not want or could not 
perform the task himself. So, either the principal has something else to do, which 
means that his opportunity costs are high, or the performance of the task requires 
specialized knowledge that the principal does not possess. The latter case does 
make it difficult for the principal to monitor the agent effectively. Alternatively, 
the principal could hire other qualified agents to do the monitoring for him, but 
then it may be difficult to prevent these monitoring agents from colluding with the 
operative agents. For all these reasons, input monitoring is likely to be very costly 
in many circumstances. On the other hand, output monitoring should be very 
easy. One only has to look to which extent the required result was achieved 
providing that it can be properly defined. So, if a client hires a consultant to 
perform a cost cutting project, it will be much easier for the client to evaluate how 
much cost was reduced than to interpret the wide variety of single measures the 
consultant takes to achieve his goal. Having clearly established the intuition for 
comparative cost advantage of output monitoring compared to input monitoring in 
a wide variety of situations, it may come as a surprise that input monitoring can 
theoretically infinitely approximate first best. This is because the agent, in his 
decision whether to cheat or not, will weigh the benefits of cheating (in the case of 
shirking reduced disutility of effort) against the expected value of punishment. 
Therefore, if harsh enough punishments are announced, the probability of 
detection and therefore the number and thoroughness of inspection can be 
infinitely reduced. In this case, there seems no rationale for output monitoring. 
If it is not cheaper, it will only provide an additional drawback: imperfect risk 
sharing. The traditional argument is that input monitoring always establishes 
the truth while output monitoring is prone to error. This is a crucial point, 
because the driving force behind imperfect risk sharing in output monitoring is 
the possibility of error in judgement and the subsequent punishment of the 
innocent. If it can be shown that output monitoring can achieve perfect accuracy 
or input monitoring is prone to error as well, this distinction breaks down. In fact, 
both can be shown to be plausible assumptions in some circumstances: Output 
monitoring will be perfectly accurate in the case of deterministic production 
functions but also if there is shifting support399. Indeed the argument of Mirrlees 
on step-functions is in the same spirit. On the other hand, it seems implausible to 
assume that input monitoring will be able to prove cheating at I 00%. There will 
always be judgement, inferences, circumstantial evidence. Whatever the process, 
there is a chance of error. Therefore, the above assumption needs to be relaxed to 
allow for error in input monitoring. These arguments appear construed, and in 
fact they are. In general, input monitoring will be more costly and output 
399 see next Section 
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monitoring more prone to error. Ignoring these arguments therefore seems to be a 
justified abstraction, but there still is some merit to taking them seriously. In brief, 
they say that regardless of whether one is looking at input monitoring or at output 
monitoring there are two relevant issues: Error in judgement and cost of 
monitoring, and that under some circumstances both schemes fare equally well or 
bad on these two dimensions. By acknowledging that there generally is a 
distinction between input monitoring and output monitoring, one is actually 
saying that these circumstances will rarely be present. Understanding why this is 
the case helps to identify other relevant situational variables which influence the 
problem of optimal contracting. 
Chapter (IV3) discusses the role of the bankruptcy constraints and the 
role of error in the monitoring process. Section (IV3. l) shows that input 
monitoring can approximate first best even if it comes at a cost if there are no 
bankruptcy constraints and no possibility of error in judgement. If there is a 
bankruptcy constraint there will be welfare loss, because of direct monitoring cost 
and possibly efficiency wages or complete uncontractability (no trade). The 
phenomenon of efficiency wages can be understood by realizing that, for purposes 
of incentive, provision differentials in agent pay utility, and not absolute pay 
levels, are relevant. Therefore, in the absence of error in judgement, increasing 
agent risk averseness even helps to set up cheap incentive schemes. Yet, if error in 
judgement is permitted, problems of imperfect risk-sharing arise, requiring the 
simultaneous minimization of the cost arising from investment in the monitoring 
technology, the frequency of inspections and the risk-premium. 
Just as input monitoring can have a problem of imperfect risk sharing due to 
pitfalls in the monitoring process, there are situations where output monitoring 
is perfectly accurate and can achieve first best beyond the obvious case of a 
deterministic production function. This will be the case for shifting support 
schemes, but Section (IV3.2) shows that such schemes are often unrealistic 
because of bankruptcy constraints (legal, moral, economic) and the problem of 
fine tuning. Another problem is moral hazard with respect to risk which arises 
in output monitoring schemes in the presence of bankruptcy constraints which 
make incentive schemes de facto asymmetrical, limiting the downside. The agent 
will have the incentive to choose very risky projects even if they have a lower 
expected value than alternative projects (this can be thought of as a call option). 
Section (IV 4.1) mentions direct transaction costs which arise for input 
monitoring and for output monitoring, though it will often be plausible that they 
are lower for output monitoring. However, there are also indirect transaction 
costs which arise from provisions which designed to lower direct transaction 
costs. The goal is to rationalize monitoring or to directly influence the agent's 
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disutility function. This leads to inefficiencies because production technology is 
prescribed from top to bottom in a way that is known to be inefficient. In addition, 
innovation from bottom to top is stifled. This is a distortive effect. 
Section (IV4.2) deals with distortion. Distortion arises if there is tension 
between what the principal wants and what the agent is rewarded for. Often it is 
not possible to eliminate this tension. What the principal wants just might not be 
contractible. As was shown in this subsection, distortion can be divided into two 
components: scaling and alignment. Scaling refers to the relative sensitivity of the 
two measures to changes in the drivers and alignment to the similarity of driver 
patterns. If a university rewards a scientist (by promotion, or resources) by the 
number of published articles during a certain period of time ( driver), there will be 
a problem of alignment if the university cares about both quantity and quality. 
Indeed, the researcher would have the incentive to publish many of articles in low 
quality journals. If no ranking of journals to account for quality is available, 
rewards should not depend too much on the number of published articles. Now, 
considering different departments it could be that a typical researcher in, say, 
marketing has 5 times as many publications than a typical researcher in, say, 
mathematics. If the basis for the bonus is the number of published articles, a 
scaling argument suggests the bonus rate for marketing researchers to be one-fifth 
of the bonus rate for mathematicians. It is obvious that there is a conflict with the 
risk-incentive trade-off. This model suggests that the bonus rate should be high if 
the observed variable is relatively undisturbed400• This will be the case for 
parameters close to the agent. These, however, will be the most distorted, 
suggesting that the bonus rate should be low. This is consistent with the 
observation that variable compensation is used more often for top managers than 
for middle managers. For top managers, undistorted incentives (the share price) 
happen to correspond with their direct responsibility for the whole company. For 
middle managers, however, incentives are either distorted if they depend on the 
individual performance of the department (failing to take into account that it is 
important to cooperate among departments for the benefit of the company as a 
whole), or too disturbed, as the share price depends on many factors beyond the 
reach of the middle manager. 
The basic problem of contracting is to find the best contract parameters or 
the best mix of contract parameters. Multi-period models do not solve the 
contracting problem costlessly as is sometimes claimed, but rather add 
predictions as to which contract parameters should enter the contract given the 
situational setting. It could well be that parties have to decide whether they want 
400 see Proposition 4 
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to contract on an input or an output parameter. They predict that using the input 
variable will lead to considerable monitoring costs, distortion and enforcement 
problems. They will therefore consider output contracting, but as the agent is very 
risk-averse they will abandon this alternative and ultimately decide to contract on 
the input variable. In multi-period settings this might change, as is discussed in 
Section (IV5.2), because the law of large numbers filters out uncertainty, 
reducing the problem of imperfect risk sharing. Therefore, multi-period 
contracting could become an attractive alternative. The model also stipulates 
situational conditions where this will work. First of all, there has to be a 
possibility to conclude long-term contracts. Therefore, the business relationship 
must be such that similar projects will repeatedly arise. In this case, long-term 
contracts will still be less flexible than a sequence of short-term contracts. 
Therefore, the question is how important flexibility is or how predictable the 
future will be. Moreover, it will be more expensive to write long-term contracts 
compared to short-term contracts. Therefore, increased transaction cost becomes 
an issue. Finally, parties will value long-term contracts only if there are saving 
and borrowing constraints for the agent outside the primary principal-agent 
relationship. This might plausibly be the case for informational reasons. 
Therefore, if time is built into an explicit long-term contract it is possible to 
reduce the cost of incentives by reducing imperfect risk sharing of output-based 
contracts. 
It has already been argued that contractibility presupposes the knowledge of 
the production function, observability and verifiability. An especially interesting 
case is discussed in Section (IV5.3) where parties can observe a performance 
measure that will not be verifiable by a third party such as a court. There are 
certain situations where a self-enforcing mechanism, also referred to as an implicit 
contract, exists, sustaining a contract based on such subjective performance 
measures. The fundamental reasoning for these mechanisms is that if one of the 
parties makes a promise, it must be able to commit to this promise. Otherwise, the 
promise is worthless and cannot create incentives. In other words, it must be clear 
that at the moment when the party will have to make good on its promise it must 
be in its interest to do so. Otherwise, it can hold up the other party. Thus, the 
centre of interest is the decision rule of the party. Consider, for instance, a 
situation where effort is observable but cannot be objectively verified. The 
principal cannot commit to paying a bonus contingent on effort because it will 
always be in his interest to renege later. So, maybe he commits on something else 
that constrains his future action space in such a way that it will be in his interest to 
make good on his promise. The tournament mechanism is a case in point. The 
principal facing many agents commits on the total amount of bonuses paid out. By 
taking away the option of saving money by reneging, he can also credibly commit 
to paying the bonus as promised if only an infinitesimal preference for honesty is 
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assumed. Also, long-term relationships are actually able to create circumstances in 
which parties find it easier to commit. The basic intuition is simple: If one party 
has experienced that the other party acted opportunistically, it will stop doing 
business with this party. However, if the other party values the ongoing trade 
relationship, it will, anticipating this decision, not let its business partner down in 
the first place. It was therefore argued that long-term relationships can in some 
circumstances support contracts that may otherwise not be feasible by reputation 
effects created between the parties. This is the case in a situation where one would 
like to contract on an input parameter but effort is not contractible as it cannot be 
objectively verified. Or, alternatively, one would like to contract on an output 
parameter but the principal cannot commit on promised bonus because it is not 
verifiable. In these situations a reputation effect can sustain these contracts if the 
trade relationship is valuable and likely to increase in value, the time horizon of 
the parties will not be short-term (low discount rate), the expected probability of 
the relationship ending is low, and the bargaining power of the agent is not too 
low. Moreover, the project's visibility and the parties' entrenchment in business 
circles also will play a role. 
In Section (IVS.4) a situation is considered where the input parameter is not 
observable, but one can act as if it were contractible because of an implicit 
contract. This is because the agent's "career" will depend on his performance 
track record. The market monitors past performance and only agents who achieve 
high performance levels will be promoted. So, they will exert effort in order to 
positively affect their career chances. In such a case one would not be forced to 
change to output contracting, which might be very expensive. If the discount rate 
is not zero, incentives will never be efficient in equilibrium. They will, however, 
be close to efficiency if the discount rate is low, job characteristics change 
considerably due to innovation, and the external factor in the output process is 
unimportant. In absolute terms, incentives will be also higher if the disutility of 
effort only rises slowly. A useful and intuitive concept in this context is the speed 
of updating. In fact, if the noise of the production function is low relative to the 
noise of the competence process, the speed of updating will be high, which in tum 
will make incentive increase, because the agent knows that higher effort will have 
an impact. If, however, talent will be expected to last forever, once it has been 
proven and potential signals to the contrary are very unreliable, one will stick to 
the prior belief. Therefore, if the discount rate is low and updating fast, there will 
be fairly high incentives to perform in equilibrium. The intuitive idea is that 
reputation is not worth so much, or high reputation has to be reproved very often. 
In this situation, career concerns solve the shirking problem. Conversely, if the 
discount rate is high (the agent does not care about the future) and updating is 
slow, there will be low incentives in the steady state. In some situations, 
incentives in disequilibrium will be very important. This is especially true in 
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cases where updating is slow and the frequency of observation is low ( due to a 
long production process). Incentives will be initially high if the precision of the 
initial belief is thought to be higher in later periods. Incentives will initially be 
low if the precision of the initial belief is thought to be lower in later periods. The 
first case will be true in most cases. In the beginning, not much is known about 
the agent. Therefore, beliefs will be relatively imprecise. In a situation where 
noise of the production function is high relative to the noise of the competence 
process, which is equivalent to a situation where there is little change of job 
characteristics due to innovations, and observation of output is only a very bad 
signal due to an important external factor, it was said that updating will be slow 
and incentives will be much too low in equilibrium. If there is low initial precision 
it was also said that incentives will be much too high in the beginning. This 
situation will persist for quite some time as the speed of updating is low. 
Therefore, an agent working in an industry where job characteristics are not 
expected to change much and the external factor is very important, as might be 
expected for many service industries, will get very inefficient incentives from 
career concerns. Situations relevant for the viability of such an implicit contract 
will therefore be the agent's time horizon, the role of the external factor in the 
production process, the amount of innovation in the relevant industry, the duration 
of projects, the precision of initial beliefs concerning the talent of the agent, the 
market's capability to monitor the agent's track record. The thesis that time can 
solve incentive problems costlessly cannot be generally upheld. It was shown that 
this will only be the case under very unrealistic circumstances like zero discount 
rate and infinite repetition. Yet, the important insight from Chapter (IV 5) is that 
the conclusions from the one-period models are not necessarily valid in the multi-
period settings. The optimal contract in the one-shot relationship will be different 
from the optimal contract in multi-period relationships. 
1.2 Checklist 
Given the complexity of contract theoretic models, it would be tempting to 
develop tools which allow the practitioner to apply the insights of contract theory 
without bothering too much about the underlying models. There are, however, two 
obstacles to such an approach that were already mentioned. First, no recipe or 
scorecard to solve for the optimal contract can be given as the final step of 
application requires qualitative judgement close to the specific problem. Second, 
even if it is possible to give a checklist of factors which are relevant to the 
contracting problem, it is probably difficult to apply the checklist without having 
understood at least the general thrust of the models they are derived from. In the 
following, such a checklist of all the identified relevant factors shall nevertheless 
be given. 
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l. Production technology and monitoring technology: The production and 
monitoring technologies determine the quality of the signal that can be used 
in output monitoring and input monitoring, respectively. It can be 
deterministic or stochastic (relevant for error in judgement but also for 
implicit contract based on learning process). If it is stochastic, it can be 
more or less so (project risk may be higher or lower). Furthermore, the 
production technology can be known or unknown to the parties. Besides 
output there may be other signals of effort. If there are many available 
signals it is important to understand how these signals depend on each other 
in order to decide which mix of signals should enter the optimal contract 
(there is no use to incur the cost to monitor signals which contain no 
additional information). 
2. Inefficiency of prescribed production technology: The principal might 
prescribe a production technology which is easy to monitor but inefficient 
(the prescription itself stifles innovation from bottom to top). 
3. Direct monitoring cost: Effort may be readily contractible at low cost. In 
other situations, it can only be contracted if a very high-cost input 
monitoring scheme is put in place. Not only input monitoring but also 
output monitoring may cause such extra transaction costs, though they will 
usually be lower: Required output has to be defined and provisions have to 
be made to record output thus defined, sometimes resulting in extra 
accounting expenses. Monitoring cost will depend on legal and 
technological possibilities. 
4. Definition of what is wanted and of what is measured and the divergence 
between the two: lfthere is a divergence this may lead to distortion. 
5. Quality of the courts or other third party enforcement facilities: The 
quality of the courts can be thought of as the extent of potential contract 
parameters, which the court can verify, and the cost of doing so. 
6. Risk attitudes of the agent and the principal: Both can be risk-neutral and 
risk-averse. If both are risk-averse, it is relevant to know the relative 
strength of risk averseness of one party compared to the other, but also the 
combined absolute level of risk averseness of both parties. 
7. Properties of the two parties' portfolios with respect to the project: In 
particular, the relative strength of diversification effects within the 
respective portfolios if the project is added. 
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8. The shape of the function specifying disutility of labour and the possibilities 
to influence it. 
9. The assumptions about the projects outcome: The shape of the optimal 
incentive scheme depends on the distributional assumptions. For some 
projects a normal distribution or a lognormal distribution will be adequate. 
For others, there will be e.g. just two outcomes. Still others will have a 
bimodal distribution (if either very high or very low outcome is likely). 
Generally speaking, any distribution of outcome can be imagined depending 
on the specific circumstances. 
IO. The precision of assumptions made: Some schemes may require very 
accurate information with respect to parties' risk preferences and the 
distribution of the project's outcome (e.g. step function schemes). 
11. The action space of the parties: The question is whether all relevant 
actions available to the parties are captured in the model. If e.g. parties can 
observe their performance in the process of performance, the issue of path-
dependency of incentives arises. 
12. The bankruptcy constraint: The amount of loss that a party can absorb, 
which may be limited by legal, economic and moral constraints. 
13. The scope of cheating: The absolute extent of the benefit that the agent can 
appropriate by using his informational advantage. 
14. Time horizon: How long will the relationship last? Is there a definite 
ending? What is the probability of the relationship after each trade ending? 
15. The presence of borrowing constraints: If there is a sequence of separable 
projects, imperfect risk-sharing can be solved by borrowing or by dissaving 
if outcome is low, and saving if outcome is high. 
16. Potential gains of trade: The utility that can be created if the trade can take 
place. 
17. The patience of the parties: Extent to which parties value present 
payments over future payments. 
18. Expected growth rate of the value of the relationship over time: Is the 
relationship of the two parties expected to bring ever more utility to the 
parties each time it is repeated? 
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19. The relative bargaining power of the parties: How are gains of trade 
divided between the two parties? 
20. Innovation: The extent to which job characteristics change and therefore 
the extent to which it is possible to infer from past to present and future 
talent. Innovation will arguably be lower for a lawyer than for a software 
developer. 
21. Precision of prior beliefs about capability: The extent to which a party 
considers its prior assessment to be precise as opposed to ambiguous. 
1.3 Outlook 
Traditionally, economists specializing in contract theory advise government 
regulation authorities or appear as expert witnesses in competition lawsuits if they 
have a practical interest at all. This is surely a very important field of application. 
The objective to help individuals, companies and lawyers to design better 
contracts and organizations in the course of their business is relatively less 
prominent. 
There is a reason for that. It was already discussed that it is questionable 
whether contract theory can actually provide any added value in this field. It could 
be argued that most of what it has to say is already known by lawyers and 
practitioners of other fields. The underlying argument is that contracts and 
institutions are the product of evolution and that they survived because they 
proved to be successful in the past. Especially in very stable settings, it is difficult 
to imagine that something which was used and tested in a myriad of situations for 
decades or even centuries (like basic contract types of civil law) should be 
fundamentally flawed. Claiming such a thing would indeed be an example of the 
most naive form of rationalist hubris. 
Still, it was argued that there is some scope for rational construction. The 
analytical approach provides the notions necessary to analyse complex 
phenomena. It helps to understand that what drives the success of established 
institutions, to classify and describe institutional phenomena and to teach and 
communicate about what happens in institutions; but beyond that it would not 
have much practical relevance in improving existing contracts. It may, however, 
be speculated that this argument does not apply in situations which are relatively 
new. Explicit knowledge is unimportant for doing routine business, but as soon as 
a new situation arises there is an advantage of turning implicit knowledge into 
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explicit knowledge. This facilitates thinking about these new challenges and 
making use of past experience by means of recombination401 • 
Moreover, even if some features of the underlying problem of contracting 
like information asymmetry and uncertainty will always be the same, the pace of 
institutional change has arguably increased at a time of rapid technological 
innovation and an increasingly deregulated and globalized economy. Deregulation 
allows for new kinds of labour contracts, financial innovation and increased 
global competition increasing the action space of individual agents. The 
revolution in communication technology led to innovations in transactions (peer-
to-peer online auctions, e-commerce). Global competition leads to an increased 
need for flexible and unorthodox transnational company alliances, but also 
cultural change affects contracting: The decline of moral institutions402, but also 
the break-up of cosy national clubs where a renegade agent could easily be 
punished by social sanctioning changes the way contracts can be enforced. 
On a fundamental level, it could be questioned if adaptation to change 
should not be left to decentralized spontaneous order. In a provocative way one 
could ask if the rationalist who was ousted as the great central planner should 
have a comeback as an advisor of individual agents. In other words, even if 
evolution did not have a chance, it may still be better to proceed by trial-and-error 
than by trying to save time by taking a short-cut using analytical models. This is 
not the view of the author. Still, it has to be acknowledged that economic contract 
theory still has to undergo much more of a market test. It is the ability of such 
theories to explain existing institutions and the extent to which it is possible to 
convince practitioners of the value and the additional insight provided by this 
approach which validates these modes much more than any econometric test. It is 
in this respect that contract theory still has a long way to go. 
Of course, some examples were mentioned in the text. The predictions of 
contract theory seem to fit quite well with certain institutional phenomena. Yet, it 
is far from playing a role as a framework for setting up real world contracts. 
Economists routinely complain about the fact that lawyers apparently do not care 
about what economists have to say, but the experience of the author suggests 
otherwise. Lawyers and managers are very interested in the promise of contract 
401 This is actually the method of analysis-synthesis. 
402 If everybody believed in divine justice this would be a very elegant way to solve the problem 
of moral hazard. But it is hard to believe that this mechanism ever worked effectively. 
Historically, it seems that it worked to some extent to suppress the lower classes, but even at 
the time failed to convince the estate manager to be honest towards the absentee noble 
landowner. 
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theory but soon get frustrated when they see what they think is considerable 
analytical complication for relatively meagre results. This is partly to blame on 
the mathematical illiteracy of most lawyers, or conversely the unwillingness of 
economists to "translate" their findings into common language, but there are still 
other problems: As was already mentioned in the introduction, there is the 
obsession of many economists with modeling single effects rather than dealing 
with concrete problems. Some effects are certainly more important than others, 
but in order to decide which effect is important and what can safely be ignored, 
one must see the whole picture. While there may be some importance in modeling 
small effects, there is certainly an imbalance between modeling such effects and 
summarizing, describing and applying them. It was also argued in the 
methodological part that analytical models can very fruitfully be used to derive 
qualitative results but that casuistic work should be used for the applications, 
leaving out the intractible middle ground; but the wrong conclusion for an 
economist would be to stop when analysis ends and informed judgement begins. 
This could be justified by citing separation of labour, saying that the development 
of applications can be done by others. The truth is, however, that nobody is 
waiting on the other side of this unilaterally defined interface. The fact that 
applications require judgement and are no longer analytically tractable or can be 
accessed by econometrics does not mean that they are any less "scientific". 
Indeed, they are a very important part of the argument. 
The following research programme is therefore proposed: First the 
analytical contract theoretical models should be summarized and systematically 
arranged. This should be done in a way that makes it possible for readers to treat 
these models largely as black box models. Then, much of casuistic work should 
be done in order to apply the models, mindful of the act that this application is 
nothing mechanical but rather an integral part of problem solving. Such casuistic 
work would not only display best practice of problem solving and be a good way 
of communication and teaching, but also enrich the model by helping to 
understand phenomena which evolved over time. In addition, translation into 
specific contexts allows submitting contract theory to a market test which is 
arguably the best empirical corroboration available for contract theory. A 
particularly interesting avenue for future research would be not just to analyse 
codified civil law but also model-contract collections of law firms and 
organizational solutions within companies. 
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